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The field of innovation studies is both very recent and constituted through a 
variety of disciplines. It has become one of the dominant discourses of the modern 
research university driving reforms, the changing relationship of the university to 
the knowledge economy and international rankings of institutions. This thesis 
reviews these literatures and their implications for a student-centred view. 
Specifically, the thesis examines the literature of innovation in economics, 
reviewing and analysing the work of three selected theorists – List, Schumpeter, 
and Lundvall – and the figure of the innovator as entrepreneur. The predominant 
economic understanding of innovation treats the process of innovation as a black 
box and neoliberalism views innovation as a means of increasing productivity, 
largely ignoring the student's contribution. This thesis argues that students’ 
capacity for innovation, which is already present in their subjectivities as tacit 
knowledge is enhanced through the use open architectures and digital platforms 
that becomes the basis for social innovation as a form of collective intelligence in 
higher education. This new model of open and social innovation is a very different 
notion to the standard economic view, bringing to the fore the ethics of 
collaboration in the service of peer and co-production that is more suited to the 
digital age of social media.  
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The thesis argument begins from the premise that, instead of ignoring the tacit 
knowledge of innovation that students express in their already formed innovative 
subjectivities, this tacit knowledge and these innovative subjectivities should be 
embraced to the benefit of institutional processes of ideation. To this effect, it is 
argued innovative students have something to offer institutional innovation – not 
in the aspect of institutional productivity but in how the institution addresses the 
problems of the world that Education1 supposes students engage in their learning. 
This is the task and responsibility of the politics of education: to not just focus 
innovation on increasing the performativity of the operations of service provision 
but also to understand how student ideation in a learning economy contributes to a 
much broader concept of what qua innovation is and what change and novelty 
comprise. 
 In taking this perspective on the role of student innovation, the possible 
role of students in institutional processes of ideation, in how the ethics of 
collaboration inform the capacity to co-produce across networked information 
economies and the formation of collective intelligence that these developments 
produce all suppose a new theoretical understanding of innovation. This 
development is already fore-grounded by thinkers outside the education sector. 
However, in the education sector itself there needs to be a break from reliance on 
the tyranny of human capital creation and this needs to be done without breaking 
completely with the idea of formal learning in the educational institution. By 
focusing the thesis on the paradoxical situation of the already innovative student, 
it will be argued that embracing the significance of this subject’s approach to the 
need for change and novelty in their learning will in itself transform and reorient 
Education towards the collective tasks that students face in the digital age.  
 Johnson (2010) is one such author who is working outside the immediate 
field of innovation studies and education, and whose thinking on innovation 
extends beyond the mere commercial interpretation of what change and novelty 
                                                 
1 Education will be capitalized throughout whenever the discussion needs to refer to education 
being inclusive of all related interests and their stakeholders. Otherwise it will be spoken about 
more specifically, for example, the politics of education, in which case it will not be capitalized.  
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refer to. He has the following to say on how innovation needs to put within a 
broader perspective: 
Every economics textbook will tell you that competition 
between rival firms leads to innovation in their products and 
services. But when you look at innovation from the long-zoom 
perspective, competition turns out to be less central to the 
history of good ideas that we generally think. Analyzing 
innovation on the scale of individuals and organizations – as the 
standard textbooks do – distorts our view. It creates a picture of 
innovation that overstates the role of proprietary research and 
“survival of the fittest” competition. The long-zoom approach 
lets us see that openness and connectivity may, in the end, be 
more valuable to innovation that purely competitive 
mechanisms. Those patterns of innovation deserve recognition – 
in part because it’s intrinsically important to understand why 
good ideas emerge historically, and in part because by 
embracing these patterns we can build environments that do a 
better job of nurturing good ideas, whether those environments 
are schools, governments, software platforms, poetry seminars, 
or social movements. We can think more creatively if we open 
our minds to the many connected environments that make 
creativity possible. (p. 21) 
Speaking of innovation in this way and by using the metaphor of a long-zoom 
perspective, Johnson (2010) highlights how privileging the object of innovation 
(product or service) over the innovation the process depreciates the role of 
collective thought in the realization of new ideas and their contribution to 
innovation. What is important is not so much the fact that the process of 
innovation does not warrant equivalent status but that this depreciation of the 
process of innovation negates the participation of innovative actors and their 
contributions to its realization. Such an approach to innovation, where the 
exclusive focus is on ends, may work well for the educational institution, in that it 
allows the institution to separate the function of its commercial operations from 
the function of its service (the provision of education). Furthermore, participation 
by students and teachers in institutional innovative processes, played out in the 
provision of education as a service, has the effect of empowering the commercial 
operations of the institution.  
However, the initiation of actions that realize institutional innovations can 
be restricted to commercial management – those who manage commercial 
operations. This means that while students and teachers populate the 
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implementation and reception of the provision of teaching and learning, the 
actions that produce benefits to the institution actually occur in a domain of power 
relations that sits outside the realm of teacher and student participation.2 From 
such a long-zoom perspective, it is possible to speak of how the institution 
delineates public and private goods within its overall production function while 
being inclusive of students and teachers in the development of the institution’s 
profile as a service provider. 
 
This introductory chapter will follow the following structure. It will begin with an 
explanation of the topic, which will be followed by an explanation of what is 
meant in taking a philosophical perspective in relation to this topic. An account 
will be provided of the manner in which the philosophical canon will be engaged 
and then there will be a series of explanations of how the key concepts that make 
up this philosophical perspective are analysed. This will lead into an explanation 
of the theoretical framework and its key components: experimentation, genealogy 
and post-Cartesian thinking. Following this explanation, there will be a 
description of the literature engaged and the approach taken in this engagement. 
Finally, there will be an exposition of the structure of the thesis in accordance 
with the development of the argument.  
 
An investigation of the role of innovation in Education could have been done 
from various perspectives with an interest in a range of objects including: the 
institution as a quasi-commercial enterprise, new pedagogies, administrative 
practices, digital governance, new curriculum developments, business and 
education policy, the evolution of the role of the teacher, new technologies used in 
learning and teaching, Research and Development (R&D), non-Government 
Organizations (NGO) and their interest in innovation in Education, the politics of 
innovation and research funding, futuristic learning spaces, to name a few.3 These 
are all objects of research that might be considered to require viewing thought a 
close-up zoom perspective. In keeping with an interest in how new ideas might 
                                                 
2 The actions that benefit the institution can be thought of as falling under the following categories: 
increases in ranking, increases in foreign student numbers and the securing of new funding 
streams. 
3 Futuristic learning spaces refer here to “innovative learning spaces”, “modern learning spaces”, 
and “flexible learning spaces”. 
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better inform the creation of an understanding of how educational institutions 
might be more endogenously innovative, it was decided to investigate, from the 
long-zoom perspective, the least called-upon to participate in institutional 
ideation: the innovative student.  
This student, as an innovative subject, does not as such refer to the 
traditional and obvious candidate – the postgraduate student working in R&D but 
rather refers to all students from the moment they begin primary school to the 
moment they complete their formal education. The premise for this interest is 
based upon the notion that students can be considered to begin their formal 
schooling with already existing innovative capacities. This premise breaks with 
the notion that students need to complete their formal education, or at least 
complete it up to the point of entering R&D, before they can be considered to be 
innovative actors. It is argued that this requisite experience is demeaning to 
students if they consider themselves already innovative. This politics of 
innovation, and its reliance of the acquisition of human capital as the means of 
qualifying students to be innovative, makes students dependent upon the 
progressive model of Education that inhibits students from thinking for 
themselves, both in terms of what innovation means and what the ontology of 
problems that student innovative activities might address.4 
While this approach to capacitating students with skills and knowledge is 
required by the politics of education (see David, Gabriel, & Lopez, 2001; The 
Treasury, 2008), it should be said that this ideological structuring of the purpose 
of education is in function of the notion that innovation can only be understood to 
refer to technological innovation and, as such, as commercial innovation. This is 
to say, it will be argued by incumbent policy-makers that students cannot be 
considered already innovative because there is presently no way of tracking the 
impact of student innovation in the market place. What this means for Education 
in a market economy is that there can be no innovation during a student’s 
education, barring time spent in R&D, when there is usually collaboration with 
commercial partners. The reason for this is basic to how Education is 
contemporaneously understood (Christensen & Eyring, 2011; Drucker, 1959, 
1969).  
                                                 
4 See Bingham and Biesta (2010) for an explanation of the limits of the progressive model of 
education. 
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The ethos of Education under neoliberalism creates an archetype that 
pretends to hold exclusive authority over how Education should serve the purpose 
of a particular interpretation of the concept of innovation (see Besley & Peters, 
2007; Murphy, 2015; Murphy, Peters & Marginson, 2010). Neoliberalism, on the 
back of international policy influences, including The International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), The World Economic Forum, the Organization of Economic Co-
Operation and Development (OECD), among others, interprets innovation as 
exclusively referring to technological innovation, the merit of which can only be 
assessed according to its commercial success in the market place. Whether this is 
an appropriate interpretation of innovation for the proprietary domain, where 
various forms of enterprise occur, is not a question that is going to be addressed 
here. However, when Education is made to serve the purpose of innovation – the 
purpose being to embed, through its process and acceptance, society in a single 
universal vision (see Drucker, 1959), then Education can be said to have delimited 
intellectual development and the formation of new ideas that the role of 
innovation has in informing society of the task of Education. Just as we do not 
know what tomorrow will bring, Education has a moral responsibility to allow the 
diversity that makes up the present generation of students to act upon existing 
articulations of what this vision refers to and to innovate according to how they 
understand the demands of the future.  
If students are not encouraged to challenge the existing vision and in so 
doing, are not shown ways in which they might challenge the foundations of why 
we do what we do, then it seems that the very aspirations of neoliberalism are in 
self-contradiction. To elaborate in brief, the following scenario could be posited. 
If neoliberal thinking in Education corresponds to the intention of producing more 
entrepreneurs and innovators, this is seemingly to be accomplished without 
students experiencing risk-taking in their learning, where thinking can be 
developed in relation to all relevant contexts and not just as a separate 
competency. Without this engagement with the unknown through the strategic 
employment of new ideas in relation to real problems, the “animal spirit” (Akerlof 
& Shiller, 2009), or what we might call today the spirit of endeavour or the spirit 
of adventure cannot be fomented and formed. In this sense, student invention and 
the ideation that follows is neglected and/or abandoned. How do we know this? 
Because the performative value of learning outcomes, generally speaking, makes 
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no room for heuristic learning, which by definition involves independent thinking 
– whether this be individual or in collective form. 
 
How is this scenario framed? If we are speaking of student ideation and new 
interpretations of existing problems, then we are speaking about the role of 
creativity and innovation in the way we work with knowledge, for reason that it is 
knowledge and our understanding of it that makes ideation possible; ideation 
being the process that enables individuals to connect the particular to the universal 
(Badiou, 2011). This is ideally how collectives of individual thinkers work 
together (see Leadbeater, 2008), but the question is, what happens when 
Education as a service renders learning as an experience as one that must uniquely 
conform to what Lévy (1997) calls “the commodity space”? The power relations 
that rule this space, in their adherence to privileging the importance of 
performativity in the progressive model (Bingham & Biesta, 2007), stifle both 
freedom to think and the risk required to break with notions of what a universal 
truth might be. Perhaps this problem can be summarized by the idea that invention 
– that which initiates the process of innovation (Schumpeter, 1934/1911) – cannot 
occur unless diversity is free to appeal to the relationship with the self, because 
without this possibility nothing new can be initiated. 
The approach taken in this investigation in elaborating this argument will 
not be to say that innovation is a deficit in student learning, or that there is a lack 
of independent thought and heuristic learning, for reason that the absence of these 
qualities also lies with teachers, the politics of education, and the politics of  
innovation. Rather the approach is to begin from the premise that the student 
should be thought of as an already innovative subject. The basis for the premise 
and its underpinning of this point of departure is that student innovation can now 
be thought of as being implicit to the paradox of learning, where diversity of 
thought and the system of education are incommensurable with one another. This 
idea has its metaphysical foundations in the idea posited by Arendt (1968) in the 
1950s, when she said that “natality” by definition means that Education in its 
present form has outlived its use to he or she who has just been born – that 
Education must be renewed and transformed. Why student innovation can now be 
thought of as being implicit to the paradox of learning is that networked peer-to-
7 
peer collaboration breaks the traditional hierarchy with teachers and depends upon 
independent thinking. 
 If the system of education fails to respond to the need for renewal and 
transformation that corresponds to the presence of the already innovative subject 
and their intrinsic diversity in nature, then not only will this individual student be 
left excluded to the benefit of institutional self-interest but so will generations of 
students to come. In these circumstances, there is no inclusion of diversity or 
welcoming of the individual whose will seeks this renewal. Rather, each 
individual, each new subject of the education system becomes an information 
asset that profits those who fear risk in place of fearing not taking the risk. If the 
politics of administering educational operations are such that, having enrolled, 
students should just accept what is and put up, then it is up to students to 
transform that which they are provided with and to innovate to the benefit of their 
learning and their search for opportunities. It is in emotional and philosophical 
empathy with these students and the situation they find themselves in that the 
already innovative subject has been identified at the outset of this investigation as 
the actor most likely to protagonize the collaborative transformation of Education.  
 Of course, it can be argued that Education is always being collaboratively 
transformed but, in truth, this can only be said in a very limited sense. Verification 
of this fact is easily made. It only needs to be asked, who initiates? If the initiation 
of change and innovation responsible for transformation is limited to the actions 
of commercial and administrative management, then innovation cannot be said to 
involve the inclusive collaborative participation of students: they will only be 
carrying out what has already been initiated. For students to be protagonists in the 
collaborative transformation of Education, the very concept of innovation needs to 
be examined and developed and furthermore the status of the student, as an 
already innovative subject, needs to be examined for its role in the process of 
innovation. What is more, the problems that innovation addresses need to be 
opened to the diverse interpretations of students, such that the arbitration of the 
value of innovation is not merely measured by performance in the market place. 
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Theory and philosophy 
The task of adopting a philosophical perspective in relation to the topic of this 
investigation is conditioned by the fact that there is no existing research that s the 
situation of the already innovative subject in Education. This is to say; 
philosophical thinking on the question of what it is to be innovative has been 
concerned to this point with questions that are other than the question that is posed 
here. Therefore, there is no philosophical canon specific to the relationship 
between the formation of the subject and the meaning of innovation as a category. 
There are of course philosophers who address the question of the subject’s 
formation (for example, Foucault) and there are philosophers who address the 
problem of understanding innovation (for example Bacon and Machiavelli) but 
none of these do both. Yes, Foucault (2010) mentions the significance of 
innovation in The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978-
1979, but he does not engage this phenomenon at any length.  
 Despite this situation, it remains necessary to assume a philosophical 
perspective in relation to the topic of this thesis, the reason being that the situation 
of the innovative subject in Education is thought of here as a paradoxical one. It is 
the paradoxical situation that requires the researcher to philosophize in that I 
understand that the paradox can only be addressed through philosophy (Badiou, 
2010). In philosophically addressing the situation of the innovative subject in 
Education, the method becomes one of analyzing concepts related to the question 
of better understanding this situation. In the following pages, a series of concepts 




The discussion in this investigation features two types of subject: the innovative 
subject and the subject of innovation. The innovative subject will also be referred 
to as the already innovative subject, which refers to the idea that an individual can 
be innovative before their education supposes they should be able to be. This 
subject is innovative despite the system of education, not because of it. The 
subject of innovation is a subject who accepts that manner in which they are 
governed by the politics of education, thus focusing on benefitting from the 
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Education provided them through acquiring the requisite human capital that 
innovation will later require. This subject is also known as homo economicus 
(economic man), as the enterprising subject or the entrepreneurial subject; as in 
the subject who treats the formation of the self as an enterprise. While these two 
subjects – the innovative subject and the subject of innovation – are juxtaposed in 
what appears to be a binary, this binary does not exist in reality. It is merely a 
theoretical binary created for the purpose of examining the various manners in 
which the subject might form him or herself in the setting of a neoliberal 
education. In fact, the relationship between the two is regarded as fluid and 
dependent upon the will of the student to think for him or herself. 
 
Innovation 
The idea that a student might be an already innovative subject requires an 
examination of the concept of innovation for the reason that their innovative 
activity cannot be thought of as a purely commercial activity. As such the 
investigation required an examination of the history of innovation as a category. 
This aspect of the inquiry is pursued from the premises that there is more to 
technological innovation than technology itself and that there is always a political 
aspect to innovation, meaning technological innovation (the orthodox 
understanding of innovation) refers to something outside what it pretends to refer 
to and this epistemological aspect is in part political in nature. As such, the history 
of innovation as a category is not treated in an historicist manner and therefore as 
a sequential development, where religious innovation is followed by political 
innovation and political innovation by social innovation and social innovation by 
technological innovation. It is argued that when a genealogical approach is taken 
to the situation of the innovative student, it makes more sense to think of these 
historical interpretations of the category as existing simultaneously in the 
innovative process of the student where they find their own balance according to 
the nature of the problem addressed. This genealogical approach supposes that 
there are other fields of arbitrating the value of innovation besides the market 
place, which is the theoretical space where the commercial value of an innovation 





Opening up the discussion on the meaning of innovation in Education implies an 
opening up of a discussion on the purpose of Education. Education may 
contemporaneously be regarded as having been charged with the task of providing 
the means for further economic development, but there is more to Education than 
job training – especially in a context when we are told that jobs are soon to 
disappear on mass as a result to cheaper artificial intelligence (AI) (see Blundell, 
2016). Even one of the greatest promoters of neoliberalism, The World Economic 
Forum (as cited in Shaw, 2016), is now saying that neoliberalism got it wrong. 
Firstly, the approach will not be one of analyzing neoliberalism with a view to 
showing how its politics stifles student innovation – this is rather a project that 
takes the side of the already innovative student in order to understand the 
paradoxical situation he or she finds him or herself in. So neoliberal politics of 
education is only engaged in as much as it contributes towards a more complex 
understanding of the situation of the student. Secondly, if the introduction of 
information and communications technologies (ICTs) in the form of computers 
networked to the Web has dismantled hierarchical relations between students and 
teachers, then student autonomy supposes a radical new disposition to knowledge, 
learning and the purpose of Education. The approach taken in this project 
involves thinking of student innovation as a phenomenon that should be 
conditioned by the idea that AI adds positive value to humanity’s experience of 
both itself and the environment. This is the alternative to doing nothing. The 
accompanying feature of this thought is that the development of AI in Education 
must be done in parallel to the development of collective intelligence. 
 
The Black Box 
In becoming such a sexy term, innovation has become the husk of a concept that 
very few people can explain, and so too the fate of the concept of the black box is 
likely to suffer. When the black box refers to the meaning of an object like a flight 
recorder, it can be said that its function depends upon a consensual understanding 
of its meaning. However when the black box refers to the meaning of an object 
that is abstract in nature like ideas then it is difficult to say what the purpose of 
using the black box is as a metaphor. In this instance, rather than facilitating 
disambiguation, it creates ambiguation. The black box is used in this investigation 
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in the first instance to recognize this ambiguation and then it is used to illustrate 
that it has been created by and/or a problem of understanding – the most absurd 
ambiguation occurring when the black box is created by thinking that pretends to 
be rational. The latter would appear to be the case of economics, not just standard 
economics, when thinking of the process of innovation; a catalyst in the 
discussion in this investigation. 
 
The Paradox 
Also a catalyst in the discussion is the paradox, in particular, the paradoxical 
situation in which the already innovative subject finds him or herself on account 
to the educational institution not recognizing the merit of student innovation. A 
paradox in this investigation is understood to refer to a situation where there are 
two elements bound together that cannot be measured by the same means or as 
commonly understood where the two elements bound together are 
incommensurable with one another. There are a number of paradoxes in this 
investigation, but the most important one is the paradoxical of the situation of the 
already innovative subject. The danger in misinterpreting the significance of 
student innovation is that this innovative activity is seen as political provocation 
or political deviance for reason that it does not sit conveniently with the politics of 
the institution. But this is a mistake as a paradox cannot be thought politically 
without it being reinterpreted as a contradiction (Badiou, 2010), which of course 
can be measured by the same means. The researcher understands that paradoxes 
need to be thought philosophically and that the risk and responsibility lies in this 
question with the student. The incommensurability of the teacher-student 
relationship exists on account of the student’s autonomous learning engagement, 
in a networked peer-to-peer collaboration, breaking with the traditional hierarchy 
that is used to governing this relationship. At a recent international symposium on 
learning environments, 5  there was evidence that teachers in this situation no 
longer know what to call themselves, and that furthermore students were leaving 
the host institution because they had concluded that they could learn more on their 
own through taking charge of their own learning trajectories. This situation 
                                                 
5 See http://www.aut.ac.nz/study-at-aut/study-areas/education/learning-environments#key 
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Such an argument as the one made in this thesis must consider how the concept of 
governmentality is understood. The notion that the problem of governmentality 
refers to the “conduct of conduct” (Foucault, 2000), as a metaphor, does not refer 
to a stable notion of what power relations in Education refer to or, more 
particularly, what the power relations in teacher-student relations refer to. The 
meaning of “the conduct of conduct” which might otherwise be taken to refer to 
the teacher’s direction of the student’s direction of the latter’s relationship with 
the self is conditioned by the context in which these power relations occur.6 At 
least three factors have recently become prominent: the replacement of new public 
management by “digital era governance” (Peters, 2013, p. 10); the introduction of 
the innovative learning environment;7 and the disruption of the teacher-student 
hierarchy on account of the formation of new student autonomies when working 
on networked information economies. All of these three factors bring the student’s 
direction of the self more strongly into play supposing new dimensions of both 
responsibility and risk taking. While Foucault provides the following explanation 
of “conduct as conduct” as referring to accepting to be governed by the other 
through referring to the relationship with the self (Foucault, 2000), it is argued in 
this investigation that this notion of governance is coming to be conditioned by 
the emergence of the above factors. As such, the theoretical framework employed 
in this investigation is one that is conditioned by the contingency of these 
emerging factors. The most important implication of this development is that 
student innovative activity is likely to produce new expressions of political 
subjectivity, which in turn is likely to make the discussion of ideas more dynamic. 
Theoretically-speaking, if teachers do not engage in a compensatory development 
                                                 
6 The researcher understands conduct to refer to the action of directing oneself and/or another to do 
something, so governing behaviour implies a certain orchestration of behaviour. This inference to 
directing behaviour comes from the researcher’s knowledge of the Spanish understanding of 
conducir, which means to direct or to drive. 
7 The innovative learning environment is alternatively referred to as the modern learning 
environment, the flexible learning environment and the space where the focus is on the acquisition 
of so-called 21st century skills and knowledge (see OECD, 2013; Osborne, 2013) 
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that involves a positive expression of this development in student learning, student 
innovation is likely to also be disruptive and force a more convert engagement 
with the problems that students are addressing in their learning.  
 
The knowledge space  
Finally, there is the concept of the knowledge space (see Lévy, 1997). This is the 
space where it is understood that most student innovation in Education is likely to 
occur. This space is delineated from the commodity space by the fact that the 
nature of the good that it produces changes. The commodity space is understood 
to produce commercial goods, which in Education can be understood to refer to 
the creation of human capital. Lévy theorizes that the knowledge space produces 
human qualities. It is this delineation of spaces that speaks to the earlier 
distinction made between the already innovative subject (or the innovative 
subject) and the subject of innovation (or homo economicus, the enterprising 
subject, the entrepreneurial subject). It is the latter subjects who comply with the 
requirements of the politics of education by accepting that learning in the 
commodity space will produce the relevant capacities to be a contributor in the 
commercial world upon graduation. The knowledge space, on the other hand, is 
more likely to engage innovative subjects in a more complex understanding of 
innovation than what technological innovation alone supposes is possible, where 
instead of self-interest being the guiding force to the formation of the self, the 
innovative subjectivity forgoes individual ownership and integrates into the 
network of collective activity. This is where collective intelligence is developed 
and students are forced to think philosophically and to develop new ethical 
knowledge about the problem of collaboration. 
 
Theoretical framework 
The theoretical framework used in this investigation embraces the use of three 
approaches: the experimental, the genealogical and the post-Cartesian. These 
approaches and their relationship will be discussed in the following paragraphs. 
 
The experimental approach 
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The investigation is experimental in various respects, including: firstly, the 
proposal that innovative capacities will develop independently of the application 
of human capital theory and that this is possible because endogenous growth 
theory supposes such a possibility; secondly, the proposal that, as a consequence 
of the introduction of networked learning economies to educational institutions, 
“the commodity space” (Lévy, 1997, p. 139) is challenged as the only space 
capable of providing adequate learning opportunities to students; thirdly, the 
proposal that theorizing the relationship between the already innovative subject’s 
learning and a new interpretation of problems that can be addressed where the 
innovation involved is not limited to technological innovation as commercial 
innovation; fourthly, the proposal that the inclusion of students in institutional 
processes of innovation benefit not only students but also the development of 
institutional ideation that informs the purpose of innovation and change; fifthly, 
the proposal that the metaphor of the black box, as that which is used by standard 
economics to describe the process of innovation, is most appropriately thought of, 
when referring to the student’s relationship[p with the process of innovation, as 
referring to the object of the blacked-out-theatre before a play begins; and finally, 
the proposal that, while philosophy is not taught in the national curriculum, 
students, while thinking the paradox of their situation, will respond to the limits of 
the curriculum through philosophical thought. 
 
The genealogical approach 
The genealogical and post-Cartesian approaches, within the theoretical 
framework, are both in their own way also experimental – all three approaches 
being implicitly related to one another and conditioning the role of the other. The 
genealogical approach refers to how this investigation uses history for the purpose 
of rethinking the nature of problems that students engage within their innovative 
activities; this concept of genealogy drawing on Foucault’s (1997a) idea that 
genealogy involves a problematization of the history of the present. 
Problematization is an opaque term in the sense that very few researchers, in 
adopting Foucault’s use of the concept of problematization, highlight whether 
they make the same distinction between the possible tasks of problematization; 
“the history of thought”, “the history of ideas” and “the history of mentalities” 
(1997a, p. 117). This distinction is very difficult to make as one that would 
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involve an adopted schema, as did Foucault in focusing on the history of thought. 
In relation to the history of economics and the constitution of Education as a 
quasi-commercial enterprise, the focus in this investigation is framed by in the 
relationship between “the history of thought” and “the history of ideas”. In the 
case of the learning environment and in regard to the formative nature of student 
thinking, the complex relationship of these orientations towards history is more 
difficult to delineate. The best that can be done in the context of this investigation 
is to be aware of the subtle influence on thought that these histories have.  
Other features of the genealogical approach involve the following: a 
rethinking of the history of the concept of innovation as one where its various 
historical meanings political, social and technological are conceptualized as 
informing contemporary student interest in problems of the present; an 
acknowledgement of the fact that the teaching of history itself supposes an ironic 
student genealogical engagement with the possible value of innovation – that 
knowledge without history implies “the leap” of innovation (Drucker, 1959, p. 13) 
involves more “an organization of ignorance, rather than that of known facts”; a 
special emphasis on the velocity and impact of technological development on 
student learning, with respect to how their engagement with new technologies and 
networked learning economies heightens fluency with the velocity of this 
development – something that requires a “forgetting” (OECD, 1996); a special 
emphasis on embracing the genealogical value of the biographical histories of 
List, Schumpeter, Lundvall and Drucker as personal histories that have informed 
the formation of ideas that are now universally used; and an evaluation of 
genealogy as a means of engaging with, critiquing and breaking with 
neoliberalism without having to subjugate the investigation to a politics that has 
its basis in an ideology (Dardot & Laval, 2013; Peters, 2011). 
 
The post-Cartesian approach 
The post-Cartesian approach to the theoretical framework of this investigation 
does not refer to the idea that Cartesian thought can be left behind. Rather it refers 
to the capacity to be objective in that this process of objectivization informs the 
individual’s thinking as an experience that becomes the basis for elevating the 
importance of the relationship between subject and object. Some professionals in 
Education will say that the relationship is everything but this is not the approach 
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taken here. The subject and object still exist as distinct entities and in fact they 
become more important than they might have been before in that consciousness of 
them now becomes conditioned by what transpires within the relationship. This 
post-Cartesian approach has been gradually acquired as a consequence of reading 
Foucault; in particular his later work. 
On what philosophical basis is a post-Cartesian approach pursued? The 
black box, the paradox of the situation of the already innovative student, 
disruptive student innovation, and digitally aided autonomy, the problem of 
integrating individual and collective processes of subjectification (Lévy, 1997) all 
presume a new emphasis on the importance of the relationships. Given this 
development and that fact that it is the intention of the researcher to theoretically 
empathizing with the situation of the contemporary student in general and already 
innovative subject in particular, an approach needs to be taken that avoids 
objectification of these above phenomena at the cost of the dignity of the 
individual student’s heuristic learning. 
  
Literature  
Now to the question of the literature engaged in this investigation. As soon as it 
became evident that traditional economics had discarded serious interest in the 
process of innovation, it was obvious that this tactical exploitation of the concept 
of innovation would imply a need for a broad and interdisciplinary approach to 
reading. This is not to say, economics has been ignored. Nor is it to say that 
economics has been turned against itself. To this effect, the problem of 
engagement with the literature on innovation and related subjects to this 
investigation is one of allowing orthodox and incumbent interests to be as they 
are. Yes, analysis and critique of the implications of neoliberal economics in 
Education are necessary, but this is done only in as much as it becomes possible to 
witness the theoretical engagement of the already innovative student with the 
institution, the politics of education and the politics of innovation. The choice and 
particular engagement of literature is sensitive to the notion that there is no formal 
and conceptual recognition of the already innovative student as an already 
innovative subject. This is to say, there is an attempt, in as much as it is possible 
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in the theoretical, to identify where the already innovative subject makes a case 
for him or herself.  
 Given this above approach, strategies have been adopted to manage the 
vast array of related literatures; which is to say, literatures that have not been 
previously engaged in relation to this topic – a new topic, without an established 
discourse. For instance, there is a heavy reliance of primary reading. The thesis 
does not involve an analysis of discourses but rather involves an engagement with 
primary literature in relation to a new and novel purpose – the yet to be 
recognized already innovative student. While this engagement is formal and 
serious, there is also engagement with sources less associated with scholarship: 
namely Wikipedia. The purpose of embracing Wikipedia as a source is to 
facilitate epistemological engagement with the existing colloquial understanding 
that students are already innovative before the politics of education believe this is 
possible. This is to say that the epistemological basis for such cultural and societal 
understanding, by definition, exists outside the piety of academia and, as such, is 
more closely related to the pragmatic reason of colloquial knowledge.  
 Lastly, while the title might suppose a substantial engagement with 
philosophical texts, such texts are only discretely engaged. The philosophical 
perspective is employed in the investigator’s use of a post-Cartesian approach to 
engaging the problems that populate the discussion. The central problem being the 
researcher’s determination to theoretically empathize with the situation of the 
already innovative subject; the problem existing because the theoretical cannot be 
thought of as enabling an overcoming of the paradoxes that characterize this 
research. Of course, these paradoxes exist on account of differences in age, 
gender, experience, education, culture, and they also exist on account of 
differences in understanding between the already innovative student and the 
politics of education as to the meaning of innovation. 
 
Structure of argument 
The thesis argument begins with an analysis of the standard economics’ treatment 
of the process of innovation as a black box and a discussion of the implications of 
this treatment for the innovative subject in Education. In order to ground the thesis 
argument, initial descriptions of how innovation is understood in economics and 
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Education are provided. The emergent problem in this chapter relates to 
recognition that the history of economics has made void the relationship between 
the innovative subject and their process of innovation. 
 In Chapter Two, a study is made of the thinking, lives and work of three 
economists with the intention of extrapolating historical evidence of the 
relationship of the innovative subject to processes of innovation. While the 
discussion is genealogical in nature, it is not one that supposes that these 
economists critically identify where the relationship between the innovative 
subject and processes of innovation have been made void by the history of 
economics. Rather the intention is to provide evidence of why it should be 
understood that there exists such a relationship.  
 From here, the discussion moves to the need to differentiate between the 
concept of the innovator and the concept of the entrepreneur as the two actors who 
are most commonly associated with the process of innovation. The distinction 
made here highlights the fact that the history of the innovator has followed the 
history of innovation, which today is understood as technological innovation, 
whereas the entrepreneur is understood as being able to implement new initiatives 
both in the marketplace and in domains where the effect of their impact is not 
judged according the commercial value of that which is introduced.  
 This is followed by a discussion on the situation of the already innovative 
subject as a problematic. This problematic is extrapolated from both political and 
philosophical perspectives in order to draw a clear distinction between the 
interests of politics and the interests of philosophy. This aspect of the thesis 
discussion is completed with an analysis of the situation of the already innovative 
subject as a black box, with a view to how the black box could be used as a 
metaphor that would enable the student to have greater protagonism within 
processes of innovation or change that take place in educational institutions. 
 Chapter Five, grounded on the discussion in the previous chapter, involves 
an investigation of the individual student’s relationship with the educational 
institution and the institution’s processes of innovation. The distinction is made 
between the student’s experience of institutional processes of innovation that are 
focused on productivity and the student’s own processes of innovation. Particular 
importance is given to human capital theory and the role this theory plays in tying 
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students into institutional processes of innovation. This analysis produces an 
explanation of how the individual can be absented from processes of innovation. 
 Following this, the discussion moves to address how technological 
innovation is understood in Education. Drawing heavily on s done by Godin 
(2010a, 2010b, 2015b, 2015c), the influence of American and European traditions 
are examined with respect to how both commercial management and researchers 
think about technological innovation in the educational institution. These 
contrasting influences are further complicated by a brief analysis of Foucault’s 
(1997a) understanding of technology, with a view to highlighting the role 
technologies of the self that play in the formation of innovative subjectivities.  
 The discussion then moves a description and analysis that differentiates 
between the subject of innovation and the innovative subject as two distinctive if 
temporal actors. The former is associated with acceptance of the Education as it is 
provided to them and, as such, as a subject who accepts to merely populate the 
institution’s processes of innovation that are focus its productive function. The 
latter subject is associated with the individual who has the capacity to break with 
the Education that they are provided with through initiating innovations in their 
own learning. This chapter finishes with a discussion of the importance of the 
relationship between risk and responsibility. 
 Chapter Eight examines open innovation. After a discussion on openness, 
an explanation of Bergson’s (1935) understanding of static and dynamic societies 
is provided with the intention of highlighting the situation of the already 
innovative subject when the educational institution is closed to the student’s 
desire to take new initiatives. This chapter finishes by highlighting the importance 
of tacit knowledge as being fundamental to the student’s innovative processes.  
 At this point, the discussion moves to engage with the concept of social 
innovation. This discussion involves an examination of the difference between 
social innovation that responds to an interest in reforming the existing system and 
social innovation that implies the existence of a will to break with the existing 
system, and begin a new project from new foundations. As neither of these 
approaches appear capable of offering real change or profound innovation in the 
face of neoliberalism’s attitude to its own social failings, the discussion picks up 
the political challenge of initiating change from below. The intention is to 
problematize the system’s “tyranny without alternatives” (Unger, 2013) with the 
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aim of understanding those aspects that may be susceptible to transformation 
through radical change. 
 The final chapter looks at how student open and social innovation, in the 
context of the use of networked information economies, produces learning 
experiences that imply new possibilities of the development of collective 
intelligence; a new public good that both accedes and challenges the significance 
of the commercial good. “The commodity space” (Lévy, 1997, pp. 135-138) and 
“the knowledge space” (pp. 138-141) are analyzed with respect to the problem 
that students face in developing new human qualities – qualities that become 
necessary for the formation of collective intelligence. This learning is thought to 
be measured according to how students learn to re-evaluate the value of 
knowledge as that which does not always need to be governed by the interests that 
govern the commodity space.       
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CHAPTER ONE 
Innovation and the Black Box 
 
Introduction 
An education system that treats its role as one that requires it to focus on simply 
increasing its productivity has a limited future. Treating institutional productivity 
as an end in itself and as the principal purpose of its function cannot guarantee its 
survival (see Lundvall, 1996). While this scenario may have functioned well prior 
to the introduction of open architectures and digital platforms, in that commercial 
student self-interest might have identified itself with the institution’s quest for 
commercial success, this is no longer the case. It now becomes obvious that 
networked peer-to-peer collaboration in the learning environment demands new 
possibilities for student implication in institutional strategic development in both 
the commercial and educational domains. This development however remains 
blocked for reason of the institution’s understanding and application of 
innovation. On the one hand, the commercial management of the institution 
appears to regard innovation as an activity that can only be initiated from above, 
while on the other hand, the same management appears not to have anticipated 
that new ecologies of student knowledges will evolve once student learning 
economies find their way about the open architectures and digital platforms of the 
contemporary learning environment. These ecologies of knowledge not only 
extend student collaboration to include the virtual participation of others in 
engagement with open source learning but they also involve students in 
addressing problems of the world that require a more expansive understanding of 
innovation.  
The initial theoretical problem in this investigation has to do with 
institutional reliance on its present economic model and the fact that this model 
stifles student participation in innovation processes that, it is argued here, would 
otherwise benefit both student learning and how the institution contributes to 
student futures. If the institution is stifling student participation in innovation, it 
needs to be shown how this is being done when the institution regards innovation 
as its prerogative and an activity that can rationally only be initiated by its 
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commercial management. This is to say the institution’s understanding of 
innovation excludes the possibility of innovation being understood in any other 
way. The intention is not to construct a polemic but to develop an argument which 
requires the politics of innovation to be more open and less irreproachable.   
 The discussion begins with an analysis of both the treatment by standard 
economics of the process of innovation as a black box and of the implications of 
this treatment has for the innovative subject in Education. In order to ground this 
point of departure in the discussion that follows, descriptions of how innovation is 
understood in both economics and Education are provided. The emergent problem 
in this chapter revolves around recognition of the relationship between the 
innovative subject per se (not just the innovative subject in Education) and their 
process of innovation has been annulled within the history of economics. 
 
1.1 
Economics’ ambiguous treatment of innovation 
Economics treats innovation in an ambiguous manner. Innovation is thought of as 
one of the drivers of economic development (see Section 1.2), which may suggest, 
because of its importance to the economy, that its understanding of innovation is 
beyond reproach. However, innovation, as an activity, is also considered to be 
“outside the framework of economic models” (Freeman, 1974, as cited in Godin, 
2010a, p. 9). In relation to the former statement, it is new goods and services that 
drive economic development. In relation to the latter statement, it can be said that 
economics’ understanding of the importance of these new goods and services to 
economic development inhibits it from having a general theory of innovation. Of 
course, there are automated and digitally managed manufacturing plants, in 
relation to which cutting edge science is mastered in order to ensure that the 
product produced competes in the marketplace, but such knowledge of this 
process is very hard to further develop without having the effect of depreciating 
the initial results. 
This ambiguous picture is complicated by the fact that there are various 
streams of economic thought. The main ones engaged in this investigation are 
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standard economics,1  neoliberal economics, neo-Schumpeterian economics and 
the economic thinking of Innovation Studies (Godin, 2010a, 2015a). The 
following statements, made by Freeman (1974) – the father of Innovation Studies 
– furthermore make these distinctive ways of thinking about innovation difficult 
to think of in terms of each other. Freeman paints this picture in the following 
way: 
Innovation is far too important to be left to scientists and 
technologists. It is also far too important to be left to economists 
and social scientists. (As cited in Godin, 2010a, p. 5)         
This is to say, how is it possible to say that standard economics, as a discipline, is 
capacitated to speak for the significance innovation has as an aspect our political 
and anthropological complexity, if standard economics regards innovation as 
being foreign to the way it thinks of its responsibilities? Even neoliberal 
economics, neo-Schumpeterian economics and Innovation Studies are not able to 
think their way through this paradox. Innovation may be strongly locked into a 
neoliberal rhetoric that presumes societal acceptance of innovation as the 
mechanism for economic growth. This is evidently based on the notion that 
coupling science and technology enables the possibility of making the market the 
unique arbiter for what innovation is understood to be. This rhetoric is rarely 
challenged.  
This thesis will challenge not only this crude paradox that standard 
economics has created for itself. What is more, it will also challenge the lack of 
serious endeavour on the part of neoliberal economics, neo-Schumpeterian 
economics and Innovation Studies to overcome their own limits in relation to the 
idea that innovation may in fact rightfully belong to a much larger field of activity 
than that which can be described as involving mere commercial activity. What are 
these limits? What is being referred to here is the inability to tackle the tyranny of 
human capital theory in Education and economics’ incapacity to recognize or 
speak to the individual subject in a manner that coincides with the nature of the 
expression through which individuals express their innovative subjectivities. 
All four forms of economics flatten the innovative subjectivity as if the 
contemporary individual could be thought of as nothing more than a consumer-
                                                 
1 Standard economics is also referred to as classical economics, depending on the authors engaged. 
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producer (see Becker, 1976; Becker, Ewald & Harcourt, 2012). Of course, the role 
of individual and therefore of subjective choice can be theorized as a means of 
explaining consumer behaviour (Treasury, 1987).2 However, the idea that there 
exists a methodological individualism that enables a universal objectification of 
the individual as a consumer has been effectively debunked by Arrow (as cited by 
Lundvall, 2016a, personal communication).3 Arrow explains that methodological 
individualism is unable to account for individual subjectivity because this 
subjectivity requires language to express its particular diversity. Then what 
happens to the individual as producer? This is the subjectivity of the entrepreneur 
and the significance of this individual will be engaged in Chapter Two and then 
throughout the thesis at various points. 
So one problem that economics has is that the individual actor – whether a 
consumer and/or a producer – is not entirely an economic actor; he or she is not 
wholly homo economicus: the individual actor is someone more, someone less or 
someone other than the ideal of economic man. The other significant problems 
homo economicus has are to do with how economics understands the process of 
innovation and the fact that this aforementioned individual anonymously 
participates in this process. Their agency in facilitating the realization of the 
process of innovation is realized in response to an external vision with which they 
are neither intimately acquainted nor have the authority to question. As such, 
innovation is a mechanism for political change.    
The relativity of economics’ engagement with innovation seems to be, in 
part, because economics, in its various forms, is almost uniquely oriented towards 
profiting from its interest in producing ends in themselves: goods, services and 
good-services.4 It is through this almost exclusive focus on ends and the profits 
that can be reaped from the commercial outcomes that economics is able to 
theoretically leave innovation unattended (see Godin, 2017), and furthermore to 
leave the process of innovation to one side, as if the theory of innovation could 
exist without any idea of how innovation occurs.       
                                                 
2 The discourse on subjective choice begins with von Mises book Human Action: A treatise on 
economics (1949) 
3 This was explained to me by Lundvall, during a conversation when I interviewed him in August, 
2016. 
4 Good-services is expressed here to explain the economic function of the APP: that APPs provide 
both a product and a service; a hybridization of its two attributes.    
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Being focused on ends – economic outcomes – means that while 
economics is able to measure the performance of a product or service of 
innovation according to its own theoretical framework, the process of innovation 
remains difficult to explain in relation to the same framework that defines the 
importance of an ends orientation to economic activity as a working model. As 
Fagerberg (2005) explains, in his Introduction to The Oxford Handbook of 
Innovation, it is “… the innovation process … [that] has been more or less treated 
as a “black box”” (p. 3). This being the case, it is the process of innovation that 
becomes important in this discussion because it is the process of innovation that 
conveys the most about the politics of innovation. Fagerberg (2005) furthermore 
adds that “[w]hat happens in this “box” has been left to scholars from other 
disciplines” (p. 3). The significance of delegating the process of innovation as a 
problem to other disciplines will be addressed a little later in this section. 
Continuing, it would be wrong to say that there has been no interest on the 
part of economics in the process of innovation. In practical terms, there seems to 
be a stage in an economy’s development when it moves beyond a dependence on 
developing new manufacturing, when production processes need to be flexible to 
new ideas and to be able to adapt to the arrival of the products of new competitors 
in the market. 5These developments are described but little else. However, in 
theoretical terms, interest in the process of innovation is limited. For example, 
while Freeman (1972, as cited in Godin, 2010a) states an interest in opening the 
black box and more recently while his descendants in Innovation Studies proclaim 
the same interest, there is no interest in identifying within this black box the 
relationship between the innovative actors and the process of innovation. 
Therefore, one would wonder how, for example, learning by doing could be 
explained as an aspect of the innovation process. 
 What then is the hurdle to economics in approaching a deeper 
understanding of this relationship? Initially, it is surmised that there is a 
phenomenological problem with respect to economics working to a framework 
that is unreceptive to the need to speak to the creative aspect of the process of 
innovation. In particular, it lacks to means of speaking to the subjective which 
                                                 
5
 This is what is occurring in China at this time. See Shipley (2017) and his article China's 
Factories Don't Fear Trump. 
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initiates the process of innovation. Economics is not short on theory, beginning 
with von Mises Human action: A treatise on economics (1949), when it comes to 
needing to explain consumer choice but it is a different story when needing to 
explain the same individual’s creativity when contributing to an innovative 
production process. Yes, there is the entrepreneur, the leader in the development 
of new ideas, but what happens when the commercialization of new ideas 
becomes dependent upon collective innovation processes which acknowledge the 
participation of all subjects involved?  
 It is with this problem in mind, that the discussion now turns to the need to 
exposit a working definition of the black box. The meaning of the black box, is a 
subject of discussion in this investigation, is not brought to a significant head 
before the end of Chapter Four. What follows is an attempt to lay the foundation 
for the interim discussion.   
The black box, as a metaphor, refers to an object’s capacity to facilitate a 
process of disambiguation (‘Black box (disambiguation)’, 2015), or clarification 
of understanding. In rudimentary terms, the black box in economics refers to how 
“inputs” produce “innovation outputs” (Rosenberg, 1982, p. 233). However, while 
economics might wish to treat the innovation process as a black box, it might be 
more accurate to argue that what economics is actually doing is what is called 
“black-boxing” (Latour, 1999, p. 304) the innovation process. This is say that 
economics makes the innovation process ambiguous. Elaborating, Latour (1999) 
describes black-boxing as follows:  
… expression from the sociology of science that refers to the 
way scientific and technical work is made invisible by its own 
success. When a machine runs too efficiently, when a matter of 
fact is settled, one need focus only on its inputs and outputs and 
not on its internal complexity. This, paradoxically, the more 
science and technology succeed, the more opaque and obscure 
they become. (Latour, 1999, p. 304)  
As such, the process of innovation cannot be explained away as a black box: the 
action of black-boxing supposing the presence of a subject. This is to say, while it 
can be said that economics treats the process of innovation as a black box, it needs 
to be added that it is economics, through its own lack of attention to how 
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economic results are created, that makes the innovation process into a black-
boxing – evidently, from what Latour (1999) says, by a process of black-boxing.  
          What would seem to be critical is to highlight the relationship between how 
economics and Education understand the process of innovation. While 
commercial enterprise black boxes the innovation process, which, according to 
Latour (1999) can be seen as being indicative of a celebration of the successes of 
science and technology, Education equally relies on science and technology, 
through embedding the STEM subjects in the curriculum with the effect of black-
boxing the institution’s processes of innovation.  
          In order to bring to the fore the reality of the already innovative student in 
contemporary Education, it becomes necessary to expose the nature of 
Education’s black-boxing of its own innovation processes because it is in the 
institution’s black-boxing of its own innovation processes that it makes the 
already innovative student anonymous. There are various ways in which 
Education’s black-boxing of innovation can be seen to do this, for example, in the 
creation of human capital over the creation of human qualities, and in the 
privileging of assessments and exams over formative learning. These are 
structured orientations that ascribe the purpose of education in that the student 
works on him or herself to create human capital by excelling in summative 
measurable academic performance. This claim presupposes the need for a 
complex analysis, before which it will be necessary to understand how economics 
and Education understand innovation according to their own interests.           
 
1.2 
The black box as metaphor 
The black box, as a metaphor, can refer to an abstract concept, as in the case of 
that which houses an ambiguous and difficult-to-access understanding of 
something. The black box, as a metaphor, can also refer to the object that it gives 
its name to; such as a flight recorder, which ironically is orange in colour, not 
black. In this case, the black box refers to its interior of the apparatus that contains 
post-accident data that is yet to be understood. The black box as a metaphor, is 
used in a broad range of disciplines (‘Black Box’, 2017) without a common 
purpose. While this situation is problematic, it also provides an opportunity.     
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The black box could be an abstract painting that mixes brutal gestures and 
with a fragile consciousness. While the aesthetic itself might be simple, the viewer 
intuitively knows that the complexity responsible for the expression is mostly 
hidden beneath the manner in which the paint is applied. In this situation, there are 
objective and subjective elements that both make up the content of the black box 
and provide the means for understanding its content. It could be said that there is 
not a viewer who does not, in some way, appreciate Rothko’s painting Orange, 
Red, Yellow (1961), and it is equally likely that there is little agreement as to why 
this painting is so appreciated. The illusion is that the black box refers to the 
obfuscation of some aspect of experience that is both fundamentally common to 
all while being extremely difficult to identify. It is as if the black box – the 
abstract painting in this instance – recovers Kierkegaard’s question in the 
aftermath of Descartes’ sweeping “aside man’s [of] spiritual existence as 
irrelevant” (Drucker, 1969, p. 304) and when he (Kierkegaard) asks: “How is 
human existence possible” without knowing its contents? Perhaps the black box is 
most usefully understood as a paradox of reason – the means by which reason can 
know itself only through being other than itself. The purpose of this analogy of 
the abstract painting is to highlight the futility of objectifying something in 
isolation from its context (the painter’s experience and the viewer’s world), while 
at the same time abandoning a sincere interest in the significance of the object – 
as the viewer does who complains that their child could paint the same painting.  
As already iterated economics in abandoning intrinsic interest in the 
process of innovation and jettisoning this object of interest to other disciplines 
(Fagerberg, Mowery & Nelson, 2005), also denies any consciousness of an 
intrinsic interest in the innovative subject – the actor who populates the process 
that makes innovation possible. If the attitude of economics, with respect to its 
role, is accepted by society without question, perhaps there is nothing more to say. 
However, the intention here is to argue that economics, in black-boxing the 
innovative subject, along with its black-boxing of the innovation process, provides 
an opportunity to reconceptualize innovation and, as such, to theorize the 
innovative subject in Education.     
To do this, the concept of the black box needs to be d, this time not just in 
terms of its ambiguous function (as reported in Section 1.1) but also in terms of 
how the concept has come to be abused and misused, and with respect to the 
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possibility that it offers new insight into the role of the innovative subject in 
Education. To this effect, the remainder of this section will be taken up with 
outlining how reference to the black box enters into the methodological approach 
assumed in the investigation of the innovative subject in Education. 
Polanyi and Prosch (1975), when discussing the relationship between the 
metaphoric term and that which it refers to, remind us that “a word has a meaning. 
It bears on something else which is its meaning. A word and its object are not 
equal partners in an association. An explanation of language along associationist 
lines is thus fundamentally wrong” (p. 69, emphasis in original). This something 
else upon which the term black box bears on is, as alluded above, going to vary 
significantly. 6  The black box can refer to the existence of a sphere of 
understanding that, until now, has not been adequately explained (see ‘Black 
Box’, 2017). In a more tangible domain, the black box can refer to computing and 
engineering devices, a transistor, an algorithm and even the human brain, not to 
mention the object most people are more familiar with, the flight recorder used on 
aeroplanes.7 As can be seen, the relationship between the word’s meaning and its 
object can be very ambiguous if it is not already announced what the black box 
refers to in concrete terms. This variability not only depends on the ontology of 
the object but also on the type of data sought within it. To this effect, the 
terminology black box lends itself to being loosely used. Sometimes the term the 
black box is used to communicate that the author is a cutting-edge thinker when in 
fact little is learned that significantly changes global understanding of an 
experience. Genuine engagement with the black box therefore presumes a ground-
breaking revelation. 
                                                 
6 The black box refers to the following objects: in transport, the black box refers to the flight 
recorder (used in aeroplanes), the event recorder (used in trains), in information and 
communication technology. The black box also refers to a Window’s manager (who works with X 
Window System platforms) and to a software development environment. In relation to questions of 
security, the black box refers to the briefcase that accompanies the President of the United States, 
containing nuclear missile launch codes. In pharmaceuticals, the black box refers to a warning on a 
prescription drug, and in the arts, it refers to the black box convention (a blacked out theatre before 
a performance). The meaning of the black box as a metaphor is generally understood to refer to the 
objects capacity to facilitate better understanding through disambiguation (‘Black box 
(disambiguation)’, 2015).  
7 “The term black box was first recorded used by the RAF [Royal Air Force] in approximately 
1947 to describe the sealed containment used for apparatus of navigation, this usage becoming 
more widely applied after 1964” (‘Black Box’, 2015). 
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 In the thesis discussion, the use of the terminology black box proposes that 
there exists a dilemma at the crux of the problem of speaking to the existence of 
the already innovative subject. While economics treats the process of innovation 
(and therefore the innovative subject) as a black box that it is not interested in 
approaching as a problem, the argument made in this investigation is that both 
economics and society stand to gain from a positive engagement with the problem 
of speaking to the innovation process. What is more, it is thought that this 
initiative not only benefits both the innovative student and Education’s 
understanding of innovation but also our global understanding of economic 
development.  
To this effect, the underlying intention is to see to provide greater clarity 
in relation to the student’s experience of the nature of change. Elaborating briefly, 
it can be said that there is a marked difference in where the ‘intrinsic interest’ lies 
(Polanyi & Prosch, 1975), i.e., whether it lies with the metaphor or the object its 
meaning refers to. While economics uses the metaphor of the black box to 
formalize estrangement between innovation and the process of innovation, the 
intention in this discussion is the contrary: to theorize the relationship between 
innovation and the process that process the innovation is to also theorize the role 
and status of the innovative subject. The task is therefore, on the one hand, to 
critique the ‘semantic mechanism’ that governs how the black box is used by 
economics while, on the other, it is to give clear and forceful meaning to the 
significance of the process of innovation and to the value of the innovative 
subject.8 
This analysis of the role that the black box plays in the upcoming 
discussion cannot be wound up without also referring to the fact that sometimes 
these two semantic mechanisms (the metaphor of the black box and the object of 
its meaning) will not be able to be discussed in the same moment of the inquiry. 
This approach to argumentation reflects the need in some moments to 
acknowledge the Cartesian construction of the operational function of Education 
in economic development while, in other moments, it reflects the need to argue 
for the significance of the process of innovation and the value of the innovative 
                                                 
8 This problem is beginning to emerge in Education as I write. See article ‘Pay teachers based on 
students' progress: Thinktank’ (Collins, 2017).  
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subject from a post-Cartesian perspective. In the latter instance, the emphasis is 
firstly, on drawing relations between student participation in innovation processes 
as a relationship that conditions the way students constitute themselves and 
secondly, on drawing attention to the educational institution’s alienation of the 
already innovative subject. The challenge is to see these two realms of the inquiry 
as distinct and yet genealogically intertwined around the problem of facilitating 
heuristic learning that requires innovation.  
 
1.3 
Innovation in economics 
In this section, an initial sketch of how economics understands innovation is 
provided. Given that publishing on commercial innovation is growing at a rate 
that outstrips the growth of publishing in general (Fagerberg, 2005), this sketch 
will be both rudimentary and overarching in nature. It is not a literature review but 
rather provides a preliminary picture of the relative status of technological 
innovation in the various sectors of the economy that have an influence of the 
thinking of policy-makers in Education.   
       The embedding of innovation into human activity is a relatively new initiative 
Innovation has not always been so important in economic life: technological 
innovation, commercial innovation and economic innovation are recent concepts 
and less than a hundred years old; technological innovation being the first to 
emerge in the late 1940s (see Godin, 2008). To understand why these concepts 
became so fundamental to the contemporary understanding of economics – 
although not all economics9 – it is necessary to understand the significance of a 
number of political, economic and theoretical developments that took place during 
the 20th century and more particularly after the end of the Second World War. 
These events include the reassertion of liberal values in the form of neoliberalism 
(Dardot & Laval, 2013; Olssen & Peters, 2005), the move from classical to 
neoclassical economics (Samuels, Biddle & Davis, 2003), the development of the 
global marketplace (‘Economic Globalization’, 2017; The World Bank, 2017), the 
contemporary emergence of knowledge as a factor of production (Machlup, 
                                                 
9 University Readers prescribed by Business Management Schools and Economics Departments 
surprising ignore the significance of innovation, despite innovation being identified in their 
curricula as a driver of economic development. 
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1962), the advent of the world-wide-web (‘Tim Berners-Lee’, 2017), the 
networked information economy (Benkler, 2006) and the formation of digital 
capitalism (Peters & Bulut, 2011), the Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development’s (OECD) protagonism of national systems of innovation as 
policy and application (Lundvall, 2004), to mention just a few of the crucial 
developments. These developments being what they are, the intention here is not 
to provide an historicist approach to understanding the origins of how economics 
came to value innovation, but it is to use knowledge of these events to trouble the 
notion that the concept of the innovation should be the prerogative of economics.     
          What is interesting about the significance of innovation during the last 80 
years is that the history of economic activity has not resulted in the development 
of a theory of innovation that holds for all forms of industrial development. The 
World Economic Forum (2016) is now speaking of industrial development since 
the mid-18th century as being marked by four revolutions, each involving a new 
orientation in production: “acceleration”, “mass production”, “automation”, and 
“cyber-physical systems” (Bloem, van Doom, Duivestein, Exoffier, Mass & van 
Ommeren, 2014, pp. 11-12). The difficulty of articulating a theory of innovation 
is not merely because of the radical change in orientation that these developments 
suppose but also because these four orientations can be seen to exist 
simultaneously and alongside each other in the same business. The relevance of 
these categories to Education has to do with how they inform the discussion of 
performativity such that the accent of student performance can be d in relation to 
how these categories stifle the already innovative student. This line of inquiry will 
be picked up again in Chapter Three. 
 
1.3.1 
New combinations of productive means 
Having briefly illustrated the complexity of the dynamic in which innovation, as a 
concept and application, has emerged, it is time to problematize the stock 
definition of innovation. The contemporary concept of innovation gets its initial 
definition from Schumpeter (1934/1911), when he describes innovation as that 
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which results from “new combinations of productive means” (p. 66). 10  These 
combinations covered what Schumpeter called five cases: 
(1) The introduction of a new good … ; (2) the Introduction of a 
new method of production … ; (3) the opening of a new market 
… ; (4) the conquest of a new source of supply of raw materials 
of half-manufactured goods … ; (5) the carrying out of a new 
organization of an industry … (p. 66). 
The curious thing about this description of the five cases n which innovation takes 
place is that fact that, while they identify distinctive economic activities that can 
influence the behaviour of the market, they do not share a lot other than the 
presence of the need for the profit motive (Schumpeter, 1934/1911). There are 
other things an entrepreneur does and there are other activities that generate 
wealth. The vagueness of this selection of categories becomes more obvious once 
knowledge is abstracted from capital as one of the three principles of modernist 
economics along with labour and land, and becomes itself a bona fide principle of 
economics (see Marshall, 1890). The emergence of knowledge as a principle of 
economics does not really occur until after the Second World War when Bush 
(1960) requests researchers work with industry to invigorate economic 
development in the United States (see Godin, 2008). From this point onwards, its 
emerging importance is captured in a series of developments that can be said to 
begin with Machlup’s (1962) studies of the economic value of knowledge (as 
cited in Peters, Marginson & Murphy, 2008) and continue through to the advent 
of the knowledge economy, beginning with the OECD’s (1996) use of the term 
“knowledge-based economy” (as cited in Peters, Marginson & Murphy, 2008, p. 
3). As is well known, knowledge assumes the full weight of it significance with 
the development of the world-wide-web (Benkler, 2006; Lévy, 1997, among many 
others ) and the global dissemination of knowledge.  
What is surprising about this development is that Schumpeter’s 
(1934/1911) categorization of cases or contexts in which innovation occurs has 
remained, for the most part, unchanged for over 80 years. The OECD (2005) 
                                                 
10 While the impact of innovation on economic development began to be understood in the 20th 
century as a consequence of Schumpeter’s The theory of economic development: An inquiry into 
profits, capital, credit, interest, and the business cycle (1934), the original work was published in 
1911, nearly a quarter of a century earlier. One can only wonder what would have happened if the 
original German text was translated into English in 1911. Could it for instance have contributed to 
the possibility of staving off the catastrophe of the First World War?       
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defines innovation, post its own use of the terminology “knowledge-based 
economy” (1996), as:  
… the implementation of a new or significantly improved 
product (good or service), or process, a new marketing method, 
or a new organizational method inbusiness (sic) practices, 
workplace organization or external relations. (p. 46)  
Returning to this initial sighting of innovation in economics and its broad brush-
strokes, while it is not possible to say that the advent of the knowledge economy 
reflects the existence of an entirely sequential process of development in 
capitalism – the effects of the four so-called industrial revolutions, “acceleration”, 
“mass production”, “automation”, and “cyber-physical systems” (Bloem et al., 
2014, pp. 11-12) continue to be fundamental – the knowledge economy adds an 
added dimension to the ecology of human behaviour. This is to say, these 
distinctive features of economic development function simultaneously, as 
Freeman (2008) notes, even within the same business, the automobile factory 
being a good example.11 Given this complexification of economic activity and its 
related features, the importance of neoliberalism, the networked information 
economy, social media, digital capitalism and the ever more educated consumer, 
there needs to be some pivotal theoretical developments in economic thinking on 
innovation for there to be the development of a philosophy of education capable 
of turning the rationale and logic of economic thought against itself and, as such, 
bringing economic thinking on innovation and its black-boxing of the innovation 
process into question.  
The pivotal theoretical developments considered in this investigation are: 
the political impetus to couple technology to innovation after the Second World 
War (Godin, 2008), Drucker’s analysis of innovation in The landmarks of 
tomorrow (1959) and the advent of a concept for the global study and 
management of the National Systems of Innovation (NSI) (Freeman, 1988; 
Lundvall, 1988; Nelson, 1988). These particular developments have been chosen 
over others because of their relevance to the problem of understanding the role of 
innovation in Education.12 
                                                 
11 To be performative within its design and financial parameters, and therefore to be competitive, 
an automobile factory needs to optimise these four industrial functions. 
12 See Chapters Two, Four and Five. 
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In more general terms, “innovation” is “spontaneously understood as 
technological innovation” (Godin, 2012, p. 4). On a theoretical level, the term 
innovation is variously thought of as referring to any change or novelty, diffusion, 
new products, processes, services, technologies, organizations, market strategies, 
the invention of a new idea, the commercialization of a new idea, the work of 
entrepreneurs, and work done in R&D (see Fagerberg, Mowery & Nelson, 2005; 
Godin, 2015a, 2015b, 2008; OECD, 2007). Evidently, the relationship between 
theory and practice is not a simple one. For instance, a technological innovation 
cannot be explained by a theory of innovation that pretends to be universal. The 
reason for this is that the concept of innovation refers to an extremely broad range 
of phenomena each of which might have involved innovation processes that do 
not overlap, although this is by no means always the case.13 Furthermore, it is 
questionable as to whether innovation can be theoretically described in the form 




Innovation in education 
It has been argued that innovation is regarded, in the current education model, as 
the prerogative of commercial and administrative management. The weaknesses 
of this model, with respect to the extent to which the institution is able to be 
innovative, are three-fold: (1) the institution black-boxes its own innovative 
process at the cost of understanding that it is black-boxing the innovation process 
as a knowledge asset, (2) the institution’s understanding on the purpose of 
Education requires it to ignore students who are already innovative, meaning the 
institution also black-boxes the already innovative student, and (3) in allowing 
itself to be led by purely commercial interests, the institution is closed to other 
forms of innovation, such as political, social and ecological innovation.14 These 
weaknesses have become structural obstacles that inhibit Education serving 
students, knowledge and society on their own terms. What is more, the institution 
sees no need to explain its incapacity to address these weaknesses – its politics of 
                                                 
13 Godin’s (2017) work addresses this issue. 
14 These weaknesses will be addressed in detail in Chapter Four. 
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innovation already being justified by its concept of economics. If this ideological 
disposition fails the institution and innovation is poorly managed to the point of 
compromising its commercial performance, rather than questioning its 
understanding of the concept of innovation, Education brings in new commercial 
expertise, in the form of a new manager to the school board or a new vice-
chancellor to the university.  
          The attitude that will be taken in this investigation is one that no model can 
be thought to be beyond reproach. This is to say that the institution’s politics of 
innovation should always be open to change in its own processes and what is 
more that such change should be able to be effected from below. Furthermore, it is 
thought that the vision that underpins this commercial model should be open to 
being transformed by the collective participation of students in the institution’s 
innovative processes. What the latter refers to is collective student capacities to 
transform the manner in which education is provided them, whether this is by 
introducing new forms of learning or through seeking to be assessed according to 
a new means of understanding the value of learning.    
   
1.4.1 
Neoliberal forms of educational innovation 
Neoliberalism’s transformation of the educational institution into a commercial 
enterprise logically supposes the adoption of a concept of innovation that must 
have its epistemological foundations in economic theory and how innovation is 
understood in the commercial world. Except for some crude differences, it is 
possible to say that the educational institution and the commercial enterprise 
operate with the same objectives: they pursue innovation as an “application” 
(Drucker, 1959, p. 17) with the aim of achieving greater presence in the 
marketplace. When speaking of crude differences, the following can be 
postulated: (1) that students (as proxies for their parents) pay to learn to work, 
whereas workers get paid for what they know and do; (2) that students work to 
create themselves as human capital, whereas workers create goods and/or 
services; and (3) that ‘learning’, ‘already existing innovative capacities’ and 
‘concepts of the important problems of the world’ are not triangulated in the non-
proprietary sector, whereas they are sometimes in the proprietary sector, 
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depending on the status of the worker (see Sennett,  2006). It will be argued in 
later chapters that, in making these basic claims, it is the strategic application of 
human capital theory as an instrument of institutional innovation policy that 
obstructs understanding how students might contribute as innovative subjects to 
the institution’s innovation process. This is to say that innovations initiated by 
students should not only be considered to be integral to their creation of new 
learning pathways, but that these same innovations should also be considered to 
merit the possibility of transforming the provision of the service that is provided 
them. How else can educational institutions stay abreast of the influence of the 
technological developments that benefit student learning? Student learning 
involves more and more learning by doing and these new technological 
developments are likely to result in greater student understanding of how they 
benefit their learning – a capacity for which, we can only imagine, most 
commercial and administrative personnel will struggle to keep up with.      
          The difficulty with the institution’s incumbent conceptual understating of 
innovation as technological innovation has to do with its will to control the 
formation of new ideas such that the only ideas that can be considered innovative 
are those that can be commercialized. In the present political economy, the very 
status of the student, as an individual who has not completed the formation of the 
self as human capital, delimits the student possibilities to be innovative such that 
their ideas can never have commercial implications as long as they are still 
studying, let alone the implications involved in addressing other problems. 
Sometimes there are exceptions but these possibilities, it is argued here, are 
largely stifled. In the educational institution, the illusion is that new ideas are the 
unique prerogative of commercial and administrative management and that such 
similar or equally important ideas do not arise in student thought, experience and 
research.15 The unanticipated emergence of new ideas in the student cohort is not 
always welcomed, as the nature of such ideas can also suppose the emergence of 
new political subjectivities; an emergence that challenges the political legitimacy 
of the institution’s commercial model for the development of knowledge.  
                                                 
15 One way some universities prohibit the possibility of student innovation is by controlling the 
parameters of with which their intellectual property is used. For example, postgraduate student 
ideation is prohibited from being promoted under the university banner in that students can be 
prohibited from using the university logo and header on a set power point of slides at a conference 
presentation. 
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          The political legitimacy of the educational institution as a commercial 
enterprise is therefore a precarious one. While Education is historically a public 
good, the contemporary institution is made to function as if its legitimacy can only 
be determined by its performance in the marketplace. This is to say, Education’s 
programme for facilitating the production of human capital supposes the 
paradoxical situation where the public educational institution must act as if it is a 
private institution.  
The feat of situating the educational institution in the proprietary domain 
has required the ongoing adherence to a cohesive metanarrative that, in economic 
history, begins with Schumpeter’s explanation of innovation in 1934. As 
intimated in Section 1.2, in 80 years, there has been little theoretical development 
of the concept of innovation; something that has been guaranteed by the OECD’s 
promulgation of a concept of innovation that is uniquely limited to being a driver 
of economic development. Lundvall’s (1996, 2007a) work for the OECD has 
ensured that this conceptual consistency is carried over into the development and 
application of the learning economy. 
 
1.4.2 
A New Zealand case in point 
In New Zealand, The Treasury is a key influence on both economic and education 
policy developments. The Treasury would seem to play a strategic role in the way 
that it speaks or does not speak to the meaning of innovation. Its work is more 
about extrapolating existing analysis and providing an ideological orientation. To 
this effect, innovation is thought of as being “one of five ‘drivers’ of productivity” 
(The Treasury, 2008, p. 1), and can be understood to conceptually draw on NSI 
literatures. 16  Here, innovation is thought to be characterized by “non-linear”, 
“pervasive”, “specialization”, “cumulative” and “collaborative” (p. 16) processes. 
The Treasury considers knowledge creation to be important in “driving innovation 
performance (and ultimately productivity)” (p. 18). To be more specific, 
knowledge is thought of in terms of capacities for “accumulation” and 
“application” (p. 18).  
                                                 
16 National Systems of Innovation will be further engaged in Chapter Two. 
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          This above thinking is fed down into ministry policy. Roger Proctor (2008), 
for the Ministry of Economic Development,17  describes innovation as driving 
productivity that is produced by “the discovery, creation and commercialization of 
new and improved products (goods and services) that consumers value, the 
development of productive markets for existing products, and the discovery and 
implementation of new and more effective ways of organization production, 
distribution and marketing” (p. 3). While this thinking draws on both 
Schumpeter’s and the OECD definitions (see Section 1.2), it also breaks from 
Schumpeter’s concept with respect to who should assume the risk of innovation. 
To Schumpeter (1934/1911), it is the creditor, to Proctor (2008), it is the 
entrepreneur. One of the positive aspects of this definition, with respect to how it 
might influence understandings of innovation in educational institutions, is that it 
does not say who discovers, who creates and who commercializes. In other words, 
the initiation of innovation (its invention as an idea) is not formally delimited to 
the role of commercial management.    
          At this point, it could be argued that the narrative that tracks the impact of 
the concept of innovation on Education becomes murky. Education makes 
rhetorical reference to innovation without explicitly stating how innovation should 
be understood in the education sector (see Ministry of Education, 2016). 
However, in this context, it is also logical that it should be harder to see how the 
commercial and administration management understand the value of innovation as 
a means of transforming Education. The educational institution, although 
strategically commercial, is situated in the non-proprietary domain where the 
profit motivation for innovation is supposedly subsumed in support of the myth 
(some might say false idea) that Education should function as a project that is 
independent of explicit commercial interests. This obfuscation of the profit motive 
is perhaps only possible because of the structural role human capital theory plays 
in ordering the relationship between Education and the commercial world. If the 
development of innovative capacities were not framed by the requirements that 
students develop skills and knowledge in the form of human capital, the profit 
motive that drives the institution’s process of innovation would become 
transparent and imply the need for alternative ways of understanding innovation. 
                                                 
17 This ministry is now called the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment. 
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For example, an alternative way of understanding change is to understand it as 
political innovation – where innovation involves the application of one idea over 
another; the commercial aspect of this idea is subsumed to become fundamental 
rather than being the sole motivation for change.   
          In the aforementioned context, innovation, as a transformative capacity that 
might implicate the conscious participation of students and teachers, in the 
political sense of what new ideas in Education should imply is for the most part 
stifled. In the schooling system, this stifling of the formation of student and 
teacher innovative capacities is structurally supported through the state’s 
designation of innovation as a “value” (Ministry of Education, 2007, p. 10). This 
would not be such a bad thing except for the fact that thinking, as a key 
competency, is designated to be learned as an extant competency and not as 
something that should be learned in all moments of the student’s education (see 
Hipkins, Bolstad, Boyd & McDowall, 2014). Because thinking, in the 
understanding of these authors, is not thought of as endemic to all learning, it is 
possible to reify innovation as a commercial value.  In doing this, the incumbent 
politics of innovation is able to evade student re-evaluation of commercial 
innovation in such a manner that student thinking should cause them to break with 
the institution’s particular notion of what it means to be innovative.  
          So, instead of innovation being understood as a phenomenon that could be 
subject to discussion rich in diverse interpretations, it is made to adhere to an 
understanding that equates with the concept applied by the institution’s 
commercial management. To this effect, the student could not be blamed for 
thinking that the meaning of innovation is beyond reproach. What this means for 
the student, as an already innovative subject, is that they must either critically 
challenge the nature of the curriculum or they must covertly pursue their thinking 
such that their tacit knowledge of innovation should remain hidden. If not, the 
student can be assumed to identify with what will later be described, in this 
investigation, as the negative subject of innovation;18 in other words, as the object 
that they make themselves into during the process of producing the human capital 
that they are yet to become.   
                                                 
18 See Chapter Seven. 
41 
          At the level of teacher implication in the innovation process, teacher 
experience is largely prescribed by policy. A good example would be the The 
Teacher-led Innovation Fund (Ministry of Education, 2014). While teachers are 
enthusiastic about the opportunities this fund supposes (Ministry of Education, 
2016b), teacher innovations will need to be sanctioned during the application 
process, which means teacher innovations are likely to need to be supportive of 
the already existing top-down governance of innovation. While teachers might 
believe that they are responsible for effecting change in the form of introducing 
new innovations to their teaching, equally they are executing a politics of 
innovation (the application of this politics) that has already been initiated by the 
institution’s executive. This politics of innovation, where the carrying out of 
teaching innovations executes what has been already decided, can be thought of as 
back-fill as it only seeks to add to the power of the institution’s political economy. 
For this reason, teacher innovation cannot transform the teaching experience such 
that it might challenge the institution’s politics of innovation. It might be added 
that teacher subjugation is also a form of human capital development, in that the 
institutional process of innovation invests in teachers, through professional 
development, so that they improve their capacity to improve quality;19 that is, so 
as they make the machine perform more efficiently.  
 
Conclusion 
It has been argued in this chapter that standard economics black-boxes its own 
process of innovation, which itself has the effect of black-boxing the actors who 
bring this process to completion. The theoretical benefit of such a feat is that, in 
objectifying this aspect of its own work, it gifts this problem of self-ambiguation 
to those who research beyond the realm of economic problematics. This is to say, 
standard economics gifts others the possibility of deciding how this problematic 
might be reconstituted as a problem for humanity rather than as a mere economic 
problem. In this sense, science cannot solve the problem of why the process of 
innovation has been black-boxed. Humanity at large has to do this collectively as 
a consequence of its recognition of its anthropological condition. What this means 
                                                 
19 The Teacher-led Innovation Fund (Ministry of Education, 2014) is part of a program that seeks 
to “Invest in educational success”.  
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is that we are faced with a decision over whether we want to participate in change, 
in order to consider the nature of the problem that we face. 
 The initial task in this investigation is to accept this above invitation as 
one that implies the need to explore how the aforementioned problem might be re-
interpreted. To begin this exploration, the next chapter will involve an 
investigation of the innovative actor and their innovative process through and 
exploration of three historical exemplars – those of List, Schumpeter and 
Lundvall. This discussion begins from the premise that if economics is 
responsible for the estrangement of the innovative subject from the process of 
innovation, then this estrangement has been bedded in over time, conceivably 
since the beginning of the first industrial revolution. This said, it is decided here 
that instead of attempting to extrapolate the genealogy of this error, it would be a 
better to begin from the perspective that there is value in analyzing the work of 
three economists who have not sought to hide the importance of the process of 
innovation, as the reason for why these thinkers might be celebrated for the 
innovation that characterized their careers.   
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CHAPTER TWO 
List, Schumpeter, Lundvall: The Process of Being Innovative 
 
Introduction 
If the process of innovation and by implication the innovative subject is treated by 
standard economics as a black box, the genealogical study that would be required 
to reveal how and why this theoretical separation occurred would involve a 
complex analysis that in itself would be too exhaustive for this investigation. Such 
a project, for example, would require an analysis of why economics has 
historically been permitted to focus on a macro interpretation of human activity at 
the expense of developing a more cohesive understanding of the macro, meso and 
micro levels of human activity that might also allow the autonomous evolution of 
these three elements.1 For such an analysis to benefit the argument of this thesis, 
there would also need to be an in-depth study of how political innovation, social 
innovation and even religious innovation have been subsumed in the history of 
thought while continuing to contribute to how technological innovation is thought 
of today.  
An alternative strategy is required to tackle the theoretical dilemma that 
standard economics poses in abandoning theoretical interest in the process of 
innovation. Instead of focusing on the aforementioned error in standard economic 
thought and therefore the history of thought in general, as would be required in 
any rigorous genealogical study (Foucault, 1998a), this chapter will adopt another 
approach to genealogical study. In place of a concern for the fate of an error – the 
separation of the innovative subject from the process of innovation – this chapter 
will concern itself with the destiny of creative thought that does not fall into error. 
This is not to say that the analysis of the separation of the innovative 
subject from the innovative process should never be thought of as an error. The 
intention is rather to alter the equilibrium in the balance shared by the will to risk 
and the will to responsibility such that theoretical empathy has the researcher 
siding with the will to risk so as not to be restrained too much by the lessons of 
                                                 
1 This is what neo-Schumpeterian economics tries to do (see Dopfer, 2007). 
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the past – as economics is be prone to being. The reason for this approach is that 
the intention is not only to reveal the positive history of the role of the innovative 
subject in the process of innovation, but it is also to elucidate that manner in 
which this relationship might be thought of as speaking to the situation of the 
already innovative subject in Education. It is in this sense that it is thought here 
that the economists List, Schumpeter and Lundvall might speak to the needs of a 
student whose will it is to be innovative.  
The argument, in positing this change in how genealogy is thought of, 
revolves around the idea that innovation, as a category, and therefore as a 
phenomenon that contributes to how the contemporary student understands the 
problem of being innovative, has been abused by contemporary historians and 
especially historians of economics (for example, Landes, Mokyr & Baumol, 
2010). This is to say, innovation has not merely evolved in a manner that 
sequentially corresponds to an historicist analysis of history. This discussion 
instead rests on a genealogical understanding that innovation should not simply be 
thought of as being responsive to a sequential evolution of its category, where 
social innovation accedes the political (in the 19th century) and the technological 
innovation accedes social innovation (in the 20th century). The genealogical 
notion of the value of history supposes innovation must still be concerned with the 
political and the social (see Drucker, 1959, Godin, 2015b). This is to say the 
social, political and technological aspects of innovation exist both in historical 
sequence and simultaneously in the foundations of innovation as a category.  
In making this argument, the question is how to structure the discussion so 
that these aspects of innovation as a category, that are both sequential and 
simultaneous, are elicited together and yet within the era that was particular to the 
life and work of each economist discussed in this chapter particular. List’s (1789-
1846) understanding of innovation would have been conditioned by the problems 
of the era in which he lived and worked, as would have been the formation of 
Schumpeter’s (1883-1950) and Lundvall’s (1941-) understanding of innovation. 
Therefore while it might be logical to engage the thinking of List, Schumpeter and 
Lundvall on the process of innovation in historical sequence, as it were, the 
approach will also attempt to couch each engagement according to how 
Schumpeter thought innovation should be studied.  
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Godin informs us that when Maclaurin sought advice from Schumpeter as 
to how to study innovation, Schumpeter proposed the following methodological 
framework: the “historical analysis of industries and business”, … “industrial 
monographs”, and the “biographies of business leaders” (as cited in Godin, 2008, 
p. 7). While the intention in this discussion is not to adhere to these categories of 
research in the way that Freeman did in his work (see Godin, 2010b).2 Rather is 
my intention to allude to how List’s biographical experience dominates our 
understanding of the process of innovation (Henderson, 1983: Hirst, 1965); as it is 
my intention to allude to how historical analysis predominates in how 
Schumpeter’s experience informs our understanding of the process of innovation 
(Schumpeter, 1939, 1954, 1987); and as it is my intention to allude to how 
Lundvall’s detailed study of the mechanics of technological change informs our 




Just as it can be said that there were individuals who understood that knowledge 
was an economic principle in the creation of wealth before knowledge became a 
factor of capitalist production, it can also be said that the innovative subject exists 
before this terminology enters common use. List was one such individual: he was 
an innovative subject who understood the value of knowledge as a factor in 
economic development and furthermore, that knowledge needed to be developed 
before technology could play its part in the development of political economy. 
Why has it taken so long for these terminologies – the innovative subject and 
knowledge – to be accepted in economic theory – something that has perhaps 
assisted in better understanding the significance of List’s contribution to economic 
development through innovation? In relation to the innovative subject, this 
terminology as a theoretical description of the innovative individual is yet to enter 
the theory of innovation. In relation to the value of knowledge as an economic 
principle, perhaps it is because historians of economic history have closed ranks 
on List’s genealogical approach to understanding how knowledge can be used to 
                                                 
2 This is to say, Freeman adopts the same advice, as that which was offered by Schumpeter to 
Maclaurin, when he (Freeman) initiates the development of a new tradition with respect to how 
technological innovation is understood, (Godin, 2010a). See Chapter Six.          
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develop the concept of political economic. While List is known today, largely on 
account of the work of Freeman (2008) and the development of the concept of 
national systems of innovation, little has been written about the work that List did 
to unify Germany’s productive forces prior to its political unification in 1871.3 
          So the question is, if List is so little known in discussions on innovation, 
how does his approach to the problem of being innovative facilitate the possibility 
of addressing (1) why the process in innovation has come to be neglected by 
economic theory and (2) why the innovative subject can be thought to be integral 
to the process of innovation? One thing that is unavoidable in reading on List’s 
life (Henderson, 1983: Hirst, 1965) is the idea that there was nothing theoretical in 
his thinking that was not already implicit to his understanding of the practical 
problem that preoccupied him. While it is possible to say that his interest in 
initiating new economic development was abstract (captured best in his writing of 
pamphlets, journalism, policy and books), his writing addressed practical 
problems of significance, where his knowledge was often used in ways that his 
possible collaborators were largely resistant to. These above questions are thus 
posited on the premise that List was himself an already innovative actor, in the 
sense that the already innovative student suffers a degree of anonymity. To this 
effect, List was a very paradoxical figure in the sense that he can be throught to 
have tried to think the paradoxes that defined the situation in Germany in his time 
(see Henderson, 1983: Hirst, 1965; List, 1966/1885). 
 
2.1.1  
Innovation as end 
In List’s day, in 19th century Germany, the concept of innovation had not yet 
focused its interest on the commercialization of inventions (Godin, 2015b). 
Although there was a great deal on invention going on (see Murphy, 2010), much 
of which was focused on acceleration and of mass production (Bloem et al., 
2014), innovation itself is not seen as the driver of economic development that it 
is today. In 19th century Germany, as in neighbouring states, the concept of 
innovation is going through a transformation (Godin, 2015). The political 
                                                 
3 The concept of National Systems of Innovation is derived from List’s concept of national systems 
of production (see Freeman, 1987, 1988; Lundvall, 1988; Nelson, 1988, as cited in Lundvall, 
2007b). 
47 
innovation of the French Revolution, while casting a long shadow on account of 
the loss of life, is falling out of view as the means of understanding change and is 
being succeeded by an interest in social innovation. The concept of technological 
innovation comes much later in developments that follow the Second World War. 
As such, List’s concept of innovation needs to be thought of as being evolved 
within and against the conditions that favoured this transformation.  
          Within this context and when looking at List’s achievements, it would be 
tempting to think of the Deutsche Reichsbahn – the national railway system 
(Henderson, 1983: Hirst, 1965) – as his innovation, because these are the terms in 
which innovation is thought of today: as an end. However, when innovation is 
thought of as a means and an achievement in itself, as it was prior to the coupling 
of technology and innovation after the Second World War, the national railways 
system, as an innovation, becomes just a piece in wider problem and puzzle, more 
of which will be explained in Section 2.1.2. Defining the national railway system 
as both a means and an end helps illustrate how the relationship between the 
innovative subject and the innovation process has changed since the 19th century 
and possibly why the innovative subject has since been absent from that which 
makes innovation possible. 
          If Germany’s national railway system were to be described in today’s 
paradigm, it would be thought of as a technology that enabled Germany to be 
more competitive with English and French exporters on the eastern seaboard of 
America. What this railway achieved for Germany is that it linked the 
disconnected principalities in Lower Germany to each other and to Prussia and its 
various regions (see Appendix A), and this global network to the major trading 
ports.  
          There are some simple things that can be said about the design of this 
network that would be easy to miss. One is that while List struggled for years to 
convince his own people of the merits of building a national railways system, in 
beginning its construction later, the Germans were able to avoid making the 
mistakes the French made. The French built their national railway system based 
on the Legrand Star or a centralized network, meaning all lines were routed 
through Paris (see Appendix B), with Paris acting as the centre to its star structure, 
which meant that when anything needed delivering to somewhere off the 
immediate line, it needed to go through Paris and then back out to its final 
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destination. The Germans chose a different design so as it could link all the 
aforementioned disconnected principalities and Prussia in the most efficient way 
possible. This created a distributed network (see Appendix C) where there were 
always alternative routes to getting goods from manufacturers to the major port. 
This design both lowered the cost and increased the speed with which goods could 
be delivered to ports. While all this difference in design provided a self-evident 
advantage when goods reached the market, this design also facilitated something 
much more important: it unified the disconnected principalities in Lower 
Germany and Prussia creating a single state and political economy where there 
were once many, as seen in Figure 1.  
 
2.1.2 
Innovation as means 
As intimated above, List’s experience of innovation was a more complex one than 
that which might be associated with how technological innovation is thought of. 
This may seem like an audacious claim and especially given how technological 
innovation is regarded today. But how else should List’s commitment to change 
be thought of? He was a man alone who sought to intervene in the cultural history 
of a country that was divided against itself and furthermore had no intention of 
changing. As such, the unification of Germany did not simply require the 
initiation of construction in 1835 of the first railway line between Nuremberg and 
Fürth (Mitchell, 1966), which eventually led to the creation of Germany’s 
distributed railway network. It required the transformation of a number of 
fundamental aspects of life that made each principality different such that these 
political entities would be receptive to being linked to a national network that 
would homogenize each entity’s special character. What made the special 
character of these principalities so distinctive is that the nobles who governed 
their principalities, governed them according to the intricacy of their own self-
designed bureaucracies (Pinkard, 2005). Pinkard creates a vivid picture of how 
these distinctive political entities culturally and politically siloed themselves from 
the world.  
To go from one area of Germany to another was to travel in all 
senses to a foreign place; as one travelled, the laws changed, the 
dialect changed, the clothes changed, and the mores changed; the 
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roads were terrible, and communication between the various 
areas was difficult (and consequently infrequent); and one 
usually required a passport to make the journey. A “liberty” was 
still within the context of the ancient regime, that is not a general 
“right” but a “privilege” to do something really quite particular – 
such as the privilege … to collect wood from a particular 
preserve – and depended on the locality in which it was 
exercised. To be outside of a particular locale was this to be 
without “rights” perhaps at all. (p. 5)   
How should List’s relationship, as an innovative subject, with the process of 
innovation be thought of? How did he initiate receptivity in the principalities to 
change such that their governors would be willing to make pragmatic steps to 
overcome their foreignness to one another?4 Did he shame them into action? Was 
it the force of his argument? As in all great social innovations, what is clear is that 
he could not have accomplished this great feat on his own and, as such, his 
argument must be thought of as being one that was in tune with social forces that 
wanted the same change. By this, it is not meant that List collaborated in a great 
social innovation, but that he engaged with the implicit nature of the problems that 
faced the German commercial populace: how to compete with the English in the 
American market (Henderson, 1983: Hirst, 1965).  
          What was his method? Through experimenting with this process abroad,5 
through taking the problem of political economy – as he understood its function 
and purpose – and problematizing it in the political and civic arenas of economic 
life in France, England and America (Henderson, 1983: Hirst, 1965). In terms of 
his innovation process – his commitment to research, reflection and arguing his 
case – his innovative activity needs to be thought of within the following 
framework. Think of the railway: if the introduction of the distributed network 
can be thought of as a technological innovation in as much as it involves a radical 
alteration of the models for networking transport that England and France were 
using, on a societal level, this innovation can be understood to have had more 
complex and far reaching implications (see Appendix D). List understood that 
“we need social innovation more than we need technological innovation” 
                                                 
4 The governors of the state of Wurttemberg, who had previously committed List to prison for 
insurrection, expelled him from the country, took away his passport and made him a stateless 
person. 
5 List even built a railway in America to service a coalmine he bought by connecting it to Port 
Clinton (Hirst, 1965). 
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(Drucker, 1959, p. 33), and that “‘[p]roductivity’ is a social innovation even 
though its tools are, in the past at least, technological” (Drucker, 1959, p. 29). To 
this effect, List, from the time he was incarcerated in 1822 to when he died in 
1846 (Hirst, 1965), engaged in activities that are perhaps best thought of as 
involving an effort to demonstrate the value of unifying Germany as a state with a 
political economy that would be self-designed to its best advantage and not as a 
replica of what Adam Smith (1723-1790) was promoting to the rest of the world 
(see Henderson, 1983: Hirst, 1965; List, 1966/1885). 
 
2.1.3  
List as innovative subject 
Beginning with Chapter One, attention has been given to the fact that innovations 
cannot be thought of as being self generating; that there is a process and that there 
are actors – innovative individuals – who make the realization of the innovation 
possible. The critique here of contemporary capitalist thinking is that it 
emphasizes the importance of ends and outputs to the detriment of the educational 
importance of the means that those who are its innovative subjects or those who 
learn from these actors would normally benefit from.  
          In the case of List’s innovations – the national railways network and the 
political economic unity that ensues from the introduction of this logistical 
infrastructure – the process was protracted, very idiosyncratic, epic in scope and 
requirements of energy and exhaustive in terms of the need for perseverance (see 
Henderson, 1983: Hirst, 1965); it killed him in the end and before the innovation 
itself had really begin to take shape.6 Upon reading the history of his experience, 
it would appear that the innovation process that delivered the aforementioned 
achievements required a very particular understanding of the innovative process 
when addressing the problems List hope to address: it required List with his great 
intellect (see List, 1966/1885), to be faithful to a kind of pre-industrial form of 
thinking. The process of being innovative required List to defy the separation of 
roles that becomes ever more explicit during the first industrial revolution, where 
                                                 
6 List committed suicide in 1846 believing his project was a lost cause (Henderson, 1983: Hirst, 
1965).   
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separate actions are allocated to different actors.7 List was both the initiator of the 
idea that Germany could be economically competitive on the global stage through 
the creation of a national system of production that itself could only come about 
through the introduction of a national railways network, and he was also the 
executor of this strategy for achievement. The process of being innovative for List 
was therefore one of beginning and achieving as if these roles needed to remain 
connected and realized by the same individual or group of individuals. This so-
called pre-industrial form of thinking can also be thought to exhibit the 
characteristics of the hero of German Romantic Idealism, the playing to and its 
associated suffering of the emotional relationship to one’s ideas (see Berlin, 
1999), but what is more important to take away here is List’s intrinsic 
understanding of what is involved when carrying through such an idea as the one 
he began with. 
          This was not an easy task for the reason that to realize his ambition, List 
had to bring about a fundamental change in German thinking. The nobility that 
governed Germany’s many principalities were happy with their lot and had no 
reason to change. As such, bringing about this change required work with no 
guarantees that this would produce results. Perhaps it is possible to imagine this 
transformation if List were a noble himself and one who worked within the 
system but he was not and much of his life was spent in forced exile. It is amidst 
these difficulties that it is possible to see List the innovative actor.  
          List did not seek to re-innovate Adam Smith’s thinking on the creation of 
wealth, instead he chose to deconstruct the questions Smith addressed and build 
his own thinking according to what he thought were a more appropriate set of 
questions (Henderson, 1983: Hirst, 1965; List, 1966/1885). Smith advances 
Quesnay’s thinking with the stipulation that “political or national economy must 
be replaced by cosmopolitical or world-wide economy” (List, 1966/1885, p. 120), 
where all that would be required for mankind to economically prosper would be 
“bearable taxation, fair administration of justice and peace” – none of which, 
could be added, have characterized world history since the 18th century. For the 
popular school “the well-being of the individual” was dependent upon “the well-
                                                 
7 Arendt (1998) describes, in her analysis of the human condition, how action is made to serve the 
interests of work and in so doing becomes separated by the roles that are ascribed to its realization: 
‘initiation’ and ‘execution’. See Chapter Ten. 
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being of the whole human race” (p. 121), which itself could only be attained 
through lasting peace.  
List (1966/1885) thinking this was an error, inverted Smith’s thinking and 
instead argues that to trumpet “the well-being of the individual” as being 
dependent upon “the well-being of the whole human race” is irrational for a 
number of reasons (p. 121), beginning with the fact that such rhetoric is the luxury 
of the position that England found itself in at the time. To List, England being the 
dominant economic power afforded its ideologues the opportunity to espouse 
whatever theory they thought convenient to the purpose of increasing their global 
economic superiority.  
          List (1966/1885) instead thought the well-being of the individual could not 
be left to the fate of the whole human race as there would never be everlasting 
peace – that war is an aspect of international conflict. Instead he thought that the 
individual needed to be thought of in terms of their productive powers and that all 
individual productive powers needed to be unified according to the political 
economic strategy of the state. Smith does away with the state believing it 
obstructs real economic growth, whereas List argues that the particular conditions 
in which individual nations live need to be taken into account when trading 
internationally: that in fact a degree of protectionism is necessary in order to 
defend the integrity of an individual nation’s right to decide its own trajectory of 
growth. It is in this sense that List (1966/1885) was theoretically innovative: his 
process of innovation changed the model by which political economy was 
understood. 
          The above speaks of List’s thinking with respect to how he thought 
Germany might achieve the best result for its people through trade. But what were 
his actions? During the odyssey that was his career, he worked as a civil servant, a 
journalist, a professor, a politician, and an entrepreneur. He also spent time as The 
Commissioner of Heilbronn, The Secretary of the Union of Merchants, The 
American Consul (to various states in Germany) and as spokesman for Germany’s 
national interests(Henderson, 1983, p. xi). Lastly he was a railway pioneer. All 
these occupations were the medium of his enterprise and, as such, provided the 
situation within which he could research, write newspaper articles and pamphlets, 
not forgetting his book The National System of Political Economy (1966/1885), all 
of which might be essentially summarized in the form of an argument for change. 
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If this picture does not convince the reader of the complex situation of this 
innovative actor, it needs to be remembered that he also suffered the indignity of 
being a fugitive (1822-1824), a prisoner (1824-1825) and to a lesser extent that of 
an emigrant (1825-1830). 
          The last thing that might be said about List’s innovative methodology and 
method, he was a post-Cartesian in a world bound by Cartesian thought: he 
understood that the future of Germany depended on its capacity to foster the 
importance of internal relationships between the principalities and the other larger 
provinces through the formation of a dispersed logistical infrastructure: the 




While Schumpeter is known for having developed the “first approach to a theory 
of economic growth” and having “identified innovation as the cause of economic 
growth, and the entrepreneur as its agent” (Drucker, 1969, p. 182), the intention of 
this section, with respect to the contribution Schumpeter makes to the thesis 
argument, is to speak to the problem of the relationship between the innovative 
subject and the innovative process. There is no doubting Schumpeter’s 
contribution to how the concept of innovation is understood by the major global 
institutions that influence economic policy8 or his contribution to understanding 
the importance of innovation to economic growth – something that continues to be 
affirmed in global adherence to his original concept of innovation (see Chapter 
One) – however, Schumpeter’s understanding of innovation is mostly utilized to 
focus on the importance of innovation as an end. The question is: what might be 
learned from Schumpeter about the relationship between the innovative subject 
and the innovative process as a means of laying the groundwork for a better 
understanding of the already innovative student’s implication in both his or her 
own innovative process and the innovative processes of the institution? 
          In contrast to the previous study, which used history to exposit List’s 
process of innovation and his role in this process, the following study will be 
                                                 
8 These institutions include, but are not limited to, the IMF, the World Economic Forum, the 
OECD, The Ministry of the European Union. 
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philosophical in nature; the reason for this is that Schumpeter’s work can be 
thought of as being consciously paradoxical (see Eliasson, 2007; Shionoya, 
2004). As already iterated earlier in the discussion, the paradox is an important 
concept to better understanding the situation of the already innovative subject. 
Because of the scope of Schumpeter’s own work (see, in particular, 1939, 1987) 
and the brevity of the scope that can be given to this study in this chapter, much of 
what is argued here comes from engagement with secondary reading; the principal 
text being Shionoya’s (2004) article ‘Scope of Method of Schumpeter Universal 
Social Science: Economic Sociology, Instrumentalism, and Rhetoric’.9 
 
2.2.1 
Innovation as process 
When Schumpeter (1934/1911) describes innovation as that which results from 
“new combinations of productive means” (p. 66),10 there is the illusion that he is 
speaking about ends. After all, he speaks about combinations, but the important 
terminology used here is productive means. Elaborating, Schumpeter refines his 
definition of innovation by saying it refers to “the carrying out of new 
combinations” (p. 66). This carrying out of new combinations does not refer to 
the introduction of innovations to the market per se but rather to the process of 
realization that is required to produce an innovation. In other words, Schumpeter 
is referring to the process of innovation, not the product, service etcetera that is 
produced; even if it is the product or service, in the end, that is said to reconfigure 
the market. So when Fagerberg (2005) explains in his Introduction to The Oxford 
Handbook of Innovation that “… the innovation process … has been more or less 
treated as a “black box”” (p. 3), Schumpeter (1934/1911) can be considered to be 
one of the exceptions to this tendency, or otherwise the conclusion must be drawn 
that Schumpeter has been more or less misinterpreted.  
                                                 
9 Yuichi Shionoya (1932-2015) was a prominent neo-Schumpeterian (Hanusch & Pyka, 2007).) 
and was known as “one of the most imaginative researchers in the history of economics” (Yagi, 
2016). 
10 Reiterating the definition provided in Chapter One, where innovation was describing as 
involving: (1) The introduction of a new good … ; (2) The Introduction of a new method of 
production … ; (3) The opening of a new market … ; (4) The conquest of a new source of supply 
of raw materials of half-manufactured goods … ; (5) The carrying out of a new organization of an 
industry … (Schumpeter, 1934/1911, p. 66). 
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          This is important for while international institutions (The World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Economic Forum, the OCED), 
government policy-makers (The Treasury, The Ministry of Education, The 
Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment) and important NGOs (for 
example, Callaghan Innovation) continue to orient political thinking towards 
innovation in terms of its end value – thinking that draws its epistemological basis 
from Schumpeter’s (1934/1911) original definition, these institutions and thinkers 
are paradoxically emphasizing the opposite of what Schumpeter himself was 
attempting to emphasize. 
          In a later text, Schumpeter (1964)  
… define[s] innovation more rigorously by means of the 
production function…. The function describes the way in which 
quantities of product varies if quantities of factors vary. If, 
instead of quantities of factors, we vary the form of the function, 
we have an innovation. But this not only limits us, at first blush 
at least, to the case in which the innovation consists in producing 
the same kind of product that had been produced before by the 
same kind of means of production that had been used before, but 
also raises more delicate questions. Therefore, we will simply 
define innovation as the setting of a new production function. (p. 
62)            
An interesting observation can be made in relation to Schumpeter’s (1964) 
definition of innovation in terms of its setting up of a new production function: 
one, there is nothing that exclusively ties this definition to the market as that 
which needs to be addressed through the application of a commercial strategy. 
Economic activity is purely an exemplar for providing a definition on innovation 
as a production function. As Schumpeter says, technological innovation is just one 
kind of innovation and, as such, is not the only kind of innovation.11 In the case of 
Schumpeter’s understanding, innovation really needs to be understood in terms of 
how his theory of economics serves his interest in the “evolution of mind and 
society” (as cited in Shionoya, 2004, p. 332). As the thesis argument progresses, it 
will be seen that Schumpeter’s open understanding of innovation itself contrasts 
with the reductive interpretation of positivist capitalism, while at the same time 
                                                 
11 To quote Schumpeter directly: “For cases in which innovation is of the technological kind …” 
(1939, p. 63). The idiom of Schumpeter’s language at times makes him difficult to quote.  
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offering a less ambiguous view of how students could be understood to be 
participants in institutional innovation. This is to say, rather than ambiguating the 
innovation process, Schumpeter disambiguates it by adopting a broader 
perspective on what qua innovation actually refers to. 
 
2.2.2 
Schumpeter’s entrepreneur is not just a commercial entrepreneur 
The question is, if Schumpeter (1964) really does have a more open understanding 
of innovation, in place of how his (1934/1911) definition has been adopted by the 
OECD and policy-makers etcetera, then what is his understanding of the 
entrepreneur? This question, of course, conditions how the relationship between 
the innovative subject and the process of innovation should be understood in 
Schumpeterian terms. What is known in the discussion to this point is that 
Schumpeter regards the entrepreneur as doing the work of innovation, or in his 
words, as the actor whose work is the “carrying out of new combinations” 
(1934/1911, p. 66). Important to note here are the facts that “[n]obody ever is an 
entrepreneur all the time, and nobody can only be an entrepreneur” (Schumpeter, 
1964, p. 77), that “entrepreneurs as such do not form a social class” (p. 79). This 
opens the discussion to the notion that anyone can be an entrepreneur. 
          Rather than think of innovation and the production function of an 
entrepreneur as being uniquely tied to the carrying out of new combinations with 
the commercial intention of introducing something new to the market, it would 
seem more useful, when trying to understand this more extensive realm of that 
which comprises innovative activity, to understand how Schumpeter applied the 
statics-dynamics dichotomy to social life. Shionoya (1964) puts it like this: 
Underlying the distinction between statics and dynamics is the 
distinction between the conceptions of man: the “hedonistic” 
man and the “energetic” man. The former is the mass of the 
people: the latter is the leader. The entrepreneur is a special kind 
of leader in the economic domain. (p. 338) 
The problem with this description of the entrepreneur as the energetic man is that 
this characterization is made to explain a special kind of leader the commercial 
entrepreneur becomes because of his actions in the economic domain. If however, 
this characterization were made in relation to a wider domain of experience, such 
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that it were possible to identify nature according to a deeper experience of the 
complexity of life, it would appear possible to isolate the economic domain such 
that it should be possible to say that economically driven behaviour sits within 
this wider experience. This would mean that it would then also be possible to 
speak of how entrepreneurs are formed according to the deeper experience of the 
complexity of life, where, for instance, an energetic leader might put the value of 
commercial goods in perspective; that is, as a subset of a bigger picture.12 
          The disclaimer needs to be added here, that in drawing the distinction 
between the hedonistic man and energetic man, it is not being argued that either is 
a social class or that the individual is always one or the other. Schumpeter was 
aware of the limits of the theoretical dichotomies that he was using and 
furthermore he aware that he needed to think of their relationship as being 
paradoxical in nature (Shionoya, 2004). To Schumpeter, a paradox is a 
philosophical opportunity rather than an inconvenience or an obstacle. As such, it 
is more useful to look at the relationship between the hedonistic man and the 
energetic man with respect to how this relationship can be characterized by its 
‘habitus’ (Bourdieu, 1980) and practices. This would seem preferable to either 
stifling the energetic man or woman on the one hand, or inhibiting the hedonistic 
man or woman from becoming more energetic on the other.13 
Shionoya (2004) continues, 
The leader as the carrier of innovations in a particular area of 
social life, is in marked contrast to the majority of people who 
take adaptive or routine actions. Schumpeter believed that such 
contrast exists not only in economy but also in science, the arts, 
politics, and so on. He applied the static-dynamic dichotomy 
various aspects of social life as the basic vision of a universal 
social science. (p. 338)   
In relation to Shionoya’s (2004) words, it would seem important to acknowledge 
the time that has passed since Schumpeter’s death (1950). More than 65 years ago, 
                                                 
12 Lévy (1997) alludes to the emergence of such leaders in his book Collective intelligence: 
Mankind’s emerging world in cyberspace, the subject of which will be engaged in Chapters Eight 
through to Ten. 
13 This relationship will be examined in Chapter Five. 
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Schumpeter proposed the thesis that, rather than capitalism collapsing on account 
of its economic failures, it would collapse on account of its economic success: 
… its social and moral foundations by a transformation in the 
ethos of social classes. Thus capitalist economic development 
driven by the innovation of entrepreneurs will in the long run 
make the Zeitgeist of the society anti-capitalistic and this in turn 
will gradually create a social atmosphere in which it is more 
difficult for economic innovation to occur. (Shionoya, 2004, p. 
339) 
In considering this prophecy and in relation to the argument made in this thesis, it 
is thought necessary to reflect upon what has become of neoliberal economics 
when pitted in the light of Schumpeter’s vision. It is argued in this investigation, 
that the trajectory of the former’s development is such that despite impressions, it 
is more and more unlikely that Education and the politics of innovation will 
permit students to be innovative in ways that challenge the understanding 
commercial management has that innovation is something that can only serve 
economic development.  
          With evidence of neoliberalism’s failure mounting (Giroux, 2015) and even 
in the eyes of one of its most ardent sponsors, the IMF (see Ostry, Loungani & 
Furceri, 2016), the institutional executive and its commercial management of the 
educational institution becomes ever more conservative such that it can be 
interpreted that a tradition has been created that fears change or new forms of 
innovation that do not require prior training in human capital development. The 
strong insinuation here is that human capital theory, as it is employed in 
Education, comes into fundamental question, once it becomes acknowledged that 
we are witnessing the demise of this form of capitalism.     
  
2.2.3 
Schumpeter: Antithesis, rhetoric and paradox 
Shionoya (2004) understands Schumpeter to engage with a “system of pretheory” 
beneath what Shionoya calls Schumpeter’s “revolutionary theory in the history of 
science” (p. 341). Pretheory in economics refers to “knowledge found in a 
prescientific stage of economics and in a broader field of economic thought”. 
Shionoya elaborates saying that “Schumpeter defined economic thought as “the 
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sum total of all opinions and desires concerning economic subjects, especially 
concerning public policy bearing upon these subjects that, at any given time and 
space, float in the public mind””. The language here is important.   
          The question is, to what extent is it relevant to speak about pretheory 
conditioning the formation of opinions and desires concerning subjects capable of 
questioning the manner in which they are governed by political economy? If the 
discussion is restricted to the field of economic thought, this question cannot be 
addressed, as this would be tantamount to extending the theory of economics 
outside the utilitarian use it makes of science. This would make it necessary for 
economics to treat Schumpeter’s system of pretheory as a black box. On the other 
hand, that which floats in the public mind and is not uniquely economic and is 
furthermore capable of producing new subjectivities, must allude to the idea that 
this black box can be philosophically engaged in relation to economic factors that 
economics would usually refuse to engage with. Certainly Schumpeter (as cited in 
Shionoya, 2004) considered it possible to “take out some solid factors from the 
black box of the prescientific process” (p. 341). The intention in the rest of this 
section is to illustrate Schumpeter’s particular approach to the ambiguity of this 
problem. 
          Shionoya’s (2004) understanding of Schumpeter’s approach to his 
pretheoretical system of economic thought is that, while the elements of vision 
and ideology are commonly thought of as the presuppositions to his work, 
rhetoric is neglected as a fundamental element of the same. If this is the case, it 
becomes evident that neoliberalism’s use of science, in putting technology at the 
service of economic development, achieves the ironic effect of creating authority 
even though it does not meet all the requirements of being rhetorical. Yes, its 
speech-making involves the modification of phrases and sentences in policy 
celebrations of new discoveries, but this logical positivism does not require it to 
justify these discoveries. To Schumpeter (as cited in Shionoya, 2004), rhetoric “is 
an instrument for posing entirely new questions and for stimulating further 
exploration of knowledge” (p. 343). If neoliberalism were to do this, it would be 
lowering its guard, leaving innovation, as a concept, open to new interpretations, 
or as Godin (2015a, 2015b) puts it, it would bring innovation into the realm of 
contestability. 
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          Analyzing the value of rhetoric a little further, Schumpeter uses three types 
of rhetoric as figures of thought: “antithesis, metaphor and paradox”(Shionoya, 
2004, p. 343). Of greatest interest here is paradox – while understanding the 
importance of antithesis and metaphor to Schumpeter’s work might have value to 
the wider scope of this thesis, there is no immediate call to engage these figures of 
thought here. Shionoya describes a paradox as  
… a situation in which two inconsistent statements appear to be 
true or a statement alleges they are true. Paradox presupposes an 
antithesis of two statements, although antithesis does not 
necessarily mean paradox. If one of the two statements is 
generally accepted, a paradox merely represents a heterodox 
view vis-à-vis a received view. A paradox may sometimes 
engender shocking effects, because one statement denies the 
other, while each is justified on the basis of different reasoning.  
          An analysis of paradox requires identification of the 
contexts or dimensions in which each statement holds and an 
explanation of why two conflicting statements are proposed in 
combination. It is important to recognize two points, first, 
conflicting statements reveal a gap in knowledge, and second, 
the rhetoric of paradox is an attempt at coordination of 
knowledge. By a gap in knowledge we mean a situation of split 
knowledge surrounding us as a result of scientific specialization. 
In this situation an attempt to disclose a gap will be facilitated by 
the rhetoric or paradox, because separate dimensions in which 
each statement is valid are logically incommensurable with each 
other so that relationship between two statements cannot be dealt 
with as philosophical knowledge but only as rhetorical 
knowledge. The rhetoric of paradox demands the coordination of 
knowledge, and solutions to paradoxes in the social sciences are 
not to be sought in formal logic but in an enlarged dimension of 
a universal social science. (p. 344)  
Before engaging with the manner in which this definition serves an articulation of 
the implicit relationship between the innovative subject and the process of 
innovation, some examples of paradoxes in Schumpeter’s thinking should be 
provided. The aforementioned importance given to the study of statics and 
dynamics would be an obvious example; as iterated by Shionoya (2004). Rather 
than focus on dynamics as a means of encouraging the development of a more 
entrepreneurial ethos in society, Schumpeter studied the dimensional differences 
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between statics and dynamics as a means of understanding how they represent 
different types of agents and behaviours that always coexist.  
          Another well-known example is that of “creative destruction” (Shionoya, 
2004, p. 345), both terms in this conceptual couplet being functions of innovation 
– not just the creative aspect. As Shionoya so eloquently puts it, “innovation 
creates a new way of life and destroy[s] the old and the two are not on (sic) the 
same dimension”. It should be noted that in the neoliberal domain, only the 
narrative of the resulting ‘new way of life’ enters the rhetoric on innovation. The 
evidence of destruction is not accounted for by neoliberal politics as it strategically 
avoids highlighting the damage done. For instance, in the static or less dynamic 
social dimensions of society, it would seem, for reason of needing to avoid having 
to rhetorically justify the introduction of technological innovations, that the 
disruptive nature of innovation is conveniently overlooked in the moment in which 
the innovation itself is addressed in, for example, the media. In other words, there 
is not the same rhetorical consistency applied when promoting the emergence of 
technological innovations. 
           The third paradox Shionoya (2004) provides as an example has to do with 
Schumpeter’s thesis that “the demise of capitalism is a consequence of its success” 
(as cited in Shionoya, 2014, p. 345). According of Shionoya,  
… the trick of [this] paradox is revealed by reference to the 
framework of his economic sociology, which discusses the 
interaction between economic and non-economic domains [– a 
recurrent theme in the discussion of this investigation and the 
promotion of the significance of student innovation]. 
Observation of the economic domain in isolation leads us to the 
dynamic picture of economic development and business cycles 
that would work forever without disturbances from the outside. 
But the capitalist system as a comprehensive civilization is 
confronted with changes in social, political and cultural 
circumstances that are sometimes negative to economic 
development as a result of its successful economic performance. 
(2014, p. 345) 
More specifically, what needs to be shown in the thesis discussion is how the 
economic success of educational institutions can be said to inhibit the students 
from asserting the value of their own innovations. The next section will explore 
conflicting statements (by policy-makers and this researcher) with respect to what 
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they reveal about a paradoxical gap in knowledge where student innovation is 
disruptive to the institutional notion of what the orthodoxy of innovation 
comprises. The latter will be engaged with respect to how, in Shionoya’s (2004) 
words “the rhetoric of paradox is an attempt at [the] coordination of knowledge” 
(p. 344), as in, the institution addresses this gap through coordinating its own 
perspective so as to manage the logic of its a priori exclusion of student 




Lundvall (1941-) is a Danish economist who lives in Aalborg, Denmark.14 The 
significance of his thinking to this chapter has to do with the manner in which he 
has drawn on the work of both List and Schumpeter, and how his work speaks to 
the innovative subject as a participant in the development of both national systems 
of innovation and the concept of the learning economy.15This section will focus 
mainly on these two concepts. It is within Lundvall’s explanation of the ontology 
and function of these two concepts that it is hoped that the third vital piece in the 
theorization of the relationship between the innovator and the innovation process 
will emerge and, as such, pave the way for the coming chapters. The concept of 
national systems of innovation will be addressed first. 
It needs to be said that, like List and Schumpeter, the innovative subject is 
not Lundvall’s object of interest. In as much as List and Lundvall deal with big 
picture scenarios, they do not consider the individual actor with the special 
consideration this subject is accorded in this investigation. This is not to say that 
they themselves were not sensitive to the importance of the individual. They are 
and this is exactly the reason that they are of value to this investigation: they both 
express an empathic interest in a more complex experience of humanity than that 
which might otherwise be defined by the interests of standard economics. With 
respect to Schumpeter, the individual innovative actor is important in the sense 
                                                 
14 Lundvall does not call himself an economist per se (Lundvall, 2016a). Rather he uses economic 
concepts to address his intellectual interests. 
15 Lundvall has been a prodigious thinker, researcher and policy writer, working with DRUID 
(http://www.druid.dk/), Globelics (http://www.globelics.org/), IKE Research Group 
(http://www.ike.aau.dk/) and the University of Aalborg, as well as writing for the OECD. National 
systems of innovation and learning economy are concepts that are central to his work.  
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that the innovator as entrepreneur is the actor who imposes an evolutionary 
dynamic upon the business cycle (see McCraw, 2007). 
  
2.3.1 
National systems of innovation 
The value of examining the concept of national systems of innovation in this 
investigation has to do with how this concept provides a setting for understanding 
the concept of innovation itself. There is no settled understanding of the function 
of national systems of innovation (Lundvall, 2007a): the political economic 
circumstances and the interests of individual states determine that the concept of 
national systems of innovation should be utilized to different ends. In order to 
recognize the concept itself as that which is applied in these distinctive contexts, it 
becomes necessary to recognize its function. Ingelstam (2002) thinks of the 
function of national systems of innovation as having to do with “performing or 
achieving something” (as cited in Lundvall, 2007a, p. 27), to which Edquist (2005) 
adds that “the main function of SIs is to pursue innovation processes, i.e., to 
develop, diffuse and use innovations” (as cited in Lundvall, 2007a, p. 27).16 The 
important terms to grasp here are perform and achieve. These terms are used to 
express an action that need not bear any practical connection to how the function 
was initiated; a thinking which bears an epistemological relationship with how 
innovation, as production (Fagerberg, Mowery, & Nelson, 2005), is focused on the 
output without need of acknowledging the significance of the process. The other 
term of importance here is diffuse, which emphasizes the will to popularize the 
value of innovative activity and its contribution to economic development.  
While Lundvall (2007a) understands it to be a mistake to assign a function 
to National Systems of Innovation, as in to assign a function to a system, it will 
hopefully become clearer later in the chapter as to why this error is important and 
continues to play a significant role in how innovation is understood. To Lundvall, 
it is not obvious that “systems have a function besides possibly securing survival” 
(p. 27). Lundvall, for his part, describes national systems of innovation as a 
“focusing device in order to better understand how innovation affects economic 
                                                 
16 SIs can be taken to be an abbreviation for Systems of Innovation, and by insinuation, because of 
its inclusion in Lundvall’s (2007a) text to refer to National Systems of Innovation.  
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development at a national level”. Furthermore, he says that he is interested in 
“both incremental innovation and radical innovation”. This is significant because 
the politics that are governed by innovation economics tend to be resistant radical 
innovation (Leifer, McDermott, Colarelli O’Connor, Peters, Rice & Veryzer, 
2000). To be resistant to radical innovation can be thought of as signifying a 
resistance to new ideas, which self-identifies as a defence of incremental 
innovation and the incumbent and therefore conservative vision. Why this conflict 
is highlighted is that Lundvall’s value to the discussion, through his theoretical 
embrace of both radical and incremental innovation, becomes more evident when 
this embrace is thought of as being symbolic of an embrace of the actors 
responsible for these types of innovation. That is, he embraces those who are more 
inclined to incremental innovation along with those who are more inclined to 
radical innovation. Within this framework, the already innovative subject in 
Education would be a radical thinker, in the eyes of the conservative educational 
institution, for reason of the institution’s interest in conserving traditional 
practices.  
It needs to be made clear that Lundvall considers the core of this activity to 
be taking place in “firms and organizations belonging to the knowledge 
infrastructure” (p. 29), which, to him, does not include the education system.17 
However, Lundvall (2007) remarks that the education system needs to be included 
“in the [wider] analysis if the aim is to link innovation to economic development” 
(p. 28). In the context of the intentions of this investigation, it needs to be asked, in 
what ways does Education link to economic development, as a consequence of the 
way in which human capital theory is applied in the education experience, and that 
exists outside the production of graduates with the capacity to contribute to 
incremental innovation. In other words, it needs to be asked, in what ways does 
Education link to economic development through producing graduates with the 
capacity to contribute to radical innovation. The point is that the absences of 
learning experiences that produce radical innovation indicate the closed nature of 
the educational institution and a general disinterest in students as innovative 
subjects. As Lundvall puts it, “all aspects of society need to be brought in to 
explain the actual pattern of innovation”. This being the case, it would be 
                                                 
17 The possible consequences of this focus will be addressed in Section 6.1.2. 
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reasonable to surmise that the attitude of the educational institution does little 
more than reflect the attitude of society itself.    
 
2.3.2 
The learning economy 
As is the case with national systems of innovation, educational institutions are not 
the primary object of the development of the concept of the learning economy. In 
both cases, the educational institution sits on a second tier with respect to its 
importance as a site of engagement with the learning economy (Nielsen & 
Lundvall, 2003). The primary focus of the learning economy is the firm. 
However, given that in this investigation, the educational institution is treated as 
an educational firm or quasi-firm (see Chapter Five, Section 5.1), it would seem 
important to explore how the concept of the learning economy might be 
understood in the educational institution. The reason for this recasting of the 
status of the educational institution becomes more obvious now that policy for the 
implementation of innovative learning environments is being applied across the 
education sector. The implication of this development, is that in the innovative 
learning environment, learning is regarded as work (OECD, 2013). This is to say, 
in Education’s linking of the educational institution through the provision of the 
innovative learning environment to the domain of paid work, the educational 
institution becomes more directly integrated into the framework according to 
which the concept of the learning economy is thought of in relation to the firm.  
 According to Lundvall and Archibugi (2001), the concept of the learning 
economy has been developed as an alternative to the concept of the knowledge 
economy.18 The key differences between the knowledge economy and the learning 
economy, with respect to the relevance of these concepts to this investigation, 
centre on the manner in which each concept accords the individual the capacity to 
respond to new technologies, the increase in knowledge and rapid change in a 
globalized world. This idea supposes the importance of understanding the 
differences between how the working subject in the knowledge economy – or 
more specifically the knowledge worker – and the subject of the learning 
                                                 
18 Application of the concept of the knowledge economy gets its policy thrust from the OECD 
report The knowledge-based economy (1996b). For a good overview of the development of the 
concept of the knowledge economy, see Peters (2009a).  
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economy should be thought of. While the idea of the knowledge worker is 
commonly understood to begin with Drucker’s (1959) identification of the role 
knowledge plays in the innovative development of new technologies, the status of 
the individual knowledge worker remains vague. Even Davenport (2005) 
definition ambiguates the meaning of the term knowledge worker. According to 
Davenport: 
Knowledge workers have high degrees of expertise, education, 
or experience, and the primary purpose of their jobs involves the 
creation, distribution, or application of knowledge. Knowledge 
workers think for a living. They live by their wits – any heavy 
lifting on the job is intellectual, not physical. They solve 
problems, they understand and meet the needs of customers, 
they make decisions, and they collaborate and communicate 
with other people in the course of doing their own work. 
(Davenport, 2005, as cited in Kardos, 2012, pp. 2-3) 
… 
Knowledge workers are workers whose main capital is 
knowledge. Examples include software engineers, physicians, 
pharmacists, architects, engineers, scientists, public accountants, 
lawyers, and academics, whose job is to “think for a living”. 
(Davenport, 2005, as cited in ‘Knowledge Worker’, Wikipedia, 
2017, emphasis in original) 
The problem with such a definition is that it does not delineate the workforce as 
neatly as the definition itself supposes it should. For instance, many jobs involve 
physical heavy lifting where the commercial success of the worker concerned is 
the result of how they think. It would not be farfetched to describe the farmer in 
New Zealand as a knowledge worker in that they can be said to have levels of 
expertise, education, and experience that make thinking more important than the 
lifting or physical work. Once this threshold is crossed, it would seem that the 
nature of the subject’s relationship with knowledge changes such that working 
with knowledge and in particular new knowledge becomes the core activity, 
which is of course not to say that the physical aspect of the job can be dispensed 
with. Furthermore, it is not farfetched to say that a farmer’s “primary purpose” is 
“the creation, distribution, or application of knowledge” – in doing this they 
potentiate their commercial capacity, by, for example, enabling themselves to 
diversify and include new categories of fund streams. Furthermore, farming, for 
the most part, is a team activity that requires fidelity to all the same elements of 
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performance that Davenport (2005) highlights as being important: problem 
solving, customer needs, collaboration and communication. So what does this 
definition actually mean?  
 Perhaps the subtitle How to Get Better Performance and Results From 
Knowledge Workers to Davenport’s (2005) text provides a hint. It is argued here 
that the knowledge worker cannot be thought of as a political subject in the sense 
of it being expected that they should have the capacity to challenge authority and 
to be disruptive in response to the individual possession of new knowledge. For 
example, if participation in the process of innovation can be thought of as either 
supporting the entrenchment of institutional traditions or, alternatively, as 
involving the taking of initiatives that challenge the merit of holding to existing 
traditions, the question becomes: is it possible to think of the knowledge worker 
as this second kind of innovator? I am not so sure. The danger is that the 
knowledge worker is really little more than a worker if they are not able to 
vindicate their individual evaluation of knowledge through asserting their political 
subjectivity to the benefit of the project they are involved in – and irrespective of 
how much disruption they cause. 
I would argue that this is where the difference between the knowledge 
worker and the subject of the learning economy lies, the essential difference being 
that these two subjects have a different relationship with knowledge. The 
knowledge worker can be thought of as the individual whose job it is to further 
apply the existing vision. To this effect, knowledge workers are agents of an 
already existing political tradition: their work being about providing greater detail 
to that which already exists. The relationship that the subject of the learning 
economy has with knowledge, in terms of how it contrasts with that of the 
knowledge worker can be typified in varies ways. The idea that most conditions 
this contrast is the fact that the concept of the learning economy is “based upon 
the hypothesis that over the last decades an acceleration of both knowledge 
creation and knowledge destruction has taken place” (Lundvall & Archibugi 
(2001, p. 1). According to Lundvall and Archibugi, the key to success is “rapid 
learning and forgetting”. This is to say, success is not only based on a capacity to 
keep up, to be performative, but it is also based on a capacity to forget, to 
abandon, to detach oneself from what was previously important. Forgetting and 
knowledge destruction, what does this mean? 
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The evidence of destruction and forgetting is perhaps easiest to see at 
policy level and then in those educational institutions where new policy is most 
quickly embraced, for example in the schools that have recently become the flag 
bearers for the value of innovative learning environments. There is the illusion 
that there has been a paradigm shift where the introduction of innovative learning 
environments has accomplished a transformation that makes the immediate past 
instantly obsolete. The danger is that this instrumental top-down application of the 
new and its realization of change only involve transformation on some levels in 
the hierarchy and in some areas of thought. Evidence of this can be seen in those 
moments when it becomes necessary to speak to the reality of the disruption 
caused by change, when it is evident that there is an implicit intention to forget. 
These crises are ameliorated by neoliberal control over the language used. In such 
moments, success focuses solely on the supposed collective value of creation and 
remembering, which in doing so implies an obligation to forget the wider social 
and political implications of what is achieved by giving such weight to the 
former.19  
More important to the thesis argument is the question of how the already 
innovative student engages this process of ‘creative destruction’, a concept which 
is drawn directly from Schumpeter’s (1987) concept of how innovation impacts 
upon the market.  
 
Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter was to overcome the theoretical obstacle of needing to 
explain standard economics’ historical depreciation of the process of innovation 
and its associated absenting of its actors. The idea is that if children and young 
people are to transform the way innovation is done in Education and in so doing 
transform how we understand the concept of innovation and the purpose of 
                                                 
19 This is what neoliberal success looks like, which, despite the illusion, is much less liberal than 
the name suggests, the point being that this transformation is instrumental in the way it ignores 
collateral damage, the language of destruction is considered as if the intention of its user is to spoil 
the party, when what is being forgotten is not the plight of he or she who has paid the price, but the 
fact that this is really an old and traditional trick that has been understood since Machiavelli’s 
(1961) identification that the task of political innovation, immediately upon initiation is unity of 
those who populate the transformation.     
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change and novelty, then our interpretation of the history must be made in such a 
way that it might prepare us for such unforeseen possibilities. 
The intention of the next chapter is to dig more deeply into the positive 
affirmation of these particular historical exemplars of the relationship of the 
innovative subject to the process of innovation by analyzing how the innovator 







As important as these actors – the innovator and the entrepreneur – seem to be, 
given the role each plays in economic development, there is no theory that 
describes how the innovator and entrepreneur should be distinguished from one 
another. This distinction is important in the context of this investigation because 
of the way in which innovation is ascribed to and managed by educational 
institutions that are framed as neoliberal quasi-commercial enterprises. The 
rhetoric that supports the change that Education has undergone during the past 
half-century privileges the figure of the entrepreneur that is captured by the notion 
of the policy-maker as entrepreneur, of the institutional manager as entrepreneur, 
and of the ideal that the institution has for its graduates as entrepreneurs. 
However, these models of entrepreneurship differ from those that will be 
investigated and engaged in this chapter.  
 The question is, how is the entrepreneurial student to be thought of outside 
of the above models, and in relation to the change they initiative and carry out in 
Education? In the case of the innovator, the line of inquiry is both more opaque 
and more obscure. In the proprietary domain, everyone is an innovator and no-one 
is an innovator, in that every individual contributes to the innovation process (in 
the sense that incremental innovation is understood). Yet no individual remains 
after change and novelty are recognized as being representative of an innovation. 
Innovation is a collective activity and the identity of innovator who contributes to 
the process of innovation disappears into the collective achievement. In the non-
proprietary domain the question is, if the axiom that everyone and no-one is an 
innovator does not hold in the same way that it does in the proprietary domain, 
how is the situation of the innovative student understood and in what ways does 
their disposition assume a complicity with the idea that their innovative activity 
also involves them in an entrepreneurial activity? 
 To think of the student in this way is new to the innovation discourse in 
Education. To this effect, it becomes necessary to do some preliminary work and 
to provide the theoretical basis necessary to address such questions. The chapter 
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therefore begins with a brief discussion on the absence of the individual 
innovative actor; the purpose being to address the notion that the theory of 
collective innovation removes the significance of the individual. This is followed 
by an examination of the history and ontology of the innovator and likewise an 
examination of the history and ontology of the entrepreneur. This comparative 
examination is summarized with a view to explaining how relations between the 
individual innovator and the collective cohort of innovators will be thought of in 
Chapters Eight, Nine and Ten, when the subjects of open and social innovation are 
discussed with a view to theorizing how student innovative activity contributes to 
the formation of collective intelligence.     
 
3.1 
The problem of delineating one actor from another 
For the reasons discussed in Chapter One, the innovative subject has no 
experience of their individual identity during the process of innovation. In as 
much as it is habitual for the commercial world to speak of innovative activity, it 
equally ignores the fact that this activity would not otherwise be possible if it were 
not for the actors who contribute to its realization. This is a curious fact given that 
innovations are not self-generating. Commercial innovations are more commonly 
spoken about as involving producers and consumers (see, von Hippel, 1988), 
although some authors (mostly neo-Schumpeterians) speak of entrepreneurs (see 
Fagerberg, Mowery & Nelson, 2005; Hanusch & Pyka, 2007) or that innovation is 
the job of entrepreneurs (Drucker, 1997; Schumpeter, 1934/1911, 1964), who are 
often just spoken about as business managers.  
 In the case of the non-existence of the innovator – the commercial 
innovator or technological innovator – they are only customarily referred to in 
retrospect. Steve Jobs1, for example, might be thought of as having been a great 
innovator (Isaacson, 2011) but it was long after his many innovations were 
introduced to the market that he was thought of in this way. Furthermore, the 
question concerning the absence of the innovative subject during the process of 
innovation is not just a question for innovation studies (Fagerberg & Verspagen, 
                                                 
1 Co-founder of Apple Inc, http://www.apple.com/ 
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2009) or for the study of innovation (Godin, 2016)2: it is a question concerning the 
nature of the innovative process and how the individual subject both absented him 
or herself and was made absent from this process. This is to say, the absence of 
the innovative subject is a question for post-Cartesian thought and how the object 
of innovation supposes a relationship to its subject: the innovator and/or the 
entrepreneur.   
 The entrepreneur, as a problematic, is distinctive from that of the 
innovator. While the innovator, as an actor, is only retrospectively associated with 
the innovation that they contributed to and are therefore considered to be in some 
part responsible for, the entrepreneurial actor exists prior to the innovative activity 
being initiated. If the entrepreneur exists before an innovation is initiated, what is 
it that exists in the entrepreneur that constitutes a relationship of subject to object 
during the innovation process? A significant hypothesis might be drawn from the 
problem of this comparison with the innovator. As a preliminary thought, it might 
be speculated that what separates the innovator from the entrepreneur is that the 
entrepreneur initiates the innovative project with a tacit appreciation that he or she 
must bear both the risk of and responsibility for the success or failure of the 
innovation – the entrepreneur may realize the innovation collectively, but this 
individual is the entrepreneur for reason of their leadership in the realization of its 
process.  
 With respect to the seemingly fictional innovator, the issue of 
responsibility and risk would seem to be a more complex one for reason that these 
capacities of risk-taking and responsibility are more ambiguously delineated than 
they are in the case of the entrepreneur. The entrepreneur, as an actor, is the lead 
actor (Schumpeter, 1934/1911; Drucker, 1959) whereas the innovator might 
identify with a troupe of actors without identifying him or herself as a leader. The 
relative prominence of the entrepreneur’s personality can however change with 
circumstances. In the commercial setting, when a new product or service is 
introduced to the market, it needs to be managed and serviced and further enabled 
such that its existing market might grow (Schumpeter, 1939; Drucker, 1997). So 
an entrepreneur cannot always be a trailblazer in the sense that their initial 
                                                 
2 See Chapter Six for a comparison of these two perspectives on innovation. 
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innovation suggests is possible: they must instead transform themselves into 
managers.    
 This above differentiation provides simplistic explanation of how these 
two actors’ roles might be delineated; the question of failure to profit from an 
innovation cannot be passed over. Because more innovations, and the business 
that promote their introduction to the market, fail than succeed (Fisher, 2014), 
bearing the risk and responsibility can be thought of as being a problem of a 
socio-political nature rather than that of a technological nature. To effectively 
carry out a new idea, such that it delivers the financial benefits, is more a 
reflection of failure to benefit from the collective intelligence of the group than it 
is a failure to understand the technological weaknesses of an innovation. This is 
the case because technological weaknesses are more likely to make themselves 
apparent if there is collective collaboration. While it is possible to imagine the 
possible financial fallout born by the entrepreneur if the innovation fails 
(leadership being responsible for the credit necessary to fund the innovation), not 
a lot is known about the experience of the contemporary innovative subject in a 
collective innovative process and what their experience of responsibility is in the 
aftermath of a failure in the market. 
 
3.2 
The ontology of the innovator 
There are only a few thinkers who theorize innovation in the form of an open 
exploration of the history and meaning of the concept as a category. Godin (2017) 
is one such thinker. Most current thinkers on innovation begin from the premise 
that innovation is technological innovation, and thereafter seek to explain 
innovation in relation to the task of achieving a premeditated end. The 
contributions made to The Oxford Handbook of Innovation (Fagerberg, Mowery 
& Nelson, 2005) are a good example of this later orientation to studying 
innovation, which has come to be known as Innovation Studies (see Fagerberg & 
Verspagen, 2009; Godin, 2010a, 2010b). While the latter field of interest is 
interesting from the point of view of understanding the student as an innovator in 
as much as innovation studies prescribes possibilities for the student to shape the 
self as homo economicus(economic man), this is not the innovator that this 
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chapter is concerned with.3 When comparing and contrasting the innovator and 
entrepreneur in this chapter, the intention is to explore how an understanding of 
the innovative actor, as one who engages all manner of problems (not just 
commercial problems), might inform an understanding of the conscious and 
already innovative subject in Education. As such, Godin’s approach to the study of 
innovation, as against innovation studies, is going to be more useful for reason 
that the former is both more reflective and involves a more profound exploration 
of the role innovation plays in how change and novelty contribute to history (See 
Godin, 2016). 
 It needs to be iterated that innovation is only discussed in this section in as 
much as the study of this concept enables a better understanding of the ontology 
of the innovator. The history of the innovator as an innovative actor is dealt with 
in the next section. 
 Godin (2015a) describes innovation as an “anonymous concept” with a 
meaning that is “rarely questioned” (p. 5). Furthermore, “[t]he history of the 
concept of innovation is an untold story” (p. 6). What this means is that if it is 
difficult to conceptualize the object of innovation in relation to the process that 
produced it, then it is equally difficult to conceptualize its subject; the innovator. 
How then is the innovator to be thought of today, if innovation itself does not 
contain within it an implicit understanding of what it refers to? It is in this 
theoretical ambit that the student is theorized as an innovative subject in this 
investigation. The student as an innovative subject is not simply homo 
economicus: he or she is also a subject who is able to act within and upon the 
paradoxes that characterize the prescription of his or her identity as a student and 
consumer. 
 The capacity to act and to not just accept the prescription that one’s 
learning should suppose the experience of a consumer is important to what 
follows in this chapter because “innovation is a subjective concept” (Godin, 
2015a, p. 6. Any understanding of innovation as concept must be perspectival and, 
as such, conditioned by the subject’s relationship with the self and the world. 
While innovation has been promoted since the end of the Second World War as 
                                                 
3 Innovation Studies will be discussed in more depth in Chapter Five ‘The Dynamic and Static 
Self-s of the Innovative Institution’. The innovator as homo economicus will be discussed in 
greater detail in Chapter Seven ‘The Subject of Innovation/The Innovative Subject’. 
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requiring science to serve economic development through the creation of new 
technologies (Godin, 2008), this development does not require the innovative 
subject to identify with the innovation processes that this production of new 
technologies depends upon. This suggests that any positive analysis of the 
innovator must be thought of in terms of a post-Cartesian experience of the 
relationship between subject and object. This latter fact highlights the possibility 
that a better understanding of innovation, and hence the constitution of the 
innovator, requires a re-engagement with history itself; something that 
characterizes Godin’s work throughout and that furthermore makes him unique as 
a theoretical thinker on the concept of innovation (see Godin, 2017). To engage 
history is therefore an engagement with a genealogical subject of innovation 
where the constitution of the innovator is conditioned by the historical formation 
of innovation processes that inform how the innovator comes to think as an 
innovative subject.4 
 Godin (2015a) highlights that while innovation is understood today as 
technological innovation, innovation was understood first as a religious idea from 
the late-Middle Ages (from 1297), and then as a political one beginning circa 
1642. This political idea of innovation endured through to the end of the French 
Revolution (1789) (Godin, 2015b). After the French Revolution and during the 
first Industrial Revolution (1760-1820/1840), innovation came to be known as a 
social idea that either described actions of social reform or alternative radical 
strategies for social change. This theoretical development and its practical 
implications endured as the predominant positive and pejorative interpretations of 
innovation until the Second World War. 
 While it might be tempting to think of technological innovation as having 
succeeded both political and social forms of innovation, thinking of history in a 
genealogical manner gives rise to a different story. If a genealogical 
understanding of the concept of innovation is one that understands the status and 
fate of the innovator as a subject, then the concepts of political innovation and 
social innovation do not fall out of view. On the contrary, it is argued that 
problems of a political and social nature that in themselves require political 
innovation and social innovation continue, to exist -  if on a subtler plane. These 
                                                 
4 This notion of genealogy as conceptualized as a problem of the present draws directly from 
Foucault’s (1997d) understanding of genealogy. 
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problems can now be seen to predominate what neoliberals would like to regard 
as a problem of market equilibrium (Nelson & Winter, 1982). As Godin puts it, 
there is always a political aspect to innovation (2015b);5 meaning, there is an 
aspect of the problem that innovation addresses and an aspect of the process of 
innovation that are always political. For the mere reason that an innovation 
process cannot be replicated to produce something new, new ideas that alter the 
process must have political implications for the collective relations that populate 
the process and ensure its success. Likewise the success of an innovation process 
is conditioned by the social aspect of those that participate in its realization.   
 To this effect, it is further argued that any interest in describing the 
constitution of the contemporary innovator would need to attend to the political 
and social aspects of technological innovation. In order to do so, it would seem 
necessary to understand the nature of the political techniques of capitalism used to 
repress and prohibit political and social innovations that question the values of 
neoliberal capitalism. The consequences of such an inquiry, in the context of this 
discussion, should be able to be seen in the problems that students identify with 




The history of the innovator 
The term innovator is first used in France in 1500 (Godin, 2015a). The term 
innovation had already been in use in Europe since 1297. What is significant in 
the developing use of this language is that innovation, according to Godin, was 
regarded as a pejorative term, first in relation to challenges made on the authority 
of the church and then in the political domain. What this meant is that the 
innovator inherited this pejorative connotation and was seen, to use the 
contemporary term, as a disruptor of the status quo and of the incumbent power 
relations of official knowledge (Godin, 2015b).  
 The question that is central to this chapter is: how might these historical 
forms of innovation contribute to the constitution of a history of the present, with 
                                                 
5 See Godin’s chapter Republicanism as Innovation … or Not Innovation (2015b, pp. 101-121), 
where he begins: “We may have forgotten in these days, but innovation is a political concept” (p. 
101).  
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respect to how it might be possible to interpret their problems they address and 
their associated processes as informing how the already innovative subject in 
education might be understood today? Rather than analysing the use the terms 
political innovation and social innovation, as Godin (2015a, 2015b) does, the 
intention is now to  the concept of innovation as understood by various thinkers, 
when innovation itself was understood to refer to the presence of either a political 
or a social problem. This analysis begins with the precept that these innovators, as 
described in Godin’s (2017) exploration and analysis of the history of the concept 
of innovation, acted in a manner conditioned by the power relations that governed 
the individual innovator at the time. 
 While the individual, who sought to bring about change in 1500, did so in 
a context where religious innovation carried a singularly pejorative connotation, 
the Reformation (beginning in 1517) changed the way in which people thought of 
the act of innovation: innovation acquired both positive and negative 
connotations; the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation each defending their 
own perspective (Godin, 2015a). What this meant was that the initiator of change 
(the participant in the Reformation) was no longer thought of in purely negative 
terms.  
 While Godin describes innovation as acquiring these positive and negative 
connotations during this period, René Descartes’ (1596-1650) made it possible for 
the individual to constitute the self according to how he or she thought about 
existing objects of knowledge (Hatfield, 2015). This is to say a political 
innovation– for example the event of the French Revolution – could acquire the 
character of something that could be understood as both good and bad or right and 
wrong. What this meant was that those who were either responsible for initiating 
or carrying out this change-event or were witness or affected by it began to 
understand that they were free to form the self according to their individual 
relationship to that event. In this way, innovation can be thought of as bearing an 
implicit relationship to Cartesian thought. 
 So, not only were there positive and negative interpretations of political 
change during the Reformation and afterwards, up until the culmination of the 
French Revolution in 1789, but thereafter there were also positive and negative 
connotations ascribed to social innovation during the 19th century (Godin, 2015a). 
This prevalence to interpret innovation both positively and negatively begs the 
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question, why is innovation today thought of in purely positive terms? Is it 
possible that there is the basis for a negative connotation that is, for example, 
implicit to technological innovation or commercial innovation? Does technology 
per se need to be questioned as the instrument of all change?6 It might be argued 
that a positive view of innovation is being used to obfuscate the moral paradox of 
how a society constitutes itself. This is to say, despite society’s identification with 
the vision that innovation promises (see Drucker, 1959), the recommended and 
sponsored method for realizing this vision delivers negative economic outcomes 
and extreme alienation as a consequence (see World Economic Forum, 2016, as 
cited in Shaw, 2016).  
 The relevance of speculating the possibility of a negative aspect as implicit 
to technological innovation is that there already exists a theoretical pretext to 
recognize the already innovative student as a subject of neoliberal economic 
aspirations: neoliberalism as an ideology, by definition, and as a political 
instrument, must absorb all diversity irrespective of the damage done to the 
individual. This subject is of course the most likely actor to address the above 
paradox. Neoliberals have no intention of addressing this paradox as it would 
seem that alienation is too useful a tool when leveraging submission to its 
education programme. It is therefore through thinking of the innovative student as 
an innovative subject that the power relations that guard neoliberal values should 
be re-evaluated.   
 Returning the discussion to the relevance of what the Reformation did for 
innovation, the question of what makes an innovation positive or negative 
becomes perspectival, or as Godin (2015a) puts it, innovation is always 
subjective. The categorization of positive and negative qualities of innovation 
refers to the delineation Godin makes when describing the actions of the 
Lutherans and Calvinists as the positive force of innovation, and the actions of the 
Catholics and later the counter-reformists as the negative force of innovation. This 
capacity to categorize innovation in dual and then diverse manners refers to the 
constitution of the individual innovator. From here it is possible to extrapolate and 
                                                 
6 There is a line of research initiated by Heidegger’s The question concerning technology and 
other essays (1977) that in proceeding through the work of Marcuse and Feenberg addresses this 
question (Peters, 2015a, personal communication). This line of inquiry is not taken up here for 
reason that these authors do not address the significance of technological innovation as a driver of 
economic development. 
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say that if power relations are also about the relationship with the self (Foucault, 
1997b, 1997c), then the relationship with the self can involve both these positive 
and negative qualities, each of which can be described in the opposite way to how 
they are understood by the subject – depending on the individual’s perspective in 
their relationship with the self. The paradox is that what may be thought of as 
being a positive quality – for example, reflection – may not be able to be 
measured in the same way when the same quality is thought of as a negative 
quality – for example when reflection is thought of in terms of performativity, and 
vice versa.   
 What this means for the already innovative subject in Education is that the 
epistemological foundations that provide the basis for understanding the paradox 
faced by already innovative subject are themselves provided in Godin’s (2015a, 
2015b) history of innovation as a concept.  
The study of innovation as such, opens the way for students to be 
considered to be already innovative subjects. From this point on, the already 
innovative subject denotes the already innovative student. 
 
3.4 
Towards an entrepreneur of ideation 
Rethinking the status of the actor in his or her relationship with the process of 
innovation is not merely about rethinking the concept of the innovator and the 
concept of the entrepreneur. Examining the combinatory actions of the innovative 
subject in Education cannot involve an analysis that is extant from its cause or 
what it addresses: the innovative process sits between the creative thought that 
initiates its process and the problem that it addresses. As already argued, the 
problem that the innovative student addresses is not simply a commercial problem 
that is arbitrated in the market-place; it is a problem with a theoretical end with a 
value that must be arbitrated according to the nature of its own phenomenon. The 
question then becomes how to theorize student innovation if there is no system for 
its realization and application?  
This is not a new question in the sense that combinatory actions that result 
in the initiation of innovative processes in the proprietary domain also involve 
processes of ideation that involve the use of new knowledge. The difference 
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between these processes of ideation is that ideation in the proprietary domain is 
systemized (see Fagerberg, Mowery & Nelson, 2005), while processes of ideation 
in the non-proprietary domain can only be systemized when this ideation is 
governed by the application of the curriculum. This is to say, ideation only has a 
theoretic end in the sense that the creation of human capital, in making the 
institution more productive, creates uncertainty for the student with respect to 
whether they foresee their human capital equating to a commercial value 
appropriated to it by the market. 7  However, when student ideation addresses 
problems that, by definition, cannot be mediated by the market and that cannot be 
systemized by the curriculum and its delivery, the phenomenon of student 
innovation can only ultimately be valued according to its relationship to 
individual intention, about which there exists a good deal more uncertainty.  
 In this section, uncertainty is explored in respect to understanding the 
conditions under which risk is taken in the context of certainty. This problematic 
is examined first in relation to the first treatise on entrepreneurship (Cantillon, 
1755, as cited in Godin, 2015a) and then in relation to the situation of the 
entrepreneurial student in the educational institution.      
 
3.4.1 
Richard Cantillon: The entrepreneur and the risk of uncertainty 
Cantillon (1734-1860) is credited with being the first to conceptualize the term 
‘entrepreneur’, (‘Entrepreneurship’, 2017). Of immediate interest is the date when 
Cantillon published Essai sur la Nature du Commerce en Général (1755). The 
term ‘innovation’ – a principal task of the entrepreneur today – was first used, 
according to Godin (2015a, p. 9), circa 1297, while “any general concept of an 
entrepreneurial function” (cited in Dioguardi, 1996, p. 1) is said to have emerged 
long after Cantillon’s conceptualization of the “entrepreneur” in 1755. Between 
1297 and 1945, the concept of innovation was referred to as something other than 
that which enabled commercial enterprise or what it is that an entrepreneur does 
today. Only a little less significant is the fact that the work of an entrepreneur 
                                                 
7 As Freeman says when referring to technological innovation, an innovation is only an innovation 
when it first impacts in the commercial domain (Freeman, 1974). 
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between 1755 and 1934 was not defined as being innovative per se. For nearly 
200 years of the most important years of industrial development, the entrepreneur 
functioned outside the parameters that currently define commercial innovation. In 
other words, before 1934 the entrepreneur and innovation can be thought to have 
maintained an unspecific and informal relationship. On this evidence alone, it 
would seem tenuous to think of innovation, as it is understood today, as defining 
the metaphysical function of the entrepreneur – an observation that would seem to 
offer sufficient scope to theorize innovation and the function of the entrepreneur 
in ways other than how neoliberals would prefer these concepts to be theorized.   
 Schumpeter describes Cantillon as having “a clear conception of the 
function of the entrepreneur” (Schumpeter, as cited in Dioguardi, 1996, p. 2). The 
clarity of Cantillon’s concept of the function of the entrepreneur is tied to the 
description of the situation of the entrepreneur and what he or she was trying to 
achieve in their historical context. Because the situation of the entrepreneur 
changes with the context and over time, the function of the entrepreneur cannot be 
other than uncertain in the broader picture of what history makes of itself. How 
does Cantillon (1775) describe the situation of the entrepreneur? Schumpeter, in 
his History of Economic Analysis (1954), comments on Cantillon’s understanding 
in the following way:8 
First, Cantillon had a clear conception of the function of the 
entrepreneur. It was quite general, but he d it with particular care 
for the case of the farmer. The farmer pays out contractual 
incomes, which are therefore ‘certain’, to landlords and 
labourers; he sells at prices that are ‘uncertain’. So do drapers 
and other ‘merchants’: they all commit themselves to certain 
payments in expectation of uncertain receipts and therefore are 
essentially risk-bearing directors of production and trade, 
competition tending to reduce their remuneration to the normal 
value of their services. This, of course, is scholastic doctrine. But 
nobody before Cantillon had formulated it so fully. (As cited in 
Dioguardi, 1996, p. 2) 
While this description of a-cause-to-action is explained in rudimentary terms such 
that Cantillon’s entrepreneur’s actions could be recognized in the actions of 
                                                 
8  Secondary literature is used here as there is no existing translation of Cantillon’s Essai sur la 
Nature du Commerce en Général (1755), meaning we are therefore reliant on those researchers 
like Schumpeter and Dioguardi who evidently read French. 
82 
today’s entrepreneur, it would seem important to remember Schumpeter’s 
(1934/1911, 1939) intention to promote the importance of the entrepreneur as the 
actor who brings about economic development through innovation. As such, 
highlighting the function of the entrepreneur is important to Schumpeter’s project. 
But just as this definition of an entrepreneur’s actions over time cannot be said to 
be those of a universal entrepreneur, the function of the entrepreneur changed in 
the mind of Schumpeter. In the beginning, the entrepreneur was a heroic figure 
who acted alone in response to market opportunities (see Schumpeter, 1934/1911). 
Later, the function of Schumpeter’s entrepreneur was less the lone hero and more 
the manager who needed to continue to make changes to what had already been 
introduced to the market (see Schumpeter, 1939). It turns out that the function of 
the entrepreneur is more plastic and malleable to the needs of the situation than the 
theorist of economic development would prefer to believe. It would seem that 
understanding the nature of the entrepreneur’s relationship to the opportunities 
they respond to has to do with the understanding of the importance of 
opportunities that can be addressed. Entrepreneurship has to do with military 
adventure, civic adventure, and social adventure. Commercial adventure is 
privileged at the moment, but this does not mean that other forms of adventure do 
not exist or that they will not replace commercial adventure sometime in the 
future.  
With this thinking in mind and in keeping with Schumpeter’s (1939) 
characterization of the above description as a scholastic one, the domain or 
arbitration where the value of entrepreneurship is decided should not be thought of 
as the market place per se. The market, which is not something new, has been 
deterritorialized and has become a domain of abstract principles, governed as 
much by “nonmarket principles” as market principles (see Sandel, 2013, p. 122). 
This being the case, it becomes not so much a question of whether non-market 
principles can be thought to govern in domains of arbitration that are other than 
those that are purely commercial, but whether non-market principles enable a 
better understanding of the nature of the actor’s actions when responding to new 
opportunities. Could these non-market principles for instance be expressions of 
‘animal spirit’ (Akerlof & Shiller, 2009) as expressed in the following: the form of 
a collective will to collective survival; the collective spirit to break with the role of 
the traditional educational institution to pursue heuristic learning; of the spirit that 
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leads the collective actions to break with rules, tradition, conventions and 
protocols; of the spirit of creation that fosters the diffusion of new forms of 
existence; of the radical new actions that cut through where resistance did not cut 
through in the past, and so on?       
 The justification for tying the employment of certain and uncertain factors 
exclusively to the arbitration of market so as to describe the situation of the 
entrepreneur as being uniquely commercial, would therefore seem to be a tenuous 
one. If the motive is financial gain, then the market is the logical arbiter. However, 
if the motive of combining certain and uncertain factors in new ways is other than 
financial gain, then the risk-bearing activity must be thought of as pertaining to 
domains of arbitration that are conditioned by a dynamic of interests that are other 
than commercial. Such a risk-bearing individual can be thought of as a ‘social 
entrepreneur’, a ‘political entrepreneur’, amongst other forms of entrepreneur (see 
Bjerke & Rämö; 2011, Grebel, 2004; Steyaert & Hjorth, 2006). As yet, we do not 




Innovation as an organized leap 
The idea that innovation involves an organized leap refers to both Drucker’s 
(1959) concept of the innovative process as entailing a “systematic, organized leap 
into the unknown” (p. 13) and the idea that this discussion needs to leap forward 
both from Schumpeter’s (1954) interpretation of Cantillon’s understanding of the 
entrepreneur to how the entrepreneur might be understood today.9 While there 
would be something to be gained from an analysis of the history entrepreneur, 
there is not sufficient scope in this investigation for such a discussion. Instead, the 
discussion will focus on the idea that Education needs to examine the concept of 
the entrepreneur from both the perspective of its own commercial interests and 
from the perspective of the student’s individual interests. These interests cannot be 
the same or even commensurable because the problems they address are not 
                                                 
9 Peter Drucker (1909–2005) was an Austrian-born American management consultant, educator, 
and author, whose writings contributed to the philosophical and practical foundations of the 
modern business corporation. As he was also a leader in the development of management 
education, he invented the concept known ‘management by objectives and self-control’ and he has 
been described as "the founder of modern management" (‘Peter Drucker’, 2017). 
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measurable by the same means, in that it should not be thought that students will 
logically progress towards sharing the same concept of innovation that the 
institution presently espouses. 
 The school and the university have continued to build their institutions on 
an historical model that is centuries-old, before the current politics of education 
began to concern itself with how to make its institutions perform as quasi-
economic enterprises.10 This is to say that the principal work of the entrepreneur 
and the principal actions that we would describe as involving the spirit of 
entrepreneurship, either happened at the inception of the formation of the concept 
of these institutions, or they happened in the moment of major events that 
presumed the need for a major transformation of the function of the institution. 
Evidently, this investigation is concerned with the instance of the latter 
occurrence. However, what I want to draw attention to here is that in the aftermath 
of major transformations, the entrepreneurial work that directed change in the 
development of schools and universities, involves a mutation of disposition such 
that the management and improvement of performance comes to refer to getting 
greater performativity from that which already exists.  
The maintenance of that which works ultimately involves quite a different 
disposition to entrepreneurial activities than that which is employed in the 
student’s approach to problematizing and initiating change. Students are in a 
period of their lives when progress and maturation can involve the need to learn 
how to break with that which already exists (the Education provided them).11 This 
is not the same type of action that involves making what already exists perform 
better. These two dispositions – over simplified as they are – are actions that 
involve different forms of innovation. Students innovate to create and invent 
themselves (see Dardot & Laval, 2013); they act upon themselves to transform 
themselves into human capital and/or, as Lévy (1997) would have us understand, 
                                                 
10 See Derek Bok’s The roots of commercialization. From universities in the marketplace: The 
commercialization of higher education (2003). In Michael A. Peters, & Ronald Barnett (Eds.), The 
idea of the university: A reader. New York, NY: Peter Lang. 
11 Breaking with the education that they are provided with is but one example of a reason for 
students to break with the reality that they are confronted with. Others might concern poor 
teaching methods; disagreement with a good teacher’s understanding of a problem; a need to 
affirm diversity of thought or culture; the need to privilege a more effective way of learning, and 
so on. All of these reasons for the innovative action on the part of the student that results in their 
breaking with the institution to some extent (see Section 4.4 on breaking while maintaining the 
relationship), while part of the paradox of the student’s situation, can be thought to produce 
positive actions on the part of the student, in that the student is acting to protect their learning.  
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to create human qualities that only they can create through their own decision-
making. Paradoxically, this involves a process where students must act both inside 
and outside the system of education, in order to learn what they believe they need 
to learn. This form of innovation tends to be more radical than that of the 
institution in that it involves the initiation of new ideas that the institution might 
struggle to anticipate. This creative student thought can even involve students 
breaking in an absolute manner with the institution, whether this is just to escape a 
dysfunctional environment or to pursue non-institutional forms of education.12 
 Before moving on, I will summarize the student’s relationship with the 
institution and in respect to what it means to say that they approach change and do 
new things in different ways and according to different ends. The innovative 
activities of the institution and its commercial management and the innovative 
activity of students are different for reason that they address different problems; 
commercial management innovate in order to improve the performance of the 
institution and its status in the market. This involves conserving what the 
institution already does well while initiating incremental innovations in relation to 
furthering the strategic plan. In practical terms, this is done with an ability to 
manage, which refers to being able “to organize people for ongoing work” 
(Drucker, 1969, p. 61). This organization needs to be understood in terms of how 
work produces performance or in terms of performativity. Identification of the 
people who organize and those who are organized provides an indication of how 
distinctive incremental innovation is from what students do: the organization has 
to do the role incremental innovation plays in the operational functions of the 
institution in its focus on increasing its commercial power, 13  while student 
innovation seeks to transform the experience of innovation according to the 
organization of individual and collective interests.  
                                                 
12 At a recent national Symposium on Innovation Learning Environments 
(http://www.aut.ac.nz/study-at-aut/study-areas/education/learning-environments#key), a professor 
from another institution recounted how students had recently shared with him that they had 
discussed how they could learn more about business by abandoning university and learning what 
they believe they needed to learn on their own and according to their own design of what this 
learning pathways should involve. 
13 See Chapter Six and Foucault’s technologies of power for more on this commercial 
administration of power. 
 
86 
Specking for the student, the problem that the already innovative student 
faces only involves engagement with the market in the sense that the completion 
of their studies supposes a correlation between their future commercial value and 
the market value of their human capital (Becker, 1964). But this is a supposition 
and a very unstable one at that. During a student’s formal education many factors 
can change and furthermore it is logical to assume that the goalposts will naturally 
move at frequent intervals: policy can change qualification requirements; 
institutional funding arrangements can change with little warning; institutional 
viability can affect courses offered; the economic sector’s knowledge of its own 
needs can change; demands on Education from the economic sector can change 
and so on (Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, 2014). Added to 
these variables is the narrative and reality that technological developments are 
occurring at a greater and greater rate is the rhetoric from Education itself, which 
that reminds students that they are studying in preparation for jobs that have not 
yet been invented. The most recent form of rhetoric to appear on the horizon of 
student futures refers to the impact of artificial intelligence and the threat that 
future workers will not be needed because a cheaper worker has already being 
fabricated (see Blundell, 2016). 
 In these circumstances, student entrepreneurship must be centred in the 
purpose of learning rather than the purpose of education. Student capacities to 
recognize the challenges that they face have to do with those factors which 
condition the possibility of learning in new ways. The question from the orthodoxy 
might be, why is this in itself innovative? Are not students just doing what they are 
meant to do? After all, it would seem impossible to justify this heuristic learning 
activity as innovative if its value cannot be arbitrated by the market. But this is 
exactly the point. The problem that students are innovating in relation to is not 
centred in the market place: the non-market principles that are influencing their 
decision-making have been formed in relation to problems other than market 
growth and market equilibrium; they have been formed in relation to problems of 
which the market is a subset in time. What are these problems that students are 
engaging with and inventing and innovating in relation to? They are problems of 
human value that have to do with our relations with the social world, the gendered 
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world, the world of multiple cultures, the political world, the environmental world, 
among others.14 
 Having said this, the discussion needs to be taken one step further. The 
difference in problem has been explained, as has the difference in relationship to 
these distinctive problems, the difference in how each actor understands 
innovation, and the difference in the purpose of being innovative. What has not 
been explained in any detail is the nature of the relationship between these actors, 
given these differences. It is these differences that begin to configure the 
rudimentary character of the paradoxical situation that the already innovative 
subject finds him or herself in. These differences cannot be reconciled according 
to how these distinctive actors conceptualize their life worlds and their motives for 
acting or behaving in the way that they do. It could be added that economics needs 
a whole new form of analysis if it is to understand what is occurring in student 
innovation and the significance of this innovation to both society and the 
economy. Given the complexity of this situation, it is planned that the discussion 
should move slowly – this relationship and its complexities are two complex and 
too important to treat without engaging their ontologies with a minimum of detail.  
 
Conclusion 
Evidently, the entrepreneur and the innovator have distinctive relations with the 
process of innovation in the proprietary domain. It has been argued here that this 
distinction only partly informs what actually happens in the educational 
institution. Taking the situation of the student supposes that the student faces a 
political decision in all moments with respect to how they balance their 
implication in institutional processes of innovation. Furthermore, students are 
focused on increasing their productivity through their will to be innovative in 
ways that differentiates their focus from that of the institution. In this way, the 
student is at once an innovator in their contribution to the realization of the 
institution’s innovations, and at the same time is an innovator in personal and 
collective processes that are largely unrecognized by the politics that govern the 
institution’s commercial interests.  
                                                 
14 This topic will be engaged in Chapter Nine. 
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It is argued that student innovation sits outside the institution’s concept of 
the student’s implication in the institution’s own innovation processes, and that 
this makes the innovative student anonymous for reason of the already 
anonymous status of the innovator in commercial innovation processes in the 
proprietary domain. Ignoring this political tactic and focusing on the situation of 
the innovative student, it becomes important to begin to theorize the innovative 
subject in Education with respect to how their innovation can be thought of as 
entrepreneurial in ways that extend beyond entrepreneurial commerce. How is this 
to be done? It will be argued in the coming chapters that this theorization 
supposes the student takes the initiative in their own learning, and initiates change 
according to their own criteria with respect to what had to be changed and why. 
This is more ambitious than it seems, because in controlling the politics of 
innovation, the institution also controls who is permitted to initiate or begin 
something new.15 What is more, it is argued that unless students get to do this, 
they end up doing nothing more than carrying out the institution’s work: that is, 
contributing to the institution’s quest for greater productivity without having 
attended to the problem of identifying their distinctive intentions within the 
institution’s processes of production.   
                                                 
15 The importance given in the idea of initiating and beginning actions is conditioned by Arendt’s 
(1998) thinking about how human action has been divided according to the need to prescribe 
distinctive roles of those who are permitted to initiate and to those who are required to execute that 
which has been initiated. It is this division of roles that facilitates the success of the enterprise of 
work and its governance. However, this division of roles also stifles workers and students from 
taking new initiatives even when these initiatives contribute to refining the system that produces 
what they work toward.     
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CHAPTER FOUR 
The Situation of the Already Innovative Subject 
 
Introduction 
In the first three chapters, the discussion alluded to the idea that innovation in 
Education creates a conflict for the student as an already innovative subject. 
Furthermore, it was observed that the politics of innovation in Education neglects 
to attend to the paradoxical situation of the already innovative subject. For this 
situation to be identified as a paradox, it first needs to be understood as a political 
situation. The student’s situation is political because the institution and the 
already innovative subject are set in opposition to the idea of what innovation 
really is and hence how the capacity to be innovative is formed. It might be 
thought that students do not have their own idea about the formation of innovative 
capacities because to have such an idea, they first need educating, in that they first 
need to acquire the requisite human capital for the development of such ideas to 
be possible. This precept for thinking about what makes innovation possible 
supposes that knowledge about innovation must first be produced or constructed 
by the politics of education and that only through this experience can such an idea 
emerge. In this context, technological innovation only has meaning as a 
consequence of its commercial impact in the marketplace. This is the perspective 
that the politics of education would need to consider in order to circumvent the 
argument that the already innovative subject finds him or herself in a paradoxical 
situation. 
The precept from which the discussion will begin in this chapter is that as 
long as it is possible to understand that students and the institution think in 
different ways about the same things, then it is also possible to imagine that they 
might think differently about what innovation is and how the capacity to be 
innovative is formed. To think differently does not, in itself, suppose the existence 
of a conflict. However, because the discussion is thought to benefit from 
acknowledgement of the existence of the aforementioned paradox, it is thought 
that failure to recognize the possibility of conflict, from the student’s perspective, 
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becomes tantamount to institutional ignorance of the paradoxical situation that has 
emerged. 
   
4.1 
Innovation begins in popular culture 
Know good ideas when you see them. Then steal them. 
First and foremost, let’s demystify Pep 1 , says Perarnau 2 . 
Everyone says that he has reinvented football. He hasn’t. His 
greatest talent might actually be something else: observing and 
listening closely. He can soak up his colleagues’ working 
methods like a sponge. He knows a good idea when he sees one, 
and he’ll steal it and make it part of a new whole.  
I’ve spoken about this with Pep and his friend, Ferran Adria, 
who is considered the best chef in the world and was the brains 
behind Spanish restaurant, el Bulli. Adria makes a precise 
distinction: “Pep isn’t a creator, he’s an innovator”. (Perarnau, 
2015, p. 40)   
This tract of text has been chosen to initiate the discussion because of the 
importance of popular culture as a consumer experience and, as such, as the 
grounded learning experience that provides students with epistemological 
foundations for a broader understanding of innovation. Students do not need to be 
academic in their reading to understand innovation, nor do they need to read 
football literature: the notion that innovation is a concept that exceeds the 
parameters of an orthodox of technological innovation is available to all.3 This 
epistemological grounding puts students in conflict with the educational 
institution because the problem of innovation in popular culture has outstripped 
the development of the necessary discourse in Education.      
This analysis of Pep Guardiola’s working methodology might be an 
affirmation of the interests of popular culture – the biography of success in the 
world of football – but there is much more to this analysis than hyping an 
engagement with something that is already a proven method. Guardiola’s 
                                                 
1 Pep Guardiola, the Catalonian football manager, is ex-manager of FC Barcelona (2008-2012), FC 
Bayern Munich (2013-2016), and now manager of Manchester City (2016-), and winner of 21 
trophies over 8 seasons. 
2 Marti Perarnau is the author of a new book on Pep Guardiola titled Pep Guardiola: The inside 
story of Pep Guardiola’s first season at Bayern Munich. 
3 The orthodox understanding of technological innovation will be challenged in Chapter Six. 
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methodology is intellectual, interdisciplinary and rigorous in the extreme (see 
Balague, 2013) and all quite probably without recourse to an orthodox 
understanding of innovation as either a technological and commercial 
phenomenon. Guardiola understands that being innovative is a question of 
combining in new ways what is already known, of recognizing an opportunity and 
re-interpreting it according to one’s interests, of not pretending to invent (the 
author of the article can be thought to use the term creator as a proxy for inventor) 
but understanding the risk and responsibility associated with the desire to act 
requires the need to leap. So all the conventional features of innovative thought 
are here and, what is more, the success of Guardiola’s innovative methods can be 
measured in the market-place, although the latter is not the unique means or even 
the most important means of measuring his success.4 
On top of this, Guardiola, through Perarnau’s analysis, brings something 
extra to how innovation needs to be understood and, in particular, in the 
educational context (The Red Bulletin, 2015). Guardiola forms what to him is a 
good idea as “part of a new whole” (p. 40). This is a phrase that would seem to 
throw the concept of innovation into a whole new light. While the market-place 
might provide the illusion of comprising a whole in our projection that acts as 
universal moral arbiter of all human behaviour, the concept of innovation that 
transforms the content and the image of the market is a concept that is drawn from 
a more complex epistemological understanding of the significance of change than 
that which merely defines the value of goods and services that make up the 
market. The concept of innovation according to which Guardiola seems to 
understand innovation would appear to function both inside and outside the 
parameters that govern economic thinking and what, in this investigation, is called 
“the commodity space” (Lévy, 1997, pp. 135-138).  
There are two essential features of this discussion that can be carried over 
into the discussion on the conflict created for the student who is already an 
                                                 
4 Some coaches prefer their teams to play beautifully rather than to win without playing 
beautifully; football being the beautiful game. Winning is the market’s criterion for how 
innovation in football is measured; the measurements being seat sales in stadiums, the size of 
television audiences and the sales of sports apparel. The success of the beautiful game is measured 
according to the dignity and loyalty with which a team plays according to the club’s or nation’s 
philosophy (see Cruyff, J. (2012). Fútbol. Mi filosofía. Barcelona, Spain: Ediciones. B.).   
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innovative subject: the idea of the whole and the idea of the thing. The whole can 
be understood to replace the thing as that which is altered by the process of 
innovation. By the whole, it is not implied that that which is altered is the global 
experience, or even that which can be said to represent all that football represents 
or what might be called qua football. Rather it is implied that the whole comprises 
the phenomenon that is framed as that which can be proven to be altered. While 
this proof might be subjective, the proof in football will be made in football by the 
way the manager explains the result in terms of the strategies employed on the 
field.  Furthermore, proof is seen by those in the stadium who measure their 
interest in buying a ticket in relation to the performance of the team and the idea 
that the team plays as a whole as the optimal representation of what it means for a 
team to perform.  
Machiavelli (1961) understood this notion of innovation in terms of what 
it took to gain loyalty from those the prince had newly conquered. In 
Machiavelli’s case, the innovation that enabled the creation of loyalty involved 
more than just the use of political innovation. In Guardiola’s case, innovation 
involves more than just an understanding of technological innovation: it involves 
an understanding of social innovation, political innovation and even philosophical 
innovation, in that he works with concepts in new ways.  
This consideration of the whole, that can be altered in order to create 
change and novelty in the game plan and performance, can be considered to 
embrace the use of both market and non-market principles. To this effect, the 
whole extends beyond the scope of the market and includes a more complex 
configuration of problems that provide the means to change. As such, the 
epistemology that supports the innovation that transforms the whole cannot be 
reduced to that which supports the innovation that transforms the thing. Without 
understanding the idea that two of more factors (e.g., the political, the social, the 
technological) can exist at once while functioning in relation to distinctive 
objectives, it would seem difficult to understand the paradox of the innovative 
student who forms him or herself in relation to a regime of learning that does not 
recognize their engagement with the whole.   
Guardiola’s innovative capacity as a football manager (Balagué, 2012; 
Cruyff, 2012) might be argued by neoliberals to be a product of the human capital 
Guardiola formed during his education. Such a claim could not be made without 
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asking why there are not more innovative subjects of Guardiola’s capacity 
graduating from the same Education system. Does not Education, as a system of 
formation, by definition, not refer to a capacity to systematically mechanically 
produce that which can be anticipated? To put the question another way, if the 
education system is so effectively focused on realizing its objective of producing 
innovative individuals, it would seem logical that Guardiola could not be such a 
startling example of the so-called “transferable skills and knowledge” that a good 
education is said to produce (David, Gabriel, & Lopez, 2001; OECD, 1996)? 
Guardiola (2011) explains his innovative capacity in a much simpler manner: 
“that all he needed was a pen and a notebook – the opportunity to develop an idea 
was already there: it just took work, experimentation, work, experimentation and 
so on”. 
But what if Guardiola’s method of developing an idea were taken up 
within the ambit of the school? This is a kind of action research where the 
innovative process does not begin with what is learned in school and an a priori 
formation of human capital, it begins outside the ambit of the school as an action 
that is learned from through first being an action rather than first being an object 
of study. Of course Guardiola had the advantage of having a sympathetic 
schooling environment, in that there existed fluidity between his innovative 
project and the context in which he did his formal studies in La Masia (the 
Farmhouse).5 But the existence of this fluidity should not be the point. If a child is 
already innovative, they should be able to carry their innovative process into their 
formal learning environment irrespective of the philosophy of the school. This is 
the case because the child or young student is learning from their own actions, and 
as such they are learning heuristically by learning by doing.  
The next questions should be, in the context of the student bringing their 
innovation process to the classroom: what should the educational process be by 
which this innovative capacity continues its formation, without being stifled by 
the requirements to privilege assessments as the obligatory work of human capital 
formation? What ensues from this question is the problem of the role of the 
teacher, when the student already has in play a line of inquiry that was formed 
such that they would be able to respond to the demands of their own curiosity. 
                                                 
5 La Masia de Can Planes is the accommodation for players in the youth teams in FCBarcelona 
who are not able to live at home during their formation with the club. 
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How does the student negotiate the power relations such that the value of their 
relative autonomy and heuristic learning would be recognized? This is not a 
simple question as such students are faced with the tyranny that does not 
conceptualize the need for greater autonomy. It is here that the discussion would 
benefit from turning to Jacques Rancière’s research on the life and work of Joseph 
Jacotot (see The ignorant schoolmaster: Five lessons in intellectual emancipation, 
1991). The relevance of Rancière’s thinking will be engaged later in the 
discussion.    
 
4.2 
The innovation process: A knowledge asset 
In this chapter, the discussion began with a theorization of innovation as a process 
that is not simply commercial while at the same time has its formation outside the 
ambit of the educational institution. The purpose of commencing in this manner is 
to configure the problematic of the already innovative student such that their 
action is at once desirable and yet not anticipated by the educational institution. 
Crucial to this configuration is the status of knowledge, which in the case of the 
already innovative subject, could be thought to be illegitimate, given that it 
undermines the institution’s role in delivering a programme for the acquisition of 
human capital. Furthermore, if the development of all innovative capacities has 
occurred outside the institution, then much of the purpose of formal education 
would be undermined, given Education’s focus on producing human capital for 
the explicit purpose of enabling graduates to be innovative. This overriding of 
educational requisites that qualify the student to be innovative can be understood 
to be already occurring in that employers are now beginning to express a greater 
interest in the less qualified at the expense of those who are more qualified. This 
suggests that learning involves an engagement with both too much knowledge and 
the wrong sort of knowledge (see Kander, 2014).6 
In Chapter One, it was highlighted that economics, in treating the 
innovation process as a black box, in effect also condemns the innovative subject 
to the same void of disinterest. It must be concluded that economics does not 
                                                 
6 See Diana Kander, Published on 27 Aug 2014, Our approach to innovation is dead wrong | Diana 
Kander | TEDxKC, Re the Marshmallow test where children beat MBA graduates to build a tower 
against the clock. Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pii8tTx1UYM 
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regard the innovation process as being capable of producing significant 
knowledge or, from another perspective, that it does not regard itself as needing to 
rethink human behaviour such that its task should be to account for innovative 
processes that reflect the engagement of human subjectivities. This is a curious 
fact given neoliberal economics’ conceptualization of the consumer subject as an 
individual and so-called ‘autonomous chooser’ (Marshall, 1999). Such a 
conceptualization of the individual subject seems to be limited to the choice to 
consume. This is to say, the same individual is not conceptualized as one who 
participates in the production processes where they are equally free to contribute 
to innovation processes in a manner that would require equivalent and 
autonomous capacity for decision-making in relation to the possibility of being 
innovative. The question that might follow is: how does the absence of interest in 
the possibility that the innovation process produces significant knowledge in 
economics become a theoretical problem for how Education has been charged by 
neoliberalism to produce individuals with the innovative capacity to free 
enterprise? 
When a firm (in this case an ‘educational institution’) privileges the profit 
of product innovation (goods and services) over the development of alternative 
innovation processes, not everything will be learned about how an innovation is 
realized (Ichijo & Nonaka, 2007). In other words, it can be assumed that when the 
firm acts in such a way, it achieves the effect of black-boxing its innovation 
process and furthermore that it does this at the cost of its own learning and the 
development of endogenous know-how.7 This practice can often have the effect of 
making an innovation look as if it were achieved by accident. This of course  can 
be the case because significant knowledge that the innovation process might 
elucidate, has not been previously sought. In these circumstances, the conditions 
that make innovation possible become difficult to reproduce. This is the negative 
connotation of economic black-boxing in the innovation process. The ultimate 
effect of this approach is that it supposes an exclusive interest in short-term profits 
or a lack of interest in “advancement strategies” (Ichijo, 2007, p. 135).  
Taking the opposing perspective, black-boxing can contrarily have a 
positive connotation in business management when, for example, a long-term 
                                                 
7 In commercial enterprise in the proprietary domain, it is understood that this privileging of 
product innovation is the result of commercial expediency and the need to be cost-effective. 
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view is taken and when the innovation process is thought of as a “knowledge 
asset” (Ichijo, 2007, p. 135). Instead of the black box being an excuse to abandon 
theoretical responsibility for the means through which innovation is achieved, the 
innovation process becomes a domain for analysis, interpretation and creative 
thought. In such circumstances, the firm might, for example, choose to use the 
black box to make “unique knowledge difficult to imitate”. This is usually done 
through “a combination of factors such as product customization, complexity, and 
intellectual property protection”.  
Curiously, the knowledge asset, in the latter instance, is necessarily 
rivalrous and excludable because the innovation process needs to be secured as 
discrete knowledge so that the competitive advantage it implies is maintained in 
the marketplace. This strategy for protecting competitive advantage is highly 
contextual. Put simply, a knowledge asset can be developed in an environment 
where both closed processes and open processes of innovation are practiced (see 
Chapters Five and Eight respectively). In the latter case, knowledge is considered 
to be “non-rivalrous” and “barely excludable”, as explained by Peters (2008, p. 5), 
in describing “knowledge as an economic good” 8  in what has been broadly 
described to the knowledge economy. On the other hand, when knowledge 
development involves a closed process, its formation is necessarily heuristic and 
to some extent covert in that it must break with prescribed processes of learning.      
 
4.3 
The political problematic of the already innovative subject 
The situation of the already innovative subject is problematic in both political and 
philosophical aspects of the student’s experience of the institution’s application of 
knowledge, governance and innovation. While differences in understanding of 
innovation cannot be elucidated without a philosophical debate, the political 
intricacies of the particular situation of the already innovative subject need to be 
described first. Hence, this section will focus on the political problematic, 
followed by the philosophical problematic. 
                                                 
8 Peters’ (2008) description of knowledge as an economic good is drawn from the work of Paul 
Romer (1990, 1994).  
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Learning does not occur in the educational institution without the student 
being subjected to power relations designed to serve the institution’s economic 
objectives.9 This means the institution’s idea of how the capacity to be innovative 
is formed directs the manner in which all power relations with students are 
structured. This is not only the case in all learning areas, but all domains of the 
student’s relations with all that is institutional. So as to avoid the trap of 
explaining the already innovative student as an ideological subject, the discussion 
begins with a problematization of these power relations from the student’s 
perspective.10 
The student’s relationship with the teacher is always subjective, as is the 
student’s experience of the curriculum and the world for which Education is said 
to prepare them for. This subjectivity is of course formed by multiple aspects of 
experience. As long as individual experience can be thought of as being diverse in 
itself, then it should be anticipated that this diversity has the possibility of 
producing new subjectivities in the form of distinctive expressions of thought in 
speech and action. As such, it is also to be anticipated that power relations 
involving students and teachers will often be problematic. For this diversity to 
flourish in its growth and contribution to the learning environment, each 
individual student endures the peril of functioning in an environment that is 
divergent in its political orientation, where governance unifies and/or separates 
individuals according to the extent to which they identify or not with the 
institution’s system of education.  
In curriculum policy that supports primary and secondary education in 
New Zealand, innovation is thought of as a “value” (Ministry of Education, 2007, 
p. 10); the illusion being that the value of innovation can be objectified and, as 
such, given a stable definition – the definition stabilized by the idea that 
innovation is technological innovation and uniquely so. It will be argued here that 
this is in fact not the case – that innovation thought of in this way is merely an 
alternative fact in a more complex understanding of what produces change and 
novelty. The big question is, if innovation is a value, is the meaning of innovation, 
as a concept, open to being re-evaluated by students?  
                                                 
9 See Foucault (2000), Laclau (1994), Negri (1989), Touraine (2001). 
10 In Section 4.2, the institution’s politics in relation to this question will be explained.  
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This is a simpler question than may be thought. Whatever teachers believe 
is important, in terms of opening up the discussion of what innovation is (Ministry 
of Education, 2007), the advocates (Hipkins et al., 2014) for the current 
curriculum delimit the possibility that innovation can be anything other than 
technological innovation. How is it possible that such a delimitation should frame 
the significance of all change and as such become the universal understanding of 
what innovation refers to? 
          In the big picture, as iterated in Chapter One, Two and Three, technological 
innovation has been tied to economic development since the end of the Second 
World War. The inculcation of technological innovation as innovation has been 
promoted in policy developments by the World Economic Forum (2014) and the 
OECD (2007), for example, and has been diffused all the way down to the local 
school in the developed world for over 10 years now. As a consequence, curricula 
have become oriented towards privileging STEM subjects so that innovative 
capacities will be acquired by future generations to greater and greater economic 
effect. Against these enduring historical processes, a new technological 
innovation does not just become an end in itself: it becomes the means by which 
society is embedded into a new universal vision (see Drucker, 1959). In such 
circumstances, the political problematic of the already innovative subject has to 
do with how Education, to paraphrase Foucault’s (2000), conducts student 
conduct, and directs or drives student self-direction or their capacity to drive the 
self. This way, technological innovation is used to conduct, direct or drive student 
diversity such that students are inculcated into the ideological subjectivities that 
make this universal vision possible.    
          In Education in New Zealand, as in this subtly drawn-out global event, re-
evaluation of the concept of innovation is in effect structurally prohibited. How? 
Through the position of thinking as a key competency (see Ministry of Education, 
2007; Hipkins et al., 2014). While the OECD thinks that the problem of thinking 
is implicit to the problem of developing all key competencies, and that it is “not 
enough to be able to just do something without being able to think about and 
critique one’s choices and actions” (Hipkins et al., 2014, p. 15), New Zealand 
policy-makers thought to make thinking a separate competency. Thinking is 
framed as something that can be developed alongside and yet outside the problem 
of developing the other competencies in The New Zealand Curriculum (MoE, 
99 
2007). Apart from the competency of critical thinking, the other competencies are 
managing self, relating to others, participating and contributing, and using 
language, symbols and texts. The weakness of this approach is that learning to 
think independently of the task of acquiring the other competencies would appear 
to undermine the value of thinking as a competency, and the development of the 
other competencies. If thinking is learned as an independent competency, what 
makes this competency a relevant form of thought if it is not grounded in both the 
ontological and epistemological problems that are particular to understanding 
associated with managing self, relating to others, and participating and 
contributing? To take the argument a step further, each of these three 
competencies supposes distinctive ethical problems that require the thought 
process to be endogenous. Of course there is exogenous value in reading, 
listening, social and academic interaction, and being mentored in relation to these 
problems. The individual needs to decide for him or herself in what ways they are 
going to identify with the risks and responsibilities that are associated with, for 
instance, the formation of the competency of managing self in ways derivative of 
a practice of thinking that is associated with an ethics of being part of that 
moment. Hipkins et al. (2014) do not  the intricacies in depth and instead prefer to 
speak to the value of applying the curriculum.  
The relevance of thinking as a competency that is best developed through 
the formation of the other competencies – assuming these competencies are in fact 
the best competencies through which one might learn to think – can also be 
argued according to what Jacques Rancière (2011) calls the distribution of the 
sensible. Rancière calls the distribution of the sensible   
the system of self-evident facts of sense perception that 
simultaneously discloses the existence of something in common 
and the delimitations that define the respective parts and 
positions within it. (p. 7, emphasis added) 
Sense perception that enables the disclosure of the existence of something in 
common that “produces a community” (see Rancière, 2011, p. 109, note 5), draws 
from aesthetic experience. The delimitations that simultaneously define the 
respective parts and positions within this community are informed by this same 
aesthetic experience and, as such, make it possible to distinguish one’s thinking 
and identification with ideas from that of another within the same community – 
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thus making it possible to see the political positions that this thinking produces 
within it. This is the political aspect of the same experience. Crucially, this 
distribution of the sensible occurs simultaneously and not sequentially i.e., it is 
not distributed first as an aesthetic experience and then as a political experience.  
Following Rancière, it is meaningless to separate the formation of a 
capacity to think from the formation of other competencies. If the experience of 
another competency (say, relating to others) supposes a distinctive aesthetic 
experience that is particular to the individual’s consciousness of community 
created by the aesthetic experience that “produces a community” (Rancière, 2011) 
in the context of needing to relate to others, then the individual’s capacity to relate 
to others can only be informed by the political experience particular to the 
aesthetic experience of that moment.  
It is in this manner that Education and the educational institution could be 
accused of ambiguating the experience of both the significance of the innovation 
process and the situation of the student as an innovative actor. In isolating the 
formation of the competency to think in the context of aesthetic experience, 
Education and the educational institution make concepts employed in Education – 
for example, technological innovation – impenetrable to those who would learn to 
think as the curriculum suggests is possible; such concepts being beyond the reach 
of thought. In this way, technological innovation becomes reified, in the sense of 
not being able to be questioned, because questions relating to the concept itself are 
not thought of as questions that need to be grounded in an aesthetic experience. 
As such, this structural abstraction would ironically appear to remove independent 
thought from the purpose of education. This situation would seem to suggest that 
students are not likely to have a strong opinion for or against technological 
innovation. Without this practice, language becomes purely ontic and loses its 
phenomenological point of reference. It becomes difficult to understand what 
critical thinking might be, as it would seem that that which is critical can only be 
so in as much as it is not disruptive to the neoliberal political agenda.    
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4.4 
The philosophical problematic of the already innovative subject 
In this section, the Cartesian and post-Cartesian subjects will be briefly described, 
after which the situation of the already innovative subject will be described in 
terms of the elements that make it an incommensurable situation and therefore a 
paradoxical one. The Cartesian subject (see Hatfield, 2015) is understood to think 
in a manner that draws a clear distinction between subject (he or she who thinks) 
and object (the other and all other phenomena that are apart from the subject). 
This capacity to think, when extended to a description of the other (and all other 
phenomena), is thought to facilitate the objectification of the other (and all other 
phenomena).  
 The post-Cartesian subject, while not a subject who can be thought of as 
being entirely independent of or separate from their Cartesian forebear, is less 
recognizable as a Cartesian subject. In fact, according to Foucault, all systems of 
thought that have to do with the acquisition of “knowledge and the notion of self-
transformation” (as cited in O’Farrell, 2007) are post-Cartesian because they come 
after Descartes and as a product of his thought. So the post-Cartesian subject 
moves as if the history of subjectivity could be told as distinct from others and 
related to the formation of others.  
In this discussion, the significance of this relative independence given to 
the post-Cartesian subject comes about as a consequence of a phenomenological 
shift in the subject’s disposition. This shift involves a movement towards 
privileging the relationship between self and other, between subject and object by 
privileging the practices or processes through which relationships evolve. It is a 
shift that is not always easy to see because while this disposition might entail 
giving importance to, for example a “certain objectivity” (Foucault, 1997d, p. 
116), this focus on objectivity can be interpreted as Cartesian if taken in isolation. 
On the other hand, if this certain objectivity – using Foucault’s explanation – is 
always thought to remain in relation to both “the development of a politics and a 
government of the self” (pp. 116-117), and “the elaboration of an ethics and a 
practice in regard to oneself” (p. 117), then the capacity to be objective must be 
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conditioned by the practices or processes that realize these other two activities – 
and vice versa.11 
These practices and processes are more easily seen in Education when 
teachers express their thinking through actions that reflect their understanding that 
students enter into learning with equal intelligence to that of the teacher (see 
Rancière, 1991). When teachers acknowledge this equality of intelligence in their 
actions, then the phenomenological shift of consciousness of the importance given 
to the relationship and the processes and practices that sustain it can be seen more 
easily.    
The history of the subject, as a concept, has been conditioned by the 
history of philosophy (Agamben, 1998; Foucault, 1998b). It might be argued that 
the Cartesian subject has disappeared with the disappearance of philosophy, in 
that today it is not individual consciousness that matters so much as identification 
with a universal idea of how we should think. Our relationship with technological 
innovation might be an example of this identification with a universal idea. The 
fact that innovation is spontaneously thought of as ‘technological innovation’ 
(Godin, 2015a) exemplifies this transformation in the thought of the Cartesian 
subject. To think of the evolution of technology though innovation without 
questioning the manner in which we constitute ourselves as technological subjects 
(as Heidegger does), supposes that the task of consciousness has been given over 
to those whose interest it is that technology should be politically determinant of 
how human beings constitute themselves as social beings. 12  However, this 
articulation of the danger of Cartesian thinking may not corroborate our common 
experience of the role that both technology and the process of innovation have in 
technological innovation; the benefits of which are explored in Chapters Eight and 
Ten. 
Curiously, the conceptual death of the subject has in more recent times 
been followed by a discrete interest in its rebirth in philosophy (Foucault, 1998a; 
Laclau, 1994; Touraine, 2001). It is this subject that might be called the post-
Cartesian subject. The post-Cartesian subject might be understood as arising in 
response to the problematization of the relationship of subject to object, where 
                                                 
11 This form of problematization is Cartesian, on account of its exclusive interest in objectification 
(See Foucault, 1997d, p. 117). 
12 Heidegger (1977). 
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instead of thought requiring identification with that which includes but does not 
require conscious participation in, thought is radicalized, demonstrating a capacity 
to both break with and remain in relation to the other and all other phenomena. 
Foucault (1989) illustrates this form of thinking when he describes his 
relationship with Nietzsche in the interview On Literature when he says,  
… in relation to philosophy, there is in Nietzsche’s work a 
roughness, a rustic simplicity, an outsideness, a kind of mountain 
peasantness that allows him , with a shrug of the shoulder and 
without appearing in any way ridiculous, to say with unavoidable 
force: “What non-sense all that is!” 
To rid oneself of philosophy necessarily implies such 
offhandedness. It’s not by remaining in philosophy, it is not by 
refining it to the maximum, it’s not by turning it against itself 
that one exits from it. No. It’s by opposing with a kind of 
astonished and joyful stupidity, a sort of incomprehensible burst 
of laughter that in the end understands, or in any case breaks. 
Yes … it breaks more than it understands. (p. 118) 
The effect of Foucault’s post-Cartesian thinking – his breaking with while 
remaining in relation to – can be extrapolated out such that Nietzsche’s 
descendents can be understood as thinkers who both continue to break with 
Nietzsche’s thinking while still maintaining an individual relationship to that 
which attracts them to his thought. Here Foucault (1989) illustrates how he could 
be both a Nietzschean and an anti-Nietzschean. Likewise in the same text, 
Foucault illustrates how he could be both philosophical and anti-philosophical (in 
the context of academic philosophy at least).  
So the question now is how to describe the paradoxical elements in the 
situation of the already innovative student who is governed by a politics of 
education that conceptualizes innovation based on the historical exercising of 
Cartesian thought; that is, a thought that today governs student innovative 
activities in relation to an objectified notion of innovation that is delimited to 
technological objective? Of course, the already innovative student may have the 
good fortune of studying in an enlightened institution and having a teacher whose 
political subjectivity and courage enables an open interrogation of all concepts 
relevant to the student’s education, but this scenario cannot be assume. 
Investigating how the concept of innovation is understood in Education from the 
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perspective of the situation of the already innovative student will benefit how the 
role of Education is understood if the already innovative subject’s situation 
acknowledges the theoretical conflict that accompanies student innovation in the 
way that innovation is understood in this discussion – as something much more 
than just technological innovation. Hence the situation of the already innovative 
subject is initially cast as a negative one. 
Institutional and/or teacher thinking that can be thought of as Cartesian, 
can be interpreted to understand relations with the student in a binary form – 
particularly when exercising of power and affirming the hierarchy. The reality of 
this dynamic – one which is prone to creating breaks in thought and undermining 
relationships – is easily seen when disruptive student speech and actions are 
thought of in contrary terms to that which is required by the institution. As such, 
the rest of the discussion in this section is framed such that the already innovative 
subject (the student) is understood to be necessarily post-Cartesian and one who is 
governed in their learning by a teacher and institution that are Cartesian in their 
thinking. This dynamic can be thought of as the initial characterization of the 
aforementioned paradoxical situation that these two subjects share.    
 
4.5 
The situation of the already innovative subject as a black box 
It can be argued that the situation of the already innovative subject does not 
actually exist for reason that the already innovative subject in Education does not 
actually exist. Be this as it may, it can also be argued, as it is in this investigation, 
that just as it is possible to say that the situation of the already innovation subject 
in Education does not exist because the same already innovative subject does not 
exist in qua society, the former exists on account of the existence of the latter. 
Moreover, just as the former argument can be discredited in various ways, so too 
the latter argument can equally be argued for in various ways. However, the 
intention is not to create a polemic – the illusion being that the student could not 
be considered to emerge unscathed from such an argument without compromising 
their innovative subjectivity. This is because the already innovative subject cannot 
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be considered a universal truth, just as the entrepreneur cannot be considered to be 
one either.13 
 When standard economics depreciates the value of learning from the 
process of innovation and as such treats the innovation process as a black box, it 
does this according to the interests of its own discipline. This is logical. To this 
effect, it is also logical that the metaphor of the black box, when used in this way, 
refers to a meaning and an object that are commensurate with these disciplinary 
interests. For example, if the purpose and objective of standard economics is to 
explain human behaviour in mathematical equations that provide macro-pictures 
of how humanity would be best suited to understanding the world – then this 
metaphor might need to be thought of as being representative of a shared 
understanding of a scientific apparatus and, as such, its object might be something 
like a flight recorder. The flight recorder is an apparatus where control is sought 
over the nature and readings of inputs and outputs, with some variance allowed 
for variance in the situation that required its use (‘Flight Recorder’, 2017) – an air 
accident.  
Of interest to this investigation is not the black box as a scientific 
apparatus and a flight recorder, because it is this very mechanism of analysis, and 
its capacity for creating a certain kind of macro-picture of events, that necessitate 
the abandonment of theoretical interest in the process of innovation and the 
innovative actors associated with this process. When analyzing the cause of an air 
accident, for example, the inputs must be predefined before the accident; there is 
no possibility that those who are part of such an event can contribute to this input. 
If the nature of this data is not predefined, the data outputs cannot be controlled. 
Such a mechanism is only able to engage pre-codifable information: it is unable to 
factor in the tacit knowledge of passengers that might be critical to collectively 
understanding why such an event took place. As imperfect as this model and 
explanation of the use of a flight recorder might be, in explaining standard 
economic use of the black box as a metaphor, what matters is that the student, as a 
                                                 
13 While there are explanations of what the entrepreneur does, that he is a manager and a 
businessman, as he is understood today (Drucker, 1997), there is universally accepted theory of the 
entrepreneur most likely because the their actions need to correspond to new conditions of change. 
Opportunities are both temporal and particular to the individual, and have something to do with the 
disposition of the spirit of the individual. 
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metaphoric passenger in this model, needs to be an active participant with a 
future, not a possible victim who should otherwise pull the blinds and go to sleep.  
In Education, the situation of the student is different from the above 
situation: tacit knowledge is fundamental to his or her learning processes, to their 
innovative activity and this, in turn, conditions how they think and perform in 
relation to the requirement that their education results in the achievement of 
outcomes. The flight recorder cannot not provide either the meaning and/or be the 
object of the metaphor to which the black box refers in this case. Tacit knowledge 
might be imperative to the scientific process when attempting to extract 
information from a flight recorder; however this is external to the effect of the 
accident: the aforementioned tacit knowledge of passengers before and during an 
accident cannot be measured, for reason of the limited nature of the scientific 
inputs used. However, in the case of the meaning and object of the black box that 
might be used as a metaphor in Education, the meaning and object of the black 
box would need to refer to the living presence of the students and to the idea that 
they are protagonists in their individual and collective futures.  
 What would the object of such a black box look like and what would its 
significance be for students and, in particular, the already innovative subject? 
What kind of object would permit the possibility of seeing the significance of the 
black box as a positive experience for students in their learning? This is to ask, 
that instead of being possible victims (of an accident of the politics of education), 
what metaphor would enable students to emerge as beings from their education 
capable of more than just fulfilling the expectations that economics has for them 
as consumers and producers (see Becker, 1964; Dardot & Laval, 2013)? In other 
words, what kind of black box would elucidate for students the possibility of 
interpreting their learning as involving innovative activities? What kind of black 
box would elucidate learning as involving innovative activities that were not just 
about attending to the production of human capital as a process that increased the 
productivity of the institution?  
These questions can neither be addressed by neoliberalism and nor can 
they be addressed by its negative, as in a critique of neoliberalism, as this negative 
is also an affirmation of neoliberalism. These questions will need rather to be 
addressed through “the surprising emergence of new natural and cultural forms 
that could not be deduced from previous facts and logical thinking” (Lévy, 2015, 
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as cited in Peters, 2015, p. 3, emphasis in original). Here Lévy is referring to the 
idea that “human qualities” (Lévy, 1997, p. 140), as new natural and cultural 
forms and the fact that they do not need to appear as a logical consequence of the 
workings of neoliberalism. He is highlighting the fact that such an event can 
transpire despite the fact that everything says that it should not, that the exemplary 
public good is more than a mere commercial good. The significance of this aspect 
of the discussion is that the black box that signifies standard economic theoretical 
disinterest in the process of innovation and the absenting of the innovative 
subject, cannot be the same black box that the contemporary student requires. The 
already innovative student who wishes to look upon their innovative activity as 
positively contributing to their learning, despite the fact that this required them to 
break with the Education that is provided them requires a black box that refers to a 
meaning and object that cannot be ascribed by the metaphysics that produces the 
commercial good. Their black box must be accompanied by the emergence of new 
natural and cultural forms, forms that function with a degree of autonomy that 
cannot be controlled by market arbitration. 
The odd thing about standard economics’ use of the black box as a 
metaphor to jettison its theoretical interest in the process of innovation is that the 
black box is not described in terms of its actual meaning or object. The most that 
can be assumed is that this abstract concept refers to a domain with which the so-
called scientism of economics does not function. This lack of attention to the use 
of this metaphor can be thought of as an invitation.  
Therefore given the approach taken in this investigation to neither break 
with economics or turn it against itself, it is argued here that there is value in 
continuing to use the black box as a metaphor, but to ascribe a more appropriate 
meaning and object to it its significance. Instead of a purely scientific apparatus 
that is only able to facilitate outputs based on the prescription of its inputs, and 
given the intentions of this investigation, the metaphor of the black box would 
need to refer a notion more oriented to the innovation process and the experience 
of its associated innovative subjects. To this effect, the black box will hereafter be 
thought of as referring to the object of the blacked-out theatre (see Mederos 
Syssoyeva, 2013).  
The meaning of this metaphor is as follows: It refers to the dimmed lights 
in a theatre space, both auditorium and stage, before the commencement of a 
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performance. The significance of this blacked-out space is multiple in terms of the 
student experience of their Education. The fact that a play, by definition, cannot 
be performed exactly the same way each time it is performed alludes to the 
existence of an innovative process, in as much as the actors and audience act upon 
its form and content to make it accord with their tacit knowledge of what is 
appropriate or required in the moment. In these circumstances, the situation of the 
already innovative subject as a black box, becomes the subjective experience of 
each individual in the unknown of the experience of commencement in their 
education in the context of a shared experience of an event where “the processes 
of individual and collective subjectivization come together” (Lévy, 1997, p. 139). 
Furthermore, this experience and field of analysis is open to all educational 
experience – it is not limited to privileging the STEM subjects and it does not 
imply by its process that innovation can only be technological in its end. What is 
more, the domain of arbitration is reconceptualized so that the effectiveness of the 
processes involved can be judged both according to the commercial merit of the 
commercial good while at the same time allowing human qualities to be judged 
according to their deeper significance. This is to say the theatre of education is not 
merely judged according to its value in the market.  
 
Conclusion 
Key to understanding the situation of the already innovative subject is the problem 
of understating the distinction between the political and philosophical aspects of 
such a situation. While the first has to do with the power of numbers and/or the 
rhetoric and strategies required to leverage more space within power relations, the 
second has to do with the problem of thinking the paradox (see Badiou, 2010). 
When Education is only framed in terms of learning as something that takes place 
in the commodity space, then both these two aspects of student innovation are 
often, it is argued here, challenging to the institution. The worst scenario for the 
student is that their working through of their paradox is interpreted as representing 
a politically contrary attitude towards teachers and the institution. This would be a 
misunderstanding on the part of the institution for reason that the elements that 
might comprise a paradox cannot be measured by political thinking: they can only 
be described and thought of in relation to one another. In this sense, the situation 
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of the already innovative subject requires new possibilities of elaboration. For this 
reason the metaphor of the blacked-out theatre has been introduced. The 





The Individual, Innovation and the Institution 
 
Introduction 
In as much as students are treated as anonymous subjects in the educational 
institution’s productive function, they are agents in the institution’s innovation 
processes. While students are agents in the these processes, they are also external 
to them in that they are fulfilling a vision that is external to what motivates their 
learning: at least, it must be speculated as being so. On the other hand, this mere 
population by students of institutional processes of innovation is hardly 
surprising. Education’s commercial contract with students involves fees for 
services provided, but being active protagonists in the institution’s introduction of 
changes to its production function is not a principle in this contract. The concern 
is how are student relations with the institution theorized in light of the fact that 
the student’s understanding of innovation is informed by a broader notion than 
mere technological innovation? As mentioned elsewhere in this discussion, there 
is more to technological innovation that just technology (Godin, 2015b). This 
raises the importance of human capital theory with respect to how it ties students 
to the institution’s production function and how human capital theory in turn 
influences the prescriptive capacity the curriculum has in prohibiting students 
from being creative and being active to their own innovation processes. This issue 
is d in this chapter, by bringing the institutional intentions of endogenous growth 
theory into play with its intentions with respect to the creation of human capital. 
When endogenous growth theory is theorized such that it might underpin the 
already innovative student’s will to be innovative in their learning, then student 
ideation needs to be controlled. This inevitably creates a tension in student-
institution relations.   
 
5.1 
The concept of the educational firm 
In speaking of how the concept of innovation has been adopted by commercial 
management in Education, the allusion has intermittently been made in this 
111 
discussion that the configuration of the quasi-commercial enterprise involves the 
use of commercial practices associated with the ‘educational firm’. This 
convenient analogy only serves the discussion up to a certain point. The 
educational firm1, as it is momentarily referred here, can be likened to the purely 
commercial firm from the point of view of the school or university’s adoption of a 
commercial ethos that supposes the institution’s commercially viability in the 
market place. Beyond this achievement, the meaning of educational, and what it 
might refers to, would need to be given importance unique to its purpose.  
This strategy for commercial development refers to the adoption of such 
practices as building the firm’s identity around a vision, a set of values and a set 
of principles. While such rhetorical articulations of a vision, values and principles 
are usually prominently displayed on the educational firm’s website, they are 
probably better understood in the enactment of the firm’s mission statement and 
the strategic plan. What is noteworthy about the strategic plan, is that it is a 
commercial strategic plan and not an educational one, or in other words, there are 
not two plans: the commercial strategic plan is made to cover for an educational 
vision of its own purpose, and so on. Taking this orientation towards the notion of 
commercial a step further, if the enactment of the mission statement and strategic 
plan are reverse-engineered, it becomes evident that the vision, values and 
principles are for the most part singularly commercial in their intentions, and bear 
a limited relationship to the philosophy of education that guides the work of the 
institution’s academics or teachers.  
So what makes an ‘educational firm’ educational – that is, beyond the fact 
that it offers a service that provides the fulfilment of qualifications for fees? Why 
is an educational firm not just like any other firm, company or corporation? 
Because an educational firm exists, as it were, outside the economy or in other 
words, it is commercial in its interests, but it is not entirely of the economy. That 
is, while its management practices are drawn directly from the commercial 
world2 , they are practiced in the public domain, the non-proprietary domain; 
meaning, student fees and government funding are the only inputs that can be 
                                                 
1 Equally, the educational institution could be referred to as a company or a corporation: some 
universities have more than one campus and multiple campuses in more than one country.  
2 The use of a vision, values and principles are consistently evidenced on the websites of 
commercial enterprises such that the genealogy of an educational firm’s vision, values and 
principles are obviously derivative as the key elements for the orientation of development.  
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leveraged to produce increased operational performativity and commercial 
outcomes. What makes an educational firm not entirely of the commercial world, 
is that the reception of fees and government funding (along with private and 
commercial research funding) just occurs in punctual moments, and is not part of 
day-to-day activities. The production function of an educational firm largely 
involves structuring operational activities that will fulfil a promise to deliver on 
something that is already paid for, 3 the performance of which is not measured just 
by aggregating the assessment results, which produce the school’s or university’s 
ranking. In this sense, it is argued that no extra creativity needs to be added to 
what has been already promised; given what is already known of historical 
commercial success of an equivalent delivery by the same service. Of course, just 
surviving this regime of delivery can require constant creativity in the form of a 
teacher’s work, but a teacher’s work is secondary to the operational performativity 
and commercial outcomes: a teacher’s work is not necessarily being reflected in 
the assessment results. 
This means that some new questions need to be asked about the purpose of 
the school and the university. What if an educational firm were deconstructed and 
d with the purpose recognizing its subjects as comprising an integral society in 
itself? This question supposes the integration of proprietary and non-proprietary 
domains of human activity within a commercial paradigm, and the population that 
occupies itself with activities that are non-proprietary could also be thought of as 
comprising a society apart. As such, the analysis of institutions that are active in 
the non-proprietary domain needs to be done with this in mind, which is to say the 
analysis of the purpose of educational and commercial activities need to 
acknowledge the purpose for which this particular society holds itself apart.  
Drucker (1969) makes the observation, when comparing totalitarianism 
and the tyranny of old, that totalitarianism “aims at total control of society rather 
than at control, of government alone” (p. 305). Because it is possible to think of 
an educational entity as comprising a society – a collective entity “where every 
social task is discharged in and through a large organization” – then “total control 
                                                 
3 An Operations management (OM) is the business function responsible for managing the process 
of creation of goods and services. It involves planning, organizing, coordinating, and controlling 
all the resources needed to produce a company's goods and services; the function having to do with 
the educational nature of the commercial business.  
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seems both attractive and possible”. While it may be confusing and even 
bewildering to many people to think of an educational firm as being governed by 
a totalitarian frame of thinking, it would appear appropriate that educational firms 
check, from time to time, whether their discharging of tasks in and through its 
organization benefits the whole of its society or just those whose task is to 
leverage greater commercial performativity.  
If this analysis is too difficult to imagine, then it might begin with an 
examination of the purpose of making this discharge of tasks attractive to its 
subjects. To what extent, for example, does this attractive aspect signify a will to 
total control? In general terms, it might be speculated that the political techniques 
that make the activities of an educational firm attractive also guarantee the 
universality of this control such that it becomes impossible for its subjects (or 
society apart) to question the firm’s vision, values and principles in such a way 
that this questioning could be thought to serve the emergence of new 
understandings. In the context of this discussion, it is the intractable nature of this 
already established new conservative thinking towards the significance of the 
already innovative activity of students that alludes to the notion that the firm seeks 
total control over all subjects within its society, and that adherence to its vision 
must not be disrupted.  
It might then be asked, what counts as disruption? Recently, a key policy-
maker at a national symposium on learning environments rejected any call for the 
possibility of teachers or students re-evaluating the key factors employed in 
strategic development – vision, values and principles – because stepping outside 
the triangle that these phenomena create would undermine the success of the 
commercial project: the implementation of innovative learning environments 
(Osborne, 2017). It will be argued in Chapter Seven that student innovation, if 
framed according to this kind of politics of education, can only be evidenced in 
logistical innovation, as an innovation that serves merely the existing commercial 
aspirations of the institution. 
5.2 
The survival of the individual student 
Proceeding with the above discussion, it might be asked, under what conditions is 
it possible for the already innovative subject in Education to break with the above 
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described triangulation of vision, values and principles while maintaining a 
relationship with the educational institution?4 Drucker (1969) in the chapter ‘How 
Can the Individual Survive?’ remarks that “institutions doing different tasks must 
be autonomous” (p. 308); different tasks in the contemporary context mean tasks 
that can only be done independently of the rules of commercial enterprise. 
Drucker goes on to add that “[t]he freedom of the individual in a pluralist society 
demands autonomy of institutions”. The question is, to what extent is the 
neoliberal quasi-commercial enterprise of Education an autonomous institution 
such that individual freedom is both understood and addressed as a condition of 
an institution being autonomous? Students have commercial freedom, but if the 
educational experience in an educational firm is also to be the result of such 
autonomy, then there must also be freedom, for instance, to evaluate an 
educational firm’s vision, values and principles in relation to the interests of the 
individual, the collective, knowledge and society.   
It would seem freedom of the individual, as experienced independently 
from that which is governed by market principles, can only be anticipated if the 
educational institution demonstrates an autonomous disposition as described 
above. This suggests there is more to learn about what an institution does with 
respect to the manner in which it conditions the possibility of an individual’s 
freedom. According to Shionoya (2004), Schumpeter defined economic sociology 
as “a sort of generalized or typified or stylized economic history” (p. 339). To 
Schumpeter, it is the “institution that can generalize, typify or stylize the 
complexities of economic history” – referring to the economic history of the 
society that populates the institution. The educational institution has something in 
its makeup that enables it to generalize, typify and stylize the behaviour of its 
students such that if it does not want its classrooms populated with already 
innovative subjects, it makes itself attractive such that there is no alternative but to 
accept the thinking that is already in the system of education. How would this be 
achieved so simply? By generalizing, typifying and stylizing through the unique 
use of market principles as when this is done, non-market principles have no role 
to play.  
                                                 
4 Having made the point of how the concept of the commercial ethos can stifle a non-commercial 
interest in the value of education, the discussion will revert to using the terminology educational 
institution rather than an ‘educational firm’.   
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But this only tells half the story in terms of the function of the concept of 
the institution. According to Shionoya (2004), to Schumpeter, 
the concept of the institution is intended to achieve the synthesis 
of theory and history in that while it is a means of generalizing 
historical events [of which student innovation that follows non-
market principles could be considered one], it is limited due to 
its historical relativity and specificity. It can be conceived of as a 
compromise between the generality of theory and the 
individuality meant by history.  (p. 339) 
The problem for the emergence of individuality, in the form of innovative activity 
in the educational institution, is that commercial management exercises control 
over the theory of how the institution should be managed and, as such, over how 
history and theory should be synthesized. This would be regarded a traditional 
responsibility of the educational institution: to assume responsibility for the 
educational needs of society and, as such, to assume responsibility for how these 
needs are met in the sense of preparing students to participate in the activities of 
the world.5 In the pre-neoliberal paradigm, the synthesis of the theory of education 
and the generalization of historical events both outside the institution (across a 
pre-global world panorama) and inside the institution with respect to the 
generalizing of individual events that mark the education experience of student 
maturation processes were more open to broader implication by diverse interests in 
society: something the involvement of the history of philosophy of education 
involvement would attest to.6 
 However, the value of this synthesis becomes twisted beyond recognition 
with the templating of neoliberal politics in the management of Education. Both 
history and theory are debunked – history, on account to series of factors that 
fermented globalization at the possible expense of the scholarship of history. It is 
as if local and regional histories need to be reconstituted as the substance of a new 
global relationship with the world – one that no longer gives credence to the 
current relevance accorded local and regional histories. Theory has been debunked 
                                                 
5 Dardot and Laval (2013/2009) provide a more technical explanation of the task when they say 
that “[i]nstitutions were constructed to train and supervise subjects somewhat recalcitrant to this 
existence and to make diverse interests converge” (p. 259). 
6 Philosophers of education in New Zealand have been shut of the development of education 
policy from the time neoliberalism assumed political control of education (Smeyers & Marshall, 
1995).  
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on account of discourse not implication the actor’s life in the voice of he who 
speaks (see Foucault, 2007). This development coupled with the political of 
neoliberalism being driven by economic concerns, supposes that theory has been 
replaced in Schumpeter’s synthesis by rhetoric that makes an argument without 
being open to argument. 
 So what has come about during institutional change over the last 30 years? 
While it is possible to see topical periods of focus on institutional theory of 
growth, institutional theory of sustainability and institutional theory of 
entrepreneurship, it is still difficult to say what an institution is. As Scott (1995) 
states, there is "no single and universally agreed definition of an ’institution’ in 
the institutional school of thought" (p. 235). While the contemporary educational 
institution might conveniently, pass for some, crudely-speaking, as a neoliberal 
institution, “new public management”, which accompanied this reassertion of 
liberal values, “is dead”, the institution is now shifting towards a digital system of 
governance (Peters, 2013, p. 20).7 The question then becomes, given that it must 
be assumed that “digital-era governance” is only just beginning to emerge, how 
should the individual-institution relationship be thought about in the context of the 
institution’s use of digital capitalism as a mean of recognizing what the institution 
does to stifle student innovation?      
This is a convenient moment to return to the discussion of Schumpeter’s 
thinking on the institution, where Shionoya (2004) has the following to say: 
It is the core proposition of institutional economics that 
institutions and individuals constitute an action-information loop 
(Hodgson, 1998, p. 176). Institutions are social norms, consisting 
of law, morality, and customs. Institutions offer information on 
normative rules to individuals, and actions of individuals, in turn, 
provide institutions with information on habitual behaviour. 
While the former process is concerned with individuals 
embedded in a society complying with a given state order, the 
latter process can involve deviations from customs and routines 
and create new order. Schumpeter sometimes called the 
institutional totality simply the Zeitgeist that exists outside the 
economy. Therefore the action-information loop between 
institutions and individuals present another picture of the 
interaction between economic and non-economic areas in 
                                                 
7 This situation is made more complex by the diversity of institutions that are now emerging to 
compete with the traditional institution, including private universities, charter schools, studio 
schools, forest schools, alternative universities and colleges, and so on. 
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addition to the interaction through social classes. (p. 339, 
emphasis in original) 
This explanation of the relationship between the individual and the institution 
supposes a symbiotic function that facilitates equilibrium between the forces that 
protect the old order and the will to bring about new order. Independent of 
ideological interests, this success of this equilibrium would appear to be dependent 
upon the equity of the benefits of the action-information loop. If the economic and 
non-economic factors that pass through this action-information loop are not 
representative of the interests of both parties – the individual and the institution – 
then the loop is likely to be in function of either entrenching the old order or the 
disruption of the will to change – the old order coming out on top as otherwise the 
institution could not be thought to survive.8 While this balancing act might be 
facilitated by the digital nature of contemporary institutional governance 
technologies to create, at a glance, periodic global pictures (for example, financial 
reports) of the dynamic, it is difficult to anticipate that what comprises a non-
economic factor to the student (for example, information included in a course 
review), that is also representative of a non-economic factor to the institution, and 
that such non-economic factors inform the renewal of how Education is 
understood. Without this equivalence valuation of the non-economic factors, 
students can only be thought to be valued in terms of the institution’s commercial 
interests. Of course, because the original contract still stands – fees for 
qualification – it is argued that such differences in the evaluation of factors 
(economic and non-economic) that measure performance of an educational 
institution are easily removed from view. 
 These differences cannot be removed permanently because the aesthetic 
experience and thinking that produced such non-economic factors are political and 
                                                 
8 Schumpeter (1954) speaking on teleology (the purpose of institutions), has the following to say: 
“Mostly, this improper use consists in exaggerating the extent to which men act, and shape the 
institutions under which they live, according to clearly perceived ends that they consciously wish 
to realize in the most rational way. This is why the teleological error may be called a particular 
instance of the wider category of rationalist errors. It is interesting to note, however, that Aristotle 
was quite free from the teleological error in matters outside of his social science. In Physicae 
auscultationes (II, 8) he recognized, for instance, that our teeth are adapted to chewing food, not 
because they were made for this purpose but, as he thought, because individuals who are by 
accident endowed with serviceable teeth have a better chance of surviving than those who have 
not. What a curious piece of Darwinism!”. (p. 55) 
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by definition define the diversity that makes up the community that populates the 
institutions’ activities. In this respect, the contemporary institution is different 
from the one Schumpeter describes (as cited in Shionoya, 2004). The educational 
institution today cannot be thought of as a Zeitgeist – as a reality apart – because 
the educational institution of today has been grafted onto the stock of the 
commercial economy; it has been made to work for the commercial economy such 
that it becomes an agent for an external vision of what its purpose should be. In the 
recent past when Schumpeter wrote of the institution as a Zeitgeist that was 
outside the economy, such diverse roots to the collective epistemology continued 
to subtly feed the actions that gave the institution its purpose – economic and non-
economic, as it was.    
 
5.3 
Tradition and new-conservatism 
When innovation is thought of as involving change through the production of new 
combinations of knowledge that temporarily define common identification with a 
particular articulation of the reality in which this change is promoted, then change 
is potentially disruptive to the current reality to which it is about to be applied. 
This dynamic is an especially complex one in Education for reason that the 
educational institution depends on continuity of practices and ways of doing 
things (habits) that in turn become traditional practices and ways of doing things 
(see Bergson, 1935).9 Such tradition is not necessarily a good or a bad thing. 
 To understand what kind of threshold tradition is in an institution that both 
prides itself on the production of both new knowledge and graduates with 
innovative capabilities,10 it becomes necessary to  the meaning of tradition as a 
threshold. In colloquial terms, what kinds of change and novelty are possible and 
what kinds of change and novelty are not possible? In the theme of inquiry in this 
investigation, the question is what kinds of innovation are possible and what kinds 
of innovation are not possible? To be more explicit, innovations that employ new 
organizational technologies in the form of digital programs that streamline the 
appearance of performativity might be possible – this depends on whether the 
                                                 
9 This idea is elaborated upon in Chapter Eight, Section 8.2. 
10 A viewing of most university websites confirms the essence of this self-characterization. 
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innovation comes from above and from the gatekeepers of tradition. However, 
what of innovations that employ technologies of the self, innovations that benefit 
not only the individual concerned but also the network of peers with which they 
interact? Are these innovations possible at the threshold of tradition? 11 Put more 
bluntly, what kinds of innovations are possible when innovative activity is 
asserted from below? Of course, if Education is configured such that its processes 
of ideation do not acknowledge student innovation prior to graduation, then of 
course no innovation can possibly be thought to come from below. To this effect, 
student innovation in the collaborative network of information economies has to 
be thought of as being of a covert nature. The discussion returns to this theme in 
the last section of this chapter.  
 To propose the question that it is necessary to know what kinds of 
innovations are possible, as a means of learning about the nature of the threshold 
of tradition, is but one question. What of the institution’s profile at this moment as 
one that recounts the institution’s history in relation to change? In addressing this 
question, it would seem pertinent to engage Schumpeter’s comment in 1950 
(nearly 70 years ago) that innovation becomes “routinized” (as cited in 
Stinchcombe, 1990, p, 152), when the economic requirements for economic 
evolution sees the disappearance of many of its economic effects. As Stinchcombe 
notes, “[e]ven if innovation continues, … its routinization destroys the 
entrepreneurial function”. In this situation, it is not difficult to see that the 
innovation that occurs must for the most part be incremental rather than radical, 
and that it must serve the continuity of existing institutional traditions rather than 
be open to new initiatives that might challenge existing foundations. It is in this 
moment that it becomes possible to speak of the educational institution as 
defending its conservatism, and furthermore of what Drucker (1959) predicted 
would be the result of innovation losing its way: the production of a “new 
conservatism” (pp. 33-34).       
                                                 
11 See Besley and Peters (2007, pp. 19-32) for an analysis of the relationship that technologies of 
the self and technologies of domination share. 
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5.4 
Human capital theory: A political instrument without alternatives 
Interest rates on mortgages must be at just correct level for capitalism to tie 
Education to its commercial enterprise. This is to say, the student’s investment in 
their future capacity to capitalize on their possibilities of financial security, 
through investing in their education, must be sufficiently screwed to the cost of 
living that nobody would suppose an alternative to the theory of human capital 
and therefore, to the role that Education plays in economic development. It is as if 
without reliance upon the fidelity of the assessment machine, the necessary skills 
and knowledge could not be acquired, as there is no other theory that outlines 
such a possibility of financial security.   
From a practical point of view, the theory of human capital is both soundly 
formed and consensually accepted as the ideologically appropriate mechanism to 
use to this end. Alternatively, the theory of human capital could be described as 
being ideologically embedded in a manner that makes it difficult to imagine how 
Education could serve the future in any other form. This said; it is evident that 
some very dramatic changes are on the horizon. Artificial intelligence is currently 
being reported as involving the imminent replacement of workers by automated 
processes, especially in “low-income jobs in offices and administration, sales and 
services, transport, construction and manufacturing” (Deloitte, as cited in 
Blundell, 2016, p. 17). This means that the certainty of the appropriateness of this 
system of education comes under scrutiny, or at least its reliance of the creation of 
human capital.     
In this section, it will be argued that the best way to test the value of 
human capital is to theorize the relationship between the theory of human capital 
and the theory of endogenous growth. Why the theory of endogenous growth? 
After all, this theory now hardly appears in education policy,12 and publications 
that influence education policy coming out of The Treasury have not had much 
new to say on endogenous growth theory since circa 2005.13 The reason for giving 
importance to endogenous growth theory in this investigation is the increasing 
importance of knowledge in education acquired in collaborative peer-to-peer 
                                                 
12 See http://www.education.govt.nz/ A good search for scholarly articles tells a similar story, the 
principal exception being articles on the exogenous and endogenous funding of education.  
13 See http://www.treasury.govt.nz/publications 
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networked economies of information in innovative learning environments in 
schools and universities. This is to say that when there is greater student 
autonomy resulting from, for example, a change from one teacher teaching 30 
students to two teachers facilitating learning for 100 students, there is more 
individual need of endogenous growth.       
Beyond the provision of discrete descriptions of these two theories and the 
problematization of the nature of their relationship, the discussion will engage a 
small array of issues that structurally stifle the formation of innovative 
subjectivities in educational institutions. To do this, the discussion will begin with 
Becker’s (Becker, Ewald & Harcourt, 2012) notion that the theory of human 
capital puts the individual at the centre of economic life.14 
In this discussion, human capital is understood to refer to skills and 
knowledge acquired through the student’s investment in their education as an 
investment that provides them with capacities to respond to employment 
opportunities (see Becker, 1964, 1971, 1976; Schultz, 1971). 15  While human 
capital is also thought to refer to what the individual has inherited (Becker, 1964), 
here the focus will be limited to the acquisition of skills and knowledge. The 
reason for this is that technological development is moving so quickly that it is 
argued that heuristic learning in collaborative peer-to-peer networked economies 
of information may be diminishing the historical advantage of inherited cultural or 
economic capital. The above definition provides the means of putting Education at 
the service of economic development through the supposed provision of pathways 
to work; that is, as long as students treat their experience of their education as an 
entrepreneurial enterprise where they work upon the self to create homo 
economicus or economic man.  
                                                 
14 The reference Becker Ewald and Harcourt (2012) refers to a seminar. In this instance, as 
throughout the thesis, it is only Becker who is quoted. Ewald was Becker’s adversary in this 
discussion and Harcourt chaired the discussion.  
15 There is not the scope in this investigation to outline the history of the development of the 
theory of human capital (Becker, Ewald & Harcourt, 2012), in either its historical or contemporary 
lines of thinking (Becker, in Becker, Ewald & Harcourt, 2012) or to discuss human capital in terms 
of social capital, cultural capital and intellectual capital as does Bourdieu (1986).  It would seem 
noteworthy to make the point that there has been little new research on human capital theory 
during the last 10 years. The theory of human capital is an applied theory where most of the 
emphasis has been on changes in how knowledge and skills are understood, and how these can be 
best developed to the end of economic development. For example, the authors of The New Zealand 
Curriculum (2007) and their more recent text Key competencies for the future (Hipkins et al., 
2014) make no mention of the theory of human capital.  
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 The theory of endogenous growth “holds that economic growth is 
primarily the result of endogenous and not external forces” (‘Endogenous Growth 
Theory’, 2017), as against holding that economic growth is primarily the result of 
exogenous and not internal forces. Endogenous growth therefore refers to all 
internal activities (within the institution) that can be measured as contributing to 
the macro equation of what equates to economic growth. In Education, this means 
“investment in human capital, innovation and knowledge”, among others. The 
theory of endogenous growth is therefore, on the one hand, broader and more 
complex than that of human capital, in that it is not limited to identifiable skills 
and knowledge and, as such, is more open in that it does not specify what type of 
innovation or knowledge should contribute to economic growth. To elucidate 
further, when capitalism’s fundamental categories or factors of production are no 
longer thought of as “land, labor and capital” but as “people, ideas and things” 
(Romer, as cited in Peters, 2008, p. 79), then this change in the epistemological 
framework must be thought to change the conditions of economic growth. The 
presence of people and ideas as categories will have the effect of humanizing the 
old category of labour, in that it must now be understood that new ideas require 
expansion of the role of creativity.   
On the other hand, when the theory of endogenous growth is applied to 
Education, it focuses on the collective performance of the populace of the 
institution. In as much as the theory of endogenous growth refers to a marco-
representation of the internal activities that produce economic growth – for 
example the activities of a centre, a school or a university (‘Endogenous Growth 
Theory’, 2017) – it does not refer to how distinctive subjectivities contribute at the 
micro-level. This is to say, although the categorization of the internal forces of an 
institution might refer to the presence of people as a fundamental category, these 
internal forces do not refer to the internal forces that people themselves exert or 
the “animal spirit” (Akerlof & Shiller, 2009) that drives them to be 
entrepreneurial, to be innovative or to be creative. Surely, the entrepreneurship 
requires the activation of internal forces within the very individual for there to be 
any change in meaning or practice, Peters and Besley (2009). Just as the 
innovative subject is yet to be theorized, so too is this aspect of the theory of 
endogenous growth is yet to be theorized.  
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The question might be, why has endogenous growth theory not been 
theorized in relation to change in meaning and practice in activities involving 
people, ideas and things in a way that recognizes individual forces? The simple 
answer is that economics has no intention of developing models that recognize 
distinctive individual efforts to change meanings and practices and that maybe 
economics does not see this as its task. Whatever the case, this question can only 
be posed here in relation to the significance of “endogenous necessity” (Boudon, 
2014, p. 1) to the heuristic individual and already innovative student. It is the 
individual who is able to be entrepreneurial and/or innovative, who draws from 
their endogenous sense of necessity. What is evident is that there is a paradox here 
that has not been made explicit: the means by which the politics of education 
seeks to make Education accountable to economic development cannot measure 
the activities that result from individual endogenous necessity and produce student 
innovation.       
 If the theory of endogenous growth uniquely provides a framework for the 
creation of macro-models, it is difficult to see how people could be a category 
capable of creating or combining new ideas. In other words, this creation and 
innovation would need to be begun or initiated by others, by those who govern 
these processes. If the endogenous growth of an institution functions in this way, 
this growth is directed growth, which can only be an exogenous experience of 
what growth requires to the people who populate these processes. Here, 
endogenous necessity is an expression of management’s will to be, the internal 
forces of which do not extend to include those who execute that which has already 
been decided by management. If this paradox is not made explicit, it ambiguates 
the process of further theorization with respect to how internal and external forces 
interact and, ostensibly, how the individual subject might initiate something new 
and unanticipated from below. 
As suggested, it would seem that this ambiguity enables the reverence for 
human capital theory to inhibit how individual creativity and innovation are to be 
understood. If, for example, human capital theory supposes that the individual 
should treat their education as an enterprise that requires them to work upon the 
self, such that they fashion the self as the producer of human capital that is in 
accordance with the politics of education and the Education that is therefore 
provided them, then this action would seem tantamount to accepting a prescription 
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of the sort of consumer and producer he or she should be? In these circumstances, 
and completely apart from the fact that economics does not intend that it should 
deal with individual necessity informed by subjective diversity, the individual will 
be unable to appeal to their own endogenous necessity without also being 
politically disruptive. The application of human capital theory requires that 
students should defer from referring to the self in the moment of accepting to be 
being governed by the politics of education in that they must accept to be 
governed by such politics without referring to the relationship they have with the 
self. This precludes any possibility of an expression of endogenous necessity. 
A colleague at another university recently recounted the following 
anecdote. At a Faculty meeting of course leaders, staff were asked to watch out 
for particular student behaviours, in particular the behaviour of students who 
provided evidence that they had become radicalized. Having clarified that 
radicalized did not refer to an act of violence against fellow students, staff or the 
institution; my colleague proceeded to question what radicalized meant. He was 
led to understand that such radicalized behaviour refers to behaviour that cannot 
be anticipated and that is of a nature that can be thought to challenge the politics 
of education. The question is, while radicalized behaviour, as it is being called 
here, may not be welcomed by the institution, it may be the only means of 
identifying endogenous necessity in students and therefore their innovative 
capacities. While such student behaviour may be regarded by the institution as 
disruptive and negative in nature, it may also be regarded as challenging 
convention and tradition, and that this indicates the institution is no longer 
concerned with the education of its students – that the defence of tradition is more 
important than questions concerning education and innovation. One way of 
interpreting this scenario is to say that the institution is concerned that students 
should not stray from the path that guarantees the importance credited to the 
production function through which human capital should be acquired. This is to 
say; the institutional production function that does not require more from students 
than that they should be content with populating this function. Accordingly, it 
could be said that teachers are being asked to repress endogenous necessity in 
individuals when this will expresses itself in heuristic student learning and in the 
production of political subjectivities that questions the politics of innovation.  
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This above scenario is an easy one to become caught up in, in the sense 
that it is possible to become trapped in the ideological semantics what radicalized 
means in a given context, forgetting that the politics of the reactionary or 
conservative is itself working through economic interest. This is to say, neoliberal 
politics works for neoliberal economics. Without analyzing such a scenario, 
theoretical progress is not possible without also analyzing the commercial 
interests of the institution and how it realizes its intentions. Put in simple terms, 
the starting point needs to be that the creation of human capital is the principal 
mechanism by which these intentions are realized in Education. To this effect, the 
mechanism of human capital creation conditions all institutional thinking and 
activities. The question is how much does human capital creation have to do with 
Education, if it is this same mechanism that stifles endogenous necessity. 




In this section, the intention is to take up the question posed in the last section: 
how much does human capital creation have to do with education, if it is this same 
mechanism that stifles endogenous necessity? Furthermore, the intention is to 
theorize how this question might be addressed in the face of Becker’s (Becker, 
1964; Becker et al., 2012) assertion that all human activities are a form of 
economic activity. As Becker puts it, “[t]he economic approach provides a 
valuable unified framework for understanding all human behaviour” (as cited in 
Dardot & Laval, 2014, p. 167). Elaborating, he says: 
The heart of my argument is that human behaviour is not 
compartmentalized, sometimes based on maximizing, 
sometimes not, sometimes motivated by stable preferences, 
sometimes by volatile ones, sometimes resulting in optimal 
accumulation of information, sometimes not. Rather, all human 
behaviour can be viewed as involving participants who 
maximize their utility from a stable set of preferences and 
accumulate and optimal amount of information and other inputs 
in a variety of markets. If this argument is correct, the economic 
approach provides a united framework for understanding that 
has long been sought by and eluded Bentham, Comte, Marx, and 
others (Becker, as cited in Besley & Peters, 2007, p. 153).  
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It is curious how human capital theory has come to fill what must have been a gap 
in neo-classical economic thinking with respect to how Education could be put at 
the service of economic development. It would seem that there is something 
missing in the historical analysis of what it is that human capital theory is 
supposed reconcile. While it is not possible to engage this point in depth in this 
discussion, it might be noted that this framework has the effect of doing two 
things that need to be briefly commented on here.  
The first is that, Becker’s (1976) framework creates the effect of providing 
a solution irrespective of the fact that the solution itself does not apply to the 
problem that it pretends to address. Godin (2015a) remarks, as iterated elsewhere 
in this discussion, that innovation has become the spontaneous solution 
irrespective of its relationship to the problem it addresses. This is to say that while 
a solution can be thought of as a response to a problem, it only need relate to the 
problem in as much as it is thought that a solution of any kind might be supplied. 
Of course, in the neoliberal ambit, an explanation is provided that justifies the 
logic of the application but the logic itself is rarely d. This latter pathology is 
possibly the product of popular media analyzing the relationship between 
solutions and problems without objectifying the ontology of either, which itself 
might suppose that the popular media should lead the action in addressing 
problems, which of course they do not see as their task.  
The second is that, while Becker provides a “unified framework for 
understanding all human behaviour” (as cited in Dardot & Laval, 2014, p. 167), 
he only provides the macro solution for how human behaviour can be described. 
This is a Cartesian picture that objectifies the individual only in as much as the 
individual’s attributes can be made useful to the macro account. It is argued here 
that not only does this form of diagnosis not create a picture of the whole 
individual, but it sells the story to students, through Education’s adoption of 
human capital theory, that their education experiences comprise what it is they are 
provided: that the positioning of the student at the centre of economic life (see 
Becker, in Becker et al., 2012) might in fact have the effect of disenfranchising 
the student. Lemke (2001) comments, when speaking of the demise of the 
category of labour as a category in economic theory, that “labour has remained 
under-illuminated in the role of a passive production factor” (p. 198, emphasis in 
original). Labour here is a proxy for the student, where the student pays to learn 
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until they are sufficiently qualified that they might be paid to learn. Paraphrasing 
Lemke, students can be said to have been “neutralized and construed only using 
quantitative concepts and in temporary forms”. As Dardot and Laval (2014) put it, 
“man as capital – which is the real meaning of the concept of ‘human capital’ – 
has proved incapable of producing the mass of subjective changes we observe 
today” (p. 168, emphasis in original).  
As a final word, this above analysis can be related back to the paradoxical 
situation of the already innovative subject in the following manner. If it was 
Becker’s (Becker et al., 2012) intention to have the individual thought of as not 
only a consumer but also as a producer (Dardot & Laval, 2014), then it must not 
have been his intention that they become conscious of their capacity to produce. 
This is to say, if to be a producer means to produce the self as human capital, then 
the economic systems that enframe Education make no requirement that 
Education inculcate this productive capacity in students through either 
encouraging them to pursue their own innovative processes or to particulate as 
conscious contributors to institutional innovative processes. In this way, human 
capital theory provides the nexus for the absenting of students from active 
participation in innovation per se. 
 
Conclusion 
Perhaps it is too early to be ambitious for the already innovative subject but in 
light of the recent roll-out of innovative learning environments (see OECD, 2013), 
it might not be long before innovative students become protagonists in the 
transformation of their own institutions. While the politics of innovative learning 
environments are yet to be worked out with respect a pedagogical engagement 
with students16, the situation of the student has already been, in part, liberated 
from the politics that govern traditional teacher-student relations. This 
development alone should open up a new area of inquiry. If the introduction of 
ICTs supposes a new autonomy for students in their learning, then after a point it 
is argued that the student’s relationship with the self must begin to inform their 
                                                 
16 The education that student-teachers have not has not included the experience of learning in 
innovative learning environments and, as such, it should not be expected that there would be any 
innate understanding of such a different learning experience, which will in the meantime inhibit 
the development of appropriate pedagogies. Pedagogy may not even me the appropriate discipline 
for what is required in these spaces. 
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learning in a manner that reflects this autonomy. To make the point succinctly, if 
innovative learning environments change the ratios of teachers to students from 
say 1:30 to 1:40 or 1:50 for example, then students in these spaces cannot be 
expected to continue to be beholden to teachers as they once were. This supposed 
shift in ratios implies both a transformation in power relations and the 
protagonism student innovation within teacher-student engagements. With this 
development in mind, the next chapter will seek to provide the foundation for a 
reflection upon the idea that the theorization of technology in Education would 
benefit from an engagement with Foucault’s (1997a) explication of his 
understanding of how pragmatic reason comprises an interplay of four 
technologies: “the technologies of production”, “the technologies of sign 
systems”, “the technologies of power”, and “technologies of the self” (p. 117).
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CHAPTER SIX 
A Question Concerning (Foucault’s) Technologies 
 
Introduction 
If the discussion thus far has challenged the manner in which innovation is 
understood, this challenge has to do with Godin’s (2015b) idea that innovation is 
something more than just technological innovation. The argument that follows 
seeks to convince its reader that understanding that innovation is something more 
than just technological innovation becomes crucial to the problem of 
understanding how society is implicated in the role innovation is made to assume 
in realising the transformation of society (see Drucker, 1959). Technological 
innovation to this effect asks the question, what is the nature of society’s 
genealogical protagonism in its transformation that might otherwise just be called 
the technological transformation of society? This broader question had to be asked 
first in order to ask the question specific to the subject of this chapter: what is the 
nature of the innovative subject’s protagonism in this technological 
transformation of society? The argument is that, to understand the innovative 
subject’s protagonism, it becomes necessary to reconceptualize the relationship 
between the will to innovate and the problem(s) innovation is said to address. 
Following this, the discussion moves to address how technological 
innovation is understood in Education. Drawing on the analysis done by Godin 
(2010a, 2010b, 2015b, 2015c), the influence of American and European traditions 
are examined with respect to how both commercial management and researchers 
think about technological innovation in the educational institution. These 
contrasting influences are further complicated by a brief analysis of Foucault’s 
(1997a) understanding of technology, with a view to highlighting the role 
technologies of the self have in the formation of innovative subjectivities.  
 
6.1 
History and scholarship 
While the concept of technological innovation has been in use since the early 20th 
century, as can be seen in the work of anthropologists, historians, management, 
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policy-makers, economists, and sociologists, it is only in the last two decades that 
this concept has become the unique specialty of management, policy-makers, and 
economists (Godin, 2010a, 2010b). As Godin explains, the use of technological 
innovation has come about on account of these actors responding to the 
development of a new tradition with respect to how innovation is understood. 
There already existed the economic tradition that follows the idea that 
“technological change” is concerned with “innovation as technological 
invention”, which is then used or introduced into an industrial production process 
(Godin, 2010b, p. 6, emphasis added). This tradition has its origin in the United 
States.  
The second tradition, that has its origins in Europe in the 1970s is, 
according to Godin (2010b), more concerned with “the commercialization of 
technological inventions”. This tradition emerges as the deliberate product of the 
scholarship of Chris Freeman, not simply in the form of an investigation of the 
existing American tradition, but in the form of an invention of a new tradition. 
While this second articulation may seem like a semantic obfuscation of the first, 
its characteristics are quite distinctive (see Section 6.1.2).  
 The relevance of engaging with these two traditions is that their 
understandings of innovation are brought to bear on Education in different ways, 
meaning any deconstruction of the politics of innovation in Education needs to be 
thought of in terms of the interests of these two traditions. In the following 
section, the American tradition of technological change will be explained, 
following which there will be an explanation of the European tradition of 
technological innovation.  
In order to avoid unnecessary ambiguity, it becomes necessary to 
highlight, before beginning, the fact that historical use of the terminology 
technological innovation has not been universal. While, a century ago, 
technological innovation was an object of investigation for anthropologists, 
sociologists, historians, and economists, and then, in the 1940s, economic 
historians, it has only been since the 1970s that economics has dominated our 
understanding of technological innovation (Godin, 2010b). This later 
development, which emerges from the European tradition, provides an initial 
understanding of the influence that this tradition has had in the commercial 
development of educational institutions. Of particular relevance is this tradition’s 
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approach to the “research-intensive” economy and the adaptive character of 
educational institutions to the diffusion of policy that has come out of the OECD.   
     
6.1.1 
Technological change: The American tradition 
Godin’s (2010a) thesis on the American tradition is that innovation, as a category, 
acquires the terminology technological innovation through a series of 
developments that take place in the aftermath of the Second World War. This 
process begins with economists borrowing and adopting the category “invention” 
(p. 6), from which the “disciplinary matrix … technological change” is invented. 
This latter articulation leads economists to focus on “technological innovation as 
commercialized invention”. In short-hand, this development moves from 
invention to change to innovation.  
This series of developments began with the US National Bureau of 
Economic Research (NBER) Conference on The Rate and Direction of Economic 
Activity. According to Godin (2010a), this was one of the first conferences to be 
devoted entirely to “the study of science, technology and innovation” (p. 4). 
Technological innovation is not discussed at this conference – this comes later. 
Rather, this was a gathering of minds, which initiated a study that moved thinking 
in this direction. 
What should be noted is that economists “borrowed and adapted an 
existing category” (Godin, 2010a) – invention, a category conceptualized by other 
fields – and adapted its use “to their own purposes” (p. 6). What also needs to be 
noted is that, if terminology can be borrowed and adapted in this manner, the 
actors who borrow and adapt are setting the rules, or at least an example to others, 
and, as such, should permit like behaviour. The researcher is not taking the moral 
ground here, but merely saying that there should be transparency, and equal 
freedom to others to do the same. This is, in part, the purpose of this investigation: 
to give meaning to the student as an innovative subject and that, through the 
adoption of this language, existing problems around student innovative activity 
can be understood in new ways.  
Continuing on, according to Godin (2010a), the focus of the study of 
invention by these early researchers was “efficiency” (p. 6), an objective that 
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could easily be associated with today’s triangulation of science, technology and 
innovation, with the difference being that neoliberal economics now requires 
efficiency to work for the goal of “performativity” (Dardot & Laval, 2013). 
Proceeding studies of technological change focused on the tool adopted – “the 
production function” – to measure this form of change (Godin, 2010a). The last 
phase of this conceptual development that produces what we now know as 
technological innovation is, according to Godin (2010a), associated with a process 
of catch-up being played out by mainstream economists who seek to compensate 
for their neglect of technological innovation as a category – technological 
innovation in America, eventually taking its lead from the researchers who do 
innovation studies and the neo-Schumpeterians (Godin, 2010b). This fact may not 
be self-evident, that is, until it is discovered that the university Reader on 
economics carries no content on technological innovation –an ironic fact, given 
that innovation is understood in policy to be a driver of economic development. 
With respect to how innovation might be understood in Education, what 
then can be taken from this explanation of the development of the concept of 
innovation as one that passes from being thought of as technological change to 
being thought of as technological innovation? Godin’s (2010a) genealogy of 
technological innovation draws out a problem, with respect to the significance of 
the concept of the production function. While Rosenberg (1976, as cited in Godin, 
2010a), thinks the production function is a fiction, with respect to its capacity to 
affirm the quantitative basis for the conviction that investment in science produces 
economic development, and, while Machlup (1962, as cited in Godin, 2010a) 
thinks that the production function is a mere abstract concept, this fiction and 
abstraction might be just what is needed to understand how the educational 
institution functions to make students create human capital in a manner that both 
includes some students and excludes others.  
To elaborate, it would be best to go back to Schumpeter’s (1964) 
definition of the production function, which he describes in the following way,  
This function, known as the production function, tells us all we 
need to know for the purposes of economic analysis about the 
technological processes of production. Production, in the sense 
relevant to economics, is nothing but combining quantities of 
factors, and it is, for economic purposes, exhaustively described 
by such a combination (productive combination).  (p. 15)  
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What are the factors that combine to make up the production function of an 
educational institution? The only factors that can be used to define the production 
function are factors that produce an economic decision, meaning only teaching 
and learning activities that are quantifiable in economic terms can be included in 
this function,1 which, of course, excludes the making part of the teaching and 
learning experience. Such an economic analysis would enable the abstraction of a 
concept of operations from the “life”, “work”, and “action” (Arendt, 1998) of the 
institution and an articulation of the real purpose of service apparatus, from which 
the “life” and “action” teaching, learning, and research must be thought of in 
terms of being a fiction, as something too subjective to quantify economically and 
therefore something that must be black-boxed. This is to say that, while 
commercial management knows that this articulation of the real purpose of the 
service apparatus is itself responsible for facilitating the production of the human 
capital that students invest in, this human capital cannot be included in this 
abstracted articulation, because it cannot be quantified economically within the 
operational work of the service apparatus. As such, student fees can be counted in 
defining the economic purpose of the institution, but student creation of human 
capital cannot be, which is to say, students are respectively included and excluded 
from the “life”, “work”, and “action” of the institution.  
While this explanation is crude in the sense that it removes all ambiguities, 
it helps explain the purpose of technological innovation in Education. Within this 
framework, technological innovation can be accredited with ascribing an 
economic purpose to science and therefore facilitating student and teacher 
implication in personal, political, and economic goals that orient teaching, 
learning, and research towards the economic purpose in the proprietary domain. 
This also helps explain how technological innovation can be put beyond reproach: 
social innovation cannot be incorporated into the production function of the 
institution; unlike new technologies associated with technological innovation, 
social innovation has no cost that contributes to the identification of economic 
purpose. 
 
                                                 
1 This might include the percentage of assessment or exam passes in relation to the cost of paying 
teachers and other utilities against income from fees and other forms of financial support from 
stakeholders and the state.     
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6.1.2 
Technological innovation: The European tradition 
Distinguishing between Godin’s (2010a) account of the American tradition of 
technological change and the following account of the European tradition of 
technological innovation would seem to be very important in that this distinction 
makes it possible to distinguish, if in a vague way at this stage, between how 
commercial enterprise thinks of innovation and how Education thinks of 
innovation. While both traditions contribute, as Godin (2010b) states, to “a shared 
representation among policy-makers and the public” (p. 36), it is argued here that 
these distinctive academic traditions remain in ignorance of one another. It is 
argued that commercial enterprise in the proprietary domain has the American 
mentality in that it has the pragmatism of technological change, focusing on 
“factors of production, market structure, economies of scale, etcetera” (p. 7). In 
this tradition and across this domain, there is, as Godin says, “no real interest in 
developing a distinctive and comprehensive theory of technological innovation”. 
Furthermore, it can be expected that, when universities and school boards bring in 
entrepreneurs from the commercial world to run their educational institutions, 
they bring with them the thinking on innovation that sustains the American 
tradition and the pragmatist ethos of what technological change refers to.  
 Despite the influence of the American tradition and pragmatist thinking in 
commercial management of educational institutions, it is argued that these 
institutions, principally universities, are populated by researchers who draw on the 
European tradition of technological innovation. This is to be expected, in that the 
epistemological foundations of this understanding of innovation feed directly 
from the main influences from which tertiary education draws its understanding of 
how research should inform practice. This is to say, the figures responsible for the 
development and embedding of the European tradition – those working in 
Innovation Studies (Godin, 2010b) – have worked as academic researchers, 
collaborators with private enterprise, and policy-makers for the OECD. 2  This 
means academic researchers who have fostered the development of Innovation 
Studies and the influence of this tradition have been able to have a hands on 
                                                 
2 Lundvall would be a good example of a contributor to this tradition. See 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bengt-%C3%85ke_Lundvall 
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approach to overseeing the application of this tradition.3 Of course, there is an 
implicit relationship between research fund provision and this overseeing of the 
process of the creation of a tradition; Innovation Studies is able to protect the 
agenda that is responsible for the orientation of the development of its tradition. 
 In the next section, the contrasting influences of these traditions will be 
examined with respect to how they impact upon the way the concept of innovation 
is understood in the university. The rest of this section will involve a selective 
engagement of Godin’s (2010b) interpretation of the European tradition of 
technological innovation. 
 The European tradition of technological innovation is an invention (Godin, 
2010b). Not all traditions are inventions: they emerge over time in response to a 
need. According to Godin (2010b), the tradition was initiated by the work of Chris 
Freeman.4 The substance of this tradition has some important characteristics if the 
way innovation is researched is to be understood when it is researched 
independently of the American tradition. Furthermore, this European tradition was 
developed in relation to the American tradition, for example, through the study of 
both the way Schumpeter worked and the study of his thinking on innovation, 
which has led to a strong involvement of neo-Schumpeterians in the work of this 
tradition. However, the intention was also to develop a tradition that pursued a 
distinctive role in how innovation should be understood. Freeman understood 
innovation by drawing a clear distinction between invention and innovation:  
An invention is an idea, a sketch or a model for a new or 
improved device, product, process or system (…). An 
innovation in the economic sense is accomplished only with the 
first commercial transaction. (Freeman, 1974, as cited in Godin, 
2010b, p. 10, emphasis in original) 
It is not uncommon to define innovation against invention: a tradition that 
certainly began with Schumpeter (1934/1911) and probably earlier. This said, 
what is important here is the idea that innovation might be defined other than in 
the economic sense. This openness lends itself to discussion of how innovation 
could be understood in Education, in relation to this commercial understanding, 
                                                 
3 Innovation Studies refers to the next generation of researchers following the development of the 
Science Policy Research Unit (SPRU) at Sussex University by Chris Freeman (See  
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Science_Policy_Research_Unit) 
4 The principal text Godin uses to study the development of this tradition is The economics of 
industrial innovation (Freeman, 1982). 
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and, furthermore, Education being a hub of new knowledge and ideation, which 
this thesis argues is what Education currently needs most. 
 Godin goes on to make the interesting observation that, to Freeman, 
“invention and innovation are ‘outside the framework of economic models’” (as 
cited in 2010b, p. 9). He adds that “Freemans’s objective is to open the black box 
and look at the technological innovation ‘process’” (p. 10). The idea that the 
economist Freeman sees innovation as being outside the framework of economic 
models, while at the same time making it his objective to open the black box and 
look at the technological innovation process, is promising.  
As for technological innovation, Freeman understood it as “an essential 
condition of economic progress and a critical element in the competitive struggle 
of enterprises and non-nation states” (1974, as cited in Godin, 2010b, p. 8). 
Furthermore he understood technological innovation to be important for 
“improving the quality of life”.  
 
6.1.3 
Technological innovation in the university 
Godin’s (2010a, 2010b) contrasting of technological change and technological 
innovation has interesting implications for how the concept of innovation is 
understood in Education, in particular, in tertiary education. Because these 
traditions involve different foci on innovation, where each focus has a distinctive 
set of interests, it is not obvious how these traditions interact to the benefit of a 
single institution. There is probably no model for how these two traditions can be 
thought to work together, apart from the hospital, with respect how doctors do 
research while at the same time meeting work-related service provider outcomes.   
In order to understand the relationship that these traditions have assumed 
in the educational institution – comfortable or uncomfortable as it is – two 
questions immediately arise.  
(1) In what contexts do these traditions influence how the university thinks 
of innovation?  
(2) How does this configuration of influences affect the situation of the 
already innovative subject in Education? 
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The first question will only be able to be addressed very briefly in this 
investigation. Such questions suppose the need for a broad discussion on how 
innovation is understood by both the institution and its society, not to mention, 
how it conducts its politics of innovation in the educational institution. Addressing 
the first question needs to be limited to that which becomes useful in answering 
the second question. 
So to the first question: In what contexts do these traditions influence how 
the university thinks of innovation? The simple answer is that the tradition of 
thinking of innovation as involving technological change can be seen in the 
approach commercial management in the educational institution has to innovation. 
This is because of the way personnel in commercial management already 
understand innovation in that critical roles in the hierarchy are often filled by 
people with experience in the business world, where innovation is understood as 
involving technological change.  
Because of the decisive influence commercial management has in the 
management and on day-to-day institutional activities relating to service 
provision, the influence of this tradition can be seen at various strata of activity in 
the hierarchy (see Christensen & Eyring, 2011). The orientation of this form of 
thinking, towards performative outcomes and outcomes that do not require more 
knowledge of the innovation process than is important to improve that which the 
institution already does, means actions required to fulfil strategic plan initiatives 
do not need any more justification than the commercial results they deliver. As 
such, there is no institutional theory of how change takes place, partly because 
this exercise would be in excess to performance requirements and partly because 
it might imply the need to invite participation of students and teachers who would 
not normally be valued as important to commercial decision-making. 
Here is it possible to see the influence of standard economics and how this 
form of economic thinking underpins neoliberal economics in that the process of 
innovation is black-boxed and ambiguated for the rest of the university 
community. Furthermore, the legitimacy of this tactic is assumed to be irrefutable 
in that its actions bring closure, such that there is no need of an explanation for 
why the ends should justify the means.   
The European tradition of technological innovation, on the other hand, 
occupies the thinking of a different sector of the institutional society, evidence of 
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which is more easily explained in relation to how this tradition is played out in the 
institution of the university than in the school. In the university, understanding of 
innovation by senior and junior researchers is influenced by how the theory of 
innovation is understood by those working in Innovation Studies (Godin, 2010a, 
2010b), which is to say, among other things, they are more interested in the 
significance of the innovation process. In the bigger picture, the scenario is 
circular in that the academics who work in Innovation Studies and who write 
policy for the OECD and other international institutions have the effect of 
designing the role they believe innovation should have in educational institutions, 
the economy and society and, as such, influence other researchers in how they 
understand innovation. Therefore, while it may seem that the American tradition 
holds the higher ground in the university, the European tradition provides a 
stronger voice for innovation in that it writes a good deal more. While business 
commentators, business and management school academics and the occasional 
business and management theorists may write on technological change, they leave 
a vacuum through their neglect of the process of innovation, which those of the 
European tradition end up filling by default. 
In summary, the American tradition of thinking of innovation as 
technological change is that which influences the way in which the institution 
thinks of the problem of increasing its production of human capital, of improving 
its ranking, the number of foreign students and its external funding streams. This 
thinking is logically delimited to the actions of commercial management, as this 
sector of the institution’s society assumes the prerogative to taking initiatives that 
correspond to these objectives. On the other hand, the European tradition of 
thinking of innovation as technological innovation is not limited to just those 
researchers who engage theoretically with the concept of innovation that is 
promoted by Innovation Studies. The reason for this does not have to do with the 
political protagonism of researchers within the institution. Rather, it is a case of 
neoliberal thinking of commercial management making use of ground-breaking 
research to promote its own project – that is, the American tradition.5 It is argued 
here that there is both a significant ignorance of the difference between these two 
                                                 
5 This is to say, when you see the home pages and faculty pages of the institution’s website 
promoting academic performance and research successes, what you are seeing is the American 
tradition in action.  
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forms of thinking – a situation fostered by the institution itself – and an ongoing 
conflict between the two at the tacit level of engagement. The reason for this 
conflict will be addressed later in this section.    
As to the second question: How does this configuration of influence affect 
the situation of the already innovative subject in Education? The American and 
European traditions of thinking on innovation, as explained by Godin (2010a, 
2010b) are in themselves kinds of thinking. These different kinds of thinking are 
influential in the two distinctive spheres that comprise the already innovative 
subject’s experience of their education. There is the sphere in which the institution 
exercises its commercial interests in the student’s education through administering 
their acquisition of human capital and in the sphere in which there exists 
discursive activity engaged in the problem of understanding innovation. While the 
already innovative subject is subjected to both these kinds of thinking, they are 
also independent from them in as much as they act upon the Education that is 
provided them and innovate in relation in their own learning needs. Being 
innovative always supposes the possibility that it is necessary to be politically 
subjective when this behaviour is not anticipated. So the already innovative 
subject can furthermore be thought of as being capable of breaking with any kind 
of thinking, including the European tradition, which, because of its focus, might 
be thought to be more sympathetic with student interests. It is argued that 
Innovation Studies is always in danger of fostering the formation of a closed kind 
of thinking for reason of its interest in its own system of thought (Godin, 2010b). 
There is one further point to make. This has to do with how Godin (2015c) 
separates these traditions according to the subject’s relationship with knowledge. 
He says the following:   
Yet, over time (technological) innovation has become a concept 
competing with technological change in the vocabulary, even 
THE concept par excellence. A contrast is often made in the 
literature, particularly by evolutionary economists, between the 
study of or tradition on technological change and that on 
technological innovation. The former treats technology as 
exogenous, so it is said, while the latter considers it as 
endogenous and study the process or generation of technology. 
This paper suggested that a fundamental contrast is between the 
‘agent’ studied. From the very beginning, the study of 
technological change was concerned with the effects of 
technology on people’s lives (unemployment, jobs deskilling, 
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etc.), and continued to be studied as such much later (e.g. 
Freeman & Soete, 1987). (p. 27, emphasis in original) 
While this text has the potential to create a confusing picture, a careful reading 
suggests that it explains why researchers and commercial managers within 
universities are not likely to understand why they do not each speak the same 
language. According to Godin (2015c), those who think of innovation as 
technological change think of technological innovation as being exogenous, while 
those who think of innovation as technological innovation think of technological 
innovation as being endogenous. It should be argued that contrary examples could 
be found in both camps and that this ambiguity is in fact logical in that the will to 
be open and innovative or closed and conservative does not depend on the sphere 
of the institution in which one works and/or studies. The more important question 
relates to Godin’s last point, where becoming an agent of these forms of thinking 




Technology is not just a method of producing and using goods and services 
through scientific thinking and pragmatic use: technology can refer to the 
existence of a methodology within the process through which an innovation is 
produced. It seems our capacity to use technology no longer requires us to 
understand our relationship to how and why a particular thing is produced. Just as 
we do not make a hammer, we buy one when we need one, likewise with a mobile 
phone, we buy one rather than make one if we need one. This fact has long been 
culturally embedded. Yet to understand the value of technology as a method of 
production, we need to understand more than just how we produce; we also need 
to understand how we organize, how we communicate, and how we express 
ourselves. What is being stated here is not the suggestion that these latter 
suggestions are optional when needing to understand how innovation supposes 
change. Rather, it is being argued that engagement with innovation, as the means 
of providing goods and services, presumes the need for a limited understanding of 
the elements of experience that contribute to its realisation. For the process of 
innovation to be rehabilitated and for the already innovative subject in Education 
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(and elsewhere) to be made contingent to this process, the ontology of the process 
needs to be deconstructed such that it becomes possible to identify the distinctive 
spectrums of knowledge that are implicit to the evolution of the innovation 
process. 
To do this, it becomes necessary to understand what that which is 
produced, expressed, organized, and communicated refers to as a means of 
understanding whether these actions are coordinated with one another or whether 
they are subjugating one another. Furthermore, for this exercise to be of 
educational value, we need to have some affirming experiences that technology, 
as a methodological approach to producing innovations, functions to produce an 
organic and global interrelation that binds our actions as if this binding affirms an 
organic interrelation of individual and collective concerns. To achieve this latter 
theoretical objective and in order to formally induct the already innovative subject 
into the incumbent theoretical engagement with the concept of innovation, there 
needs to be a break in how our understanding of technology merely refers to the 
means as a method and to innovation’s realisation as a Cartesian object of 
knowledge. There need to be new concepts of how technology informs the 
development of knowledge about ourselves and how we inform our relationship 
with technology. Few such breaks have been made in theoretical developments 
that inform how innovation in Education might be understood.  
Conventionally, the study of innovation does not engage the precept that 
the process of innovation must serve a need to develop knowledge about 
ourselves. However, because the student, as a subject of innovation (see Chapter 
Seven) and/or as an innovative subject (see Chapters Three and Seven), is made 
out to be theoretically integral to the innovation process, then the role of 
technology in the innovation process automatically becomes a field of experience 
where individuals and the collective develop knowledge about themselves. To 
ignore this fact is tantamount to ignoring the relationship of humanity to the 
problems it tries to address, which is furthermore tantamount to problematic to the 
notion that the university does not considers itself to be implicated in the 
formation of such problems. Likewise, the capacity of humanity to address 
problems will always be inhibited, meaning change will occur in limited fields – 
mostly as a consequence of the impact of new and novel production techniques 
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and products achieve in orienting our focus towards their importance. Change in 
this sense is occurring in a narrow field of experience.     
Returning to the concerns of the penultimate paragraph, one such 
theoretical example of a new concept of how technologies might be used in the 
process of innovation can be extrapolated from Foucault’s explication of how 
technologies enable humans to develop knowledge about themselves. Foucault 
(1997a) writes: 
My objective for more than twenty-five years has been to sketch 
out a history of different ways in our culture that humans 
develop knowledge about themselves: economics, biology, 
psychiatry, medicine, and penology. The main point is not to 
accept this knowledge at face value but to  these so-called 
sciences as very specific “truth games” related to specific 
techniques that human beings use to understand themselves. (p. 
224)   
To contextualize this analysis as a form of inquiry, the truth game in this 
investigation would refer to standard economics’ theory of innovation, which 
admits neither the value of the innovation process, nor the significance of the 
innovative subject in this process and therefore being party to how the concept of 
innovation is understood.  
Foucault goes on: 
As a context, we must understand that there are four major types 
of these “technologies”, each a matrix of practical reason: (1) 
technologies of production, which permit us to produce, 
transform, or manipulate things; (2) technologies of sign 
systems, which permits us to use sign, meanings, symbols, or 
signification; (3) technologies of power, which determine the 
conduct of individuals and submit them to certain ends or 
domination, an objectivising of the subject [as in the subject of 
innovation described in Chapter Seven]; (4) technologies of the 
self, which permit individuals to effect by their own means, or 
with the help of others, a certain number of operations on their 
own bodies and souls, thoughts, thoughts, conduct, and way of 
being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain 
state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection or mortality. (pp. 
224-225) 
Of these four types of technologies, it is argued here that innovative activity, as 
that which drives economic development, is dominated by the first and the third 
categories: technologies of production and technologies of power. This is not to 
say that the other two technologies are not important. The important detail is, 
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rather, that the interests of technologies of production and technologies of power 
dominate the interests of technologies of sign systems and technologies of the self 
to the point of radically limiting their protagonism in the process of innovation. Of 
course, in acknowledging the importance of economic activity, as that which 
provides a structure of human behaviour associated with the problem of survival, 
sustainability and development, observers of this discussion might presume that, 
for there to be political stability, technologies of production and technologies of 
power should always dominate the use of technologies of sign systems and 
technologies of the self. However, the dominance of technologies of sign systems 
and technologies of the self by technologies of production and power should 
become a question of concern when such a hierarchy of technologies is 
contextualized within the production function of the educational institution. The 
reason for this concern is this privileging of technologies of production and 
power, while supporting the ever-present need to increase the productivity of the 
institution has the effect of centering student learning within this regime of 
productivity. The danger of this is that the dominance of technologies of 
production and power can be such that students never come to understand the 
importance of giving protagonism to technologies of sign systems and 
technologies of the self and, therefore, accept to be formed without knowledge of 
the importance of affirming their political subjectivities. 
 It might be asked, what are the special significances of technologies of 
sign systems and technologies of the self? As will be explained in Chapter Ten, 
the introduction of ICTs to learning in the form of networked information 
economies supposes new forms of peer-to-peer collaboration and learning that 
themselves presume the development of new forms of writing (see Lévy, 1997) 
and the development of new human qualities (see Lévy, 1997). It is argued that 
these new forms of writing and new human qualities do not come automatically; 
that for students to identify that the balance of risk and responsibility should be 
necessary to be entrepreneurial, they also need to feel they can challenge the 
politics of innovation and its orientation towards its sole role of making the 




So, while the technological may be thought of as defining the appropriate 
response to that which may be considered to be important and in relation to the 
future, it is argued here that the critical capacity effecting valuable change will not 
be technological, that is, in terms of how technology is understood by either the 
American or the European traditions. Both these traditions exclude the value of 
technologies of the self on account of their attitude towards the innovation 
process. While the European tradition may pretend to open this black box 
(Freeman, 1974, as cited in Godin, 2010b), this desire has not been fully 
embraced since Freeman’s expression of his intention to do as much. How is it 
possible to say this? Apart from there being no evidence of this commitment in 
the Innovation Studies’ literature, this tradition of thought not achieved a bringing 
together of these two traditions within Education. If they had been able to do so, 
the value of technologies of the self would have become critical to proceeding 
with a concern for how innovation might serve the way we collectively address 
problems. Furthermore, there would have been an interest in the theorization of 
not only how the innovative subject of education experiences this black box, but 
how the innovative subject in the proprietary domain experiences this black box. 
As will be seen in Chapter Ten, Lévy manages to bypass this resistance to the 
significance of the individual subject to processes of innovation, by reframing the 





The Subject of Innovation/The Innovative Subject 
 
Introduction 
In Chapter Three, the innovator and the entrepreneur were theorized with a view 
to identifying their practical relations to the process of innovation. The purpose of 
this comparative examination was to prepare the way for a closer look at the 
subject of innovation and the innovative subject – two distinctive actors with 
respect to how the individual actor’s relationship to the process of innovation is 
most usefully understood in the context of this discussion. 
 In this chapter, the subject of innovation and the innovative subject are 
thought of in terms of how they form themselves as subjects in Education. These 
two actors are not identities as such, although it might be possible to profile them 
in such a manner. The subject of innovation provides the means of speaking to the 
individual’s implication in the institution’s processes of innovation; meaning 
those activities that correspond to the institution’s realization of its commercial 
strategic plan. As iterated earlier in the discussion, this application of innovation 
processes is achieved through, among other things, focusing academic 
performance the improvement of an assessments oriented culture of learning. 
While this supposedly proves student acquisition of human capital, it also doubles 
as logistical participation in the processes that meet the institution’s outcomes.  
 The innovative subject on the other hand provides a way of speaking about 
innovative actions that highlight the student’s break with the form in which their 
Education is provided them. This involves a recognition, on the one hand, of what 
it is that the institution requires of the student while, on the other, a realization 
that their learning would be both more easily achieved and richer in its 
implication if the subject followed their own interpretation of what the best course 
of action should be. This behaviour might be seen in the way an individual 
combines different forms of learning in the same moment so as to bring about a 
unique result. In Chapter Ten, it will be theorized how these innovative activities 
can occupy multiple individuals in collective peer-to-peer engagement. In 
describing these two subjectivities, there is no intention to juxtapose them. Rather 
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it is argued that that they are interchangeable dispositions. The question is more 
one that concerns understanding practices that are considered to be formative.  
 It is argued in this chapter that it is only when these two subjectivities are 
theorized that it is possible to see how responsibility must be understood in terms 
of risk and vice versa; that there is no responsibility without assuming risk and 
vice versa.  
 
7.1 
The governance of innovation as governance of subjectivities 
According to Drucker (1959), the function of innovation is the embedding of 
society into a new universal vision. How does Education do this? In other words, 
through what action does Education succeed in stifling that which already exists, 
so as to embed students, as re-engineered others, such that they should identify en 
masse with a vision that they are never invited to act upon or change? Actually, 
there is no act of oppression here. The institution does not need to act within the 
governance of students as individuals or as a collective to achieve this effect. The 
effect of the action that stifles students’ already existing innovative subjectivities 
is achieved as a consequence of the way in which the student’s relationship with 
the institution is a prefabrication. It might be assumed that the reason for this 
prefabrication is the primacy that both Education and society give human capital 
theory as that theory which should explain the purpose of education. As long as 
human capital theory is not questioned, challenged and called to account, the 
already innovative student might very well have the sensation that their innovative 
subjectivity has been automatically overlooked. In order to see this automatic 
overlooking of multiple innovative subjectivities across the student cohort, the 
education sector and its stakeholders, including policy-makers, would only need 
to give Bingham and Biesta’s Jacques Rancière: Education, truth, emancipation 
(2010) a serious reading. Speaking explicitly, once it is recognized that the 
progressive education model comes up short in its capacity to include students, 
with respect to student need to explain their learning in their own voices, then it 
can be assumed that, by implication, student innovative subjectivities are 
automatically overlooked. In such circumstances, the illusion is that students are 
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de-schooled and re-schooled – and this probably, as previously iterated, without 
knowing what they have volunteered for. 
 
7.2 
The function of history 
From the above description of student-institution power relations, it would seem 
time to ask the question, how is this subject to be thought of, this subject who is 
both the subject of innovation and the innovative subject? In this investigation, the 
subject has been given a theoretical role and status that has no conventional place 
in the broader discourse on innovation. The innovator per se is hardly spoken 
about as someone who provides us with a portrait of the contemporary individual, 
of the role they play in augmenting the status of the current political economic 
project. Because the innovator can be regarded as interchangeable with other 
innovators who may equally be capable of realizing the same innovation, because 
the innovative process itself is not generalizable, because workers are thought of 
as being logistically fundamental to the realization of an innovation and yet not 
credible as authors for they are only workers, and because consumers are only 
regarded as producers in the theoretical sense – for example, students investing in 
and producing their own human capital – there appears to be no need to employ 
the theoretical figure of the subject as a means of speaking of the individual who 
constitutes him or herself as an innovative subject. However, the story of the 
student as a subject of innovation is both untold and a story that portrays the 
acquisition of human capital in a new way – one that should change our thinking 
on how Education serves the need to capacitate society to be innovative. Speaking 
of the student as a subject of innovation should therefore pave the way for a 
discussion on the student as someone who is formed to be the contemporary 
individual. To this effect, the discussion will now address the question of how the 
subject of innovation should be distinguished from the innovative subject. 
          If the function of innovation has the aim of embedding society into a new 
universal vision (Drucker, 1959), the exercising of power, with respect to the 
carrying out of this master plan, is something that cannot be achieved without the 
implication of the individual and, as such, society itself. In as much as this 
individual willingly remakes him or herself as someone capacitated to fulfil such a 
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vision, they make the self a subject of this vision; which is to say, they make the 
self a subject of the means of its realization: innovation.  
          Before moving on to discuss both the subject and subjectivity, the question 
of what this vision might comprise should be addressed. The idea that the function 
of innovation is to embed society into a new universal vision supposes a 
predetermined and collective transformation of society such that it is possible to 
anticipate the implication of society as a whole in the process of change, right 
down to the last individual. Crucial to the value of innovation is that it functions 
as a political economic mechanism in making this transformation possible, which 
in turn becomes the premise for the idea that society should always live as if the 
end should always define the means. What does this mean that the means can only 
be what it is through always and only being defined by an end that is neither 
anticipated nor engaged with?  
          For this project to guarantee the social cohesion that it supposes to achieve, 
the mechanism of innovation needs to be inclusive in such a manner that this 
inclusiveness can at once deny all alternative approaches to this unspecified future 
while, at the same time, coercing all radical alternatives in a form that would 
restrict the individual from expressing strategies for transforming this vision of 
the future; the former objective being achieved through a form of educational 
discipline, the latter being achieved through a mechanism of discipline and 
punishment (see Foucault, 1990).  
          While a conservative view might speculate that the latter aspect of this 
mechanism is less important than the former, the latter provides an insight into the 
seriousness with which innovation is adopted as the mechanism through which 
society is to subjectivize itself as a whole. It would seem difficult to understand 
the significance of this statement without grappling with the problem of 
understanding why it would seem impossible to identify, in the democratic and 
commercial state, a contemporary equivalent to Agamben’s (1998) explication of 
the subject who lived in “a state of exception” in Roman Antiquity.
1 However, while there is not the space for such an inquiry here, it should be said 
that a degree of political danger accompanies the implication of all individuals 
                                                 
1 The form that this individual discipline takes with respect to the purpose of its collective healing 
depends on the political system according to which society is made to be operational. 
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and, therefore, society itself when accepting to constitute a self through 
identifying both with the metaphysical role given to innovation – as the 
mechanism of change and the production of the novelty of the new – and through 





Since the mostly silent and consensual death of the subject as a philosophical 
concept (Heartfield, 2002) – an event that could be intuited to accompany the 
impact of Cartesian thought on capitalism after the Second World War – there has 
been little attention given to the theorization of the subject and its relevance to 
understanding what is produced in the act of the individual constituting the self. 
The most prominent exceptions are Foucault (1977, 1990), Negri (2003), Touraine 
(2001), Agamben (1998), Žižek (1999), and Badiou (2010, 2011). 
          The fact that it becomes necessary to posit the individual’s constitution as a 
subject is itself indicative of the aspiration held in this research project for the 
student who is already innovative and, as such, that he or she can be thought of as 
a positive subject of innovation; which is not to mean a positivist subject of 
innovation. Badiou (2010) provides an example of how such a subject might be 
thought of in relation to both the above discussion and education’s implication in 
the project of fleshing out the universal vision that Drucker (1959) equates with 
the purpose of innovation. In describing thought as “the proper medium of the 
universal” (p. 26), Badiou (2010) goes on to say:   
By ‘thought’, I mean the subject insofar as it is constituted 
through a process that cuts through the totality of established 
knowledge. Or, as Lacan puts it, the subject insofar as it 
makes a hole in knowledge. (p. 26) 
The points that can be made about this description of the subject that are 
significant to the discussion at hand are the following: firstly, and most 
importantly to the thesis argument, the constitution of the subject is a consequence 
of a process of thought that can be understood to involve an innovative process. 
This is not an innovative process that gives primacy to the use of the ecology of 
technologies of power, production and/or sign systems (Foucault, 1997a) at the 
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exclusion of the thinking subject and their use of technologies of the self: the 
subject is in fact constituted through both remaining party to this said ecology and 
through being the protagonist who employs technologies of the self according to 
the primacy of their individual interest. By primacy, what is meant is not that 
these technologies of power, production and sign systems are not implicated in the 
process of thought that cuts through the totality of established knowledge, but that 
there exists the premise that the individual must act in order to participate in the 
constitution of oneself through giving primacy to the use of technologies of the 
self.  
          This is to say that the positive object of innovation can be understood to be 
innovative on account of the purpose of the individual’s engagement with the 
associated ecology of knowledge(s). This is not to say that the individual is an 
innovative subject because they are singularly a political subject, a productive 
subject, a communicative subject or the self as a consciously constituted subject; 
this is the negative subject of innovation, which will be discussed in Section 7.3.2. 
What is more important here, is understanding the significance of what it is to act 
in order to participate in the constitution of oneself such that one is compelled to 
give primacy to the use of technologies of the self within the ecology of 
technologies that serve the political, the productive and the communicative.  
          Secondly, when student innovation is considered in the context of their 
education, a red herring emerges. Stating that the subject constitutes the self 
through thought cutting through “the totality of established knowledge” is not to 
suggest that established knowledge must be constructed by each individual in its 
totality before this “cutting through” (Badiou, 2010, p. 26), “making a hole in” 
(Lacan, as cited in Badiou, 2010, p. 26) or breaking with (Foucault, 1989) 2 
becomes possible. The totality of established knowledge is not an object as in it 
cannot be constructed as an explicit body knowledge: what can be known also 
requires the use of tacit knowledge (Polanyi, 1966) and intuition (Badiou, 2004). 
This is to say, an individual does not have to reach a point of cumulative 
knowledge of all fields to think in order that the process of their thought permit 
them to cut with, make a hole in or break with. In other words, the individual who 
                                                 
2 The actual language used by Foucault (1989) in the translation of the interview On Literature is 
“breaks”. Breaking with or breaks with is a better use of the language in this instance. Foucault’s 
notion of breaking with is outlined in Chapter Four, Section 4.4. 
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thinks does not have to be an expert let alone a teacher for reason that established 
knowledge cannot be objectified; it exceeds its capacity for objectification for 
those who populate its field of interest. A student may cut with, make a hole in or 
break with the totality of what is known to them as established knowledge and, as 
such, constitute him or herself as a subject.  
          The latter point is crucial to the argument of this investigation in that the 
student does not have to be awarded a qualification to be considered innovative in 
their capacity to constitute him or herself as a subject of innovation, or in the form 
of a degree that states they have acquired the requisite skills and knowledge. The 
idea that the purpose of education should be to equip students with a capacity to 
be innovative upon graduation is misguided if students are already considered to 
be thinking individuals capable of differentiating their understanding from that 
which established knowledge would have them believe. In as much as students are 
capable of acting in relation to their own and others’ interests, they must also be 
considered to be already innovative subjects with respect to their employment of 
technologies of the self. The most accessible example of this form of innovation 
can be seen in learning techniques developed by students because the way they are 
taught to learn proves to be limited in relation to the aspirations they have for 
themselves (see, for example, Clay & Phillips, 2015; Davis, 2016). 
          Having established the protagonism of student thinking as determinant of 
student innovation, there is a series of questions that have to do with the 
complexity of the paradoxical situation of the student, which require philosophical 
thought on the part of the student. The first concerns the question of whether all 
students can be considered to be innovative subjects given that all students think 
when it appears equally obvious that not all students are already innovative. 
Another way of asking this question might be to ask, do students prioritize the use 
of technologies of the self with the intention of being innovative? And how should 
the student cohort be thought of, with respect to the need to say that there are 
innovative subjects because all students think? One way to bring clarity to this 
question might be to begin with the premise that all student-learning is initially 
subject to being governed by a teacher or lecturer, and more generally by the 
institution and the politics of education.  
          There are only two ways to act in such circumstances: either the student can 
accept to be governed or they can act according to their thinking such that they cut 
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with, make a hole in or break with that which can be said to characterize power 
relations in that moment. At least this is how it must look. It might be argued that 
it is also possible for the student to not accept to be governed in the way that the 
teacher hoped they might while at the same time not giving any impression of 
cutting with, making a hole in or breaking with that which is taking place. The 
overriding problem for the student is that there is a need for compliance. This 
achieves the effect of acceding to the manner in which the purpose of innovation 
is governed by the institution because not everyone can speak at once. This in turn 
can be said to have the effect of embedding students into the universal vision that 
the institution can be said to identifying with, as an objective of the service it 
offers (see Chapters Four and Five).  
          While the choice of having to act or not act is the simple fact that confronts 
the student in the context of referring to the self when accepting to be governed in 
their learning; no situation replicates another and furthermore there is no limit to 
the reasons why a student might choose or be required to not act when their will is 
to differentiate their thinking from that of others and in particular the institutional 




The subject of innovation 
The value in being able to theorize and in turn critique the subject of innovation is 
based on the idea that Education is oriented towards producing skills and 
knowledge that enable students to contribute to economic development through 
being innovative. While, as iterated in the Introduction to this investigation, there 
is no such theoretical entity, in either Education or economic discourse, it seems 
undignified to the researcher to speak of the above political project without also 
speaking to the problems associated with student participation when a student’s 
will to be innovative differs from the institution’s strategy for commercial 
development. For the sake of this discussion, a dichotomy has been drawn 
between the subject of innovation and the innovative subject. These entities do not 
need to be treated as if installed in a theoretical binary but it is useful to the 
discussion if the logical outcomes of the above definitions can be explored. One 
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of these outcomes is theorized as resulting in the formation of a subject of 
innovation.  
 In theorizing and critiquing the subject of innovation it becomes important 
to speak to how this particular subject is related to contemporary conceptions of 
homo economicus (economic man) as the ambiguities are strong. It might be noted 
before I provide an account of the homo economicus (see Section 7.3.2) that the 
principal differences, and therefore in their differences in educational possibilities, 
have to do with how each of these subjects is d; that is to say it has to do with the 
methodology used. The homo economicus is understood here to be a product of 
the critique of neoliberalism (Besley & Peters, 2007) – and before it, classical 
economics (Besley & Peters, 2007; Foucault, 2008; von Mises, 1949/1940).  
On the other hand, the subject of innovation is understood as a product of 
how the politics of innovation impact upon the already existing innovative 
capacities that students begin school with. Firstly, it is argued that the subject of 
innovation is not just a product of the politics of education: they are also a subject 
with a relationship with the self that supposes possibilities to challenge the power 
relations that are the operant of the politics of innovation. In other words, it needs 
to be assumed that the subject of innovation can also be an innovative subject – 
that they have within them an innovative capacity that can be directed towards the 
self as a subject.  
Use of the concept of the subject of innovation is therefore merely a way 
of speaking to the individual’s implication in the institution’s processes of 
innovation. As iterated earlier in the discussion, the subject of innovation 
constitutes him or herself through exclusively focusing their academic 
performance on realizing the highest possible assessment grades. While this 
supposedly proves student acquisition of human capital, it also doubles as 
expression of their logistical participation in the production function of the 




In this section, the discussion will address the problem of how to think about 
homo economicus (economic man) in the context of the thesis discussion. The 
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initial issue is that while homo economicus and the subject of innovation share 
ambiguities, there is no literature on homo economicus that also engages the idea 
that the influence of economics on Education can be said to have resulted in the 
formation of subjects of innovation. In positing the theoretical value of the subject 
of innovation as a subject of the current system of education, it will not be argued 
that homo economicus should be thought of as a subject of innovation. The reason 
for this is that the concept of innovation itself is not stable. As argued in the 
previous section, the subject of innovation can at any time choose to act upon the 
relationship they have with the self, so as to break with the Education that is 
provided them in order to be innovative in their own learning. After all, who is 
going to say to the most compliant student that they do not have it within them to 
begin thinking for him or herself? 
In as much as it is argued in this investigation that students begin their 
education with already existing innovative capacities, students enter an a priori 
situation. In as much as it is argued that the subject of innovation, as an individual 
who is formed by the institution’s own processes of innovation, should be thought 
of as also being able to be thought of as an innovative subject in their own right, 
all students learn in a system that functions according to an already established 
project. During this discussion, this aforementioned project has been spoken of in 
terms of Drucker’s (1959) explanation of the function of innovation: that the 
intention of innovation is to bed society into a new universal vision.  
While this explanation could be broadened to include an analysis of what 
economics makes of students, independently of this investigation, when Margaret 
Thatcher said: “Economics are (sic) the method. The object is to change the soul” 
(as cited in Dardot & Laval, 2013, p. 263), the question becomes, depending on 
your politics, from what perspective should such a statement be understood? But 
first, these words need to be put in context. On the one hand, nearly 30 years have 
passed since Thatcher’s proclamation, meaning economics as a method has 
proved its formative capacity to have individuals constitute the self according to 
the interests of economics. There have been significant critiques of this pathology, 
of which Dardot and Laval (2013), Foucault (2010), Marshall (1999), Peters 
(2011), Touraine (2001) are just a few. On the other hand, Thatcher’s words in 
1988 were also followed by a series of events that, it is argued here, have 
collectively led to the possibility of challenging the grip of economics as a 
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method. There has been the advent of the World Wide Web (Berners-Lee, 1989), 
Lévy’s book Collective Intelligence: Mankind’s emerging world of cyberspace 
(1997), the advent of social media platforms (Six Degrees, 1997), to name just a 
few developments.   
 
Conclusion 
In naming the subject of innovation and the innovative subject as two distinctive 
theoretical notions of the individual who is innovative, and in promoting the 
notion that the best way to understand the situation of the already innovative 
subject is to think of their paradox experience as being best understood through 
use of the metaphor of the blacked-out theatre, it is not argued here that the 
subject of innovation in Education cannot be thought of as merely an object of 
scientific thinking. To enter the black box of the blacked-out theatre, the scientist 
will find the pathology of their thinking blacked-out as the lights go down on 
before the drama itself begins. To hold onto one’s thinking in this moment is 
tantamount to an expression of denial of the event of the present and in effect 
signifies the closedness of the subject to the event. This is to say, to understand 
the nature of drama, thought should begin in innocence and with the 
commencement of the drama. In effect the individual’s incapacity of forget 
represents a resistance to embrace the conflict that comes with the simultaneous 
integration of the subjectivization of the individual with the subjectivization of the 
collective; the experience of this black box being always collective and populated 
by those both present in the audience and on the stage. In the darkness of the 
blacked-out theatre, what precedes the fall of the lights collapses the relationship 
between science and aesthetic experience. In such a moment, maybe it becomes 
possible to understand that the subject of innovation cannot be about abstracting 
the individual from their experience of this ambit: that it is rather a question of 
understanding the conditions under which risk and responsibility facilitate the 
possibility of bringing up the lights on what is ultimately a collective experience.  
How are risk and responsibility to be understood in the context of this discussion?  
If the most valuable learning experience now is to develop a capacity to be 
a protagonist of collective change, whether this is as an entrepreneur or just as 
someone who needs to be a collaborator in affecting the realization of collective 
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change, understanding of what is meant by risk and responsibility becomes 
important. The risk of engaging danger is not what risk refers to here. This danger 
is addressed in the way that one’s sense of responsibility addresses the need to 
measure the factors concerning danger after having already assumed the risk. 
Risk, can also be thought of as implying a responsibility to leap. As such, it is a 
responsibility to leap, individually and collectively.  Responsibility has to do with 
how the leap is measured during the leap and what we learned having found 
ourselves in the space to which this leap delivered us. To enter the blacked-out 
theatre is to take a leap, to practice leaping, as it can never be known what is 




Open Innovation (in Theory) 
 
Introduction 
Open innovation presumes an overcoming of the idea that innovation per se is 
only possible in the proprietary domain. Not only is open innovation not specific 
to the interests of private enterprise, it has no specific domain.  
While open innovation and social innovation can be considered to be 
implicitly related, they are rarely theorized in relation to one another.1 Treating 
open innovation as a stand-alone form of innovation is challenged in this chapter 
from the perspective that open innovation, as an ideal, is understood here to be 
ontologically a social experience, where innovation that is occurring is regarded 
as a collective achievement. The aim of this examination is not so much to 
reconcile why these concepts have to be considered together, but to create the 
theoretical foundations for why this conceptual coupling can be most usefully 
understood when collective action is thought to arise from educational experience.  
Because the student’s experience of open innovation is not formally recognized, 
the chapter begins with a brief exposition of the problem of understanding 
openness. From here the investigation proceeds to an examination of the French 
philosopher Bergson’s (1935) explanation of how open and closed societies are 
theoretically and practically co-dependent. This discussion provides the 
framework for a brief critique of the theories of open innovation promoted by 
Chesbrough, von Hippel and Nonaka, utilizing the work of Tuomi. During the 
course of this investigation, it becomes evident that economics has become 
complicit in the marginalizing of the social from the open on account of its 
interest in treating tacit knowledge as explicit knowledge; an observation that 
provides the basis for the final chapter in this investigation.2 
Chapter Eight examines open innovation. After a discussion on openness, an 
explanation of Bergson’s (1935) understanding of static and dynamic societies is 
                                                 
1  Peters, M. A., & Heraud, R. (2015). A rare example! 
2 This is a poignant irony given the importance of the personality of the entrepreneur to economic 
development and the extent to which entrepreneurs rely upon tacit knowledge (See Drucker, 
1997). 
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provided with the intention of highlighting the situation of the already innovative 
subject when the educational institution is closed to the student’s desire to take 
new initiatives. This chapter finishes by highlighting the importance of tacit 




The intention in this section is to briefly engage with the question concerning 
openness; the purpose being to initiate the theoretical coupling of the open and the 
social in student innovative activities. 
Openness is such an overarching term. It is not an easy term to understand. 
Is openness, for instance, the antithesis of closedness? If openness is a virtue, can 
closedness also be a virtue! It could be argued that closedness is every bit as much 
of a virtue as openness – that the choice of disposition depends upon the 
sustainability of the space in which the action takes place. For example, when a 
culture is in recovery from an event that threatened its survival, its people might 
close themselves off from others in order to seek recourse to their traditions, 
world-view and to reflect upon their relative preparedness for the future. 
Openness seems to suppose the radical crossing of a threshold, as if it had 
previously been an instinctive response to a phenomenon, event or trend of a 
nihilistic nature. If we accept the relevance and necessity of this radical leap, the 
idea of openness continues to be relative to the situation in which it is experienced 
and, as such, is subjective. For this reason it is difficult to speak of the openness 
of something or somebody without also qualifying what this means from another 
perspective. Perhaps neoliberalism has provoked such closure on a personal level 
that we do not know how closed we have become and therefore how to identify 
with an interest in openness (Peters, 2010).  
Peters (2010) identifies four twentieth-century thinkers who have 
contributed to the “the politics of openness” (p. 250): the French philosopher 
Bergson, Popper, von Hayek (both Austrians) and Soros, the Hungarian American 
businessman and philanthropist. I will engage with the work of Bergson, in 
particular, because his conceptual understanding of openness is not extrapolated 




Firstly, in the broader sense, Bergson (1859-1941) is relevant to the problem of 
thinking about openness for reasons that may not be immediately apparent. While 
his book The two sources of morality and religion (1935) compares two forms of 
both religions and moral life – subjects that are not the focus of this inquiry – his 
exploration of these subjects informs various epistemological aspects of how 
innovation is understood and engaged with elsewhere in this investigation. These 
aspects include: the history of religious innovation; as something that influences 
how we think about innovation today (Godin, 2015b), the market as that which 
replaced the church as the arbiter of moral formation of society (Sandel, 2013), 
and the methodological contrasting of static and dynamic economic s that can be 
applied to the educational institution (see Chapter Five).  
What is particularly valuable in Bergson’s (1935) analysis of open and 
closed societies is his description of the relationship between what he calls the 
dynamic society and the static society; the former being thought of as an open 
society and the latter as a closed society. In order to make use of this thinking, it is 
necessary to think of the concept of society in a different manner from that which 
has made it less popular in recent decades.3 In this chapter, the concept of society 
will be thought of as referring to social groups that distinguish themselves from 
one another through constituting themselves according to distinctive rationalities 
and practices. For example, in an educational institution the student and teaching 
cohort constitutes itself through a distinctive set of rationalities and practices from 
those according to which commercial managers and administrators can be said to 
constitute themselves. As will be seen from Bergson’s analysis, the teacher and 
student cohort are more inclined to be an open and dynamic society while the 
commercial and administrative cohorts are more inclined to be closed and static 
societies. Bergson’s understanding of the relations between such societies 
becomes interesting when considering the concept of the educational institution 
                                                 
3 While a genealogical analysis would suggest that the concept of society has been losing its 
conceptual leverage over some time, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s (The Sunday Times, 
1987) statement that “there is no such thing as society” is regarded as divisive, especially given her 
and President Reagan’s role in the construction of the neoliberal paradigm where the symbolic 
social unit becomes the autonomous individual (Roberts & Peters, 2008). 
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and the manner in which these distinctive rationalities and practices contribute to 
a particular idea of the role and scope of innovation.  
Bergson (1935) summarises his thesis on the closed society in the following way: 
The closed society is that whose members hold together, caring 
nothing for the rest of humanity, on the alert for attack or 
defence, bound, in fact, to the perpetual readiness for battle. 
Such is human society fresh from the hands of nature. Man was 
made for this society… (p. 266).  
Given Bergson’s explanation of the closed society in the context of this 
discussion, the question must be, if the spirit of entrepreneurship is to be 
understood as involving the balancing responsibility and risk as impulses 
(Drucker 1959, 1997), then it is not difficult to appreciate that the educational 
institution’s approach to innovation is going to be guided by the notion that the 
continuity of the institution depends upon the capacity for responsibility to be 
alert to the dangers of risk. So, while it might initially be tempting to draw a 
derogatory inference from the idea that the commercial management and 
administration comprise a symbolically closed society, this is not the intention. 
Rather, a more valuable strategy might be to identify where the threshold for 
change exists in relations between these so-called open and closed societies in the 
educational institution – the will to be an open society most clearly seen in the 
student cohort and its interest in risk-taking. It needs to be remembered here, that 
an open dynamic society can never overthrow a closed static society (Bergson, 
1935), without destroying the institution itself. This said, the argument in this 
investigation, with respect to how these power relations should be addressed, has 
been one of proposing that the present politics of innovation needs the call for a 
transformation of the institution by those forces that are open and dynamic, by the 
forces that are capable of pressing and challenging – as discussed in Chapter Six, 
when the question of technology was explored – with the purpose of creating a 
problematic that obliges the institution to address the productive interests of the 
teacher and student cohort, rather than merely their presumed consumer interests. 
Considering, in such circumstances, the potential for impasse, Bergson 
(1935) has the following to say: 
Never shall we pass from the closed society to the open society, 
from the city to humanity, by mere broadening out. The two 
things are not of the same essence. The open society is the 
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society which is deemed in principle to embrace all humanity. A 
dream dreamt, now and again, by chosen souls, it embodies on 
every occasion something of itself in creations, each of which, 
through a more or less far-reaching transformation of man, 
conquers difficulties hitherto unconquerable. But after each 
occasion, the circle that has momentarily opened closes again. 
Part of the new has flowed into the mould of the old; individual 
aspiration has become social pressure; and obligation covers the 
whole. (p. 267, emphasis added) 
Hence it is never a question of choosing between an open society and a closed 
society but rather it is one of how each might be thought to transform the other 
and thereby benefit from the other.  
Bergson (1935) asks, “[d]o these advances take place in the same 
direction?” Responding to his own question, he says, “[w]e can take it for granted 
that the direction is the same, the moment that we agree [that] there are advances” 
(p. 267). To which the response might be that collaboration between these so-
called open and closed societies in the contemporary educational institution is not 
so straightforward in that, agreement between the subjects of these societies 
requires the political implication of all subjects, as free individuals in the same 
dynamic. This is to say, it not only requires the implication of the commercial 
managers and administrative staff but also the implication of teachers and 
students.  
As such, it is becomes difficult to argue that innovation will produce an 
advance in the same direction in the neoliberal educational institution for reason 
that the educational institution does not anticipated the value of “the new has 
flowed into the mould of the old” (Bergson, 1935, p. 267). Such an invitation on 
the part of the institution would be symbolic of a political contradiction: if 
students must first acquire the requisite skills and knowledge before being 
permitted to be innovative, the invitation for the new to flow into the mould of the 
old cannot be genuine in its expression. The situation is there such that students 
must bring, without invitation, their new thinking to the old mould. Here there is 
the image of the student, as the uninvited guest, described by Derrida in Of 
hospitality (2000). The already innovative subject must be welcomed even though 
they are uninvited. What is more, the old mould, the pedagogy, the institution, the 
politics of innovation must, by insinuation, open themselves to student innovation 
for if the commercialized educational model wishes to be thought of as a moral 
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project that seeks to serve the whole of society, then it must open its closed and 
static mould to that “which is deemed in principle to embrace all humanity” – the 
innovative student who seeks to transform for the understanding of a problem that 
the institution is not ready, a problem that it cannot see coming.   
In such circumstances, the advances are in many instances independent 
and even unsighted by the other: where innovation that is based on “the 
organization of ignorance” (Drucker, 1959, p. 13, emphasis added), as it will be in 
an open society, can be of no interest to those who base their concept of 
innovation on the organization “of the known facts”, as innovation needs to be in 
a closed society 4 . In saying this, it must be remembered that the social 
demographics that characterize each society are fluid and will take in populations 
that might normally be associated with the other society; for example, a teacher 
may have management and/or administrative ambitions and, as such, may assume 
a conservative disposition with the intention of preserving existing practices such 
that they identify with the opposing society – that of commercial management and 
administration. These tensions affirm their presence at the said threshold of the 
open and the closed, and in the experience of the subject in different ways. 
Bergson (1935) addresses this problem in the following manner: 
In the insect world, the diversity of social function is bound up 
with a difference of organization; you have “polymorphism”. 
Shall we then say that in human societies we have 
“dimorphism”, no longer both physical and psychical as in the 
insect, but psychical only? We think so, though it must be 
understood that this dimorphism does not separate men into two 
hard and fast categories, those that are born leaders and those 
that are born subjects. … The truth is that dimorphism generally 
makes of each of us both a leader with the instinct to command 
and a subject ready to obey, although the second tendency 
predominates to the extent of being the only one apparent in 
most men. (p. 278)  
As can be seen, it would be hypocritical to stigmatize the intentions of the teacher 
with hypothetical ambitions, as according to Bergson (1935), we are all 
ontologically constituted as subjects with this potential. What is more relevant is 
the notion that this dimorphism supposes distinctive responses to two different 
                                                 
4  Innovation, as the organization of ignorance, can be interpreted to give greater precedence to 
risk in relation to the need to be responsible, while innovation as the organization of the known 
facts intends to have the contrary effect. See Conclusion to Chapter Ten.  
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paradigms of understanding of what the philosophical scope and the political role 
of innovation is.5 
Before moving on to the next section, there remains something 
outstanding in the penultimate Bergson quote that cannot be left unaddressed. 
Bergson refers to (1935): “A dream dreamt, now and again, by chosen souls …” 
(p. 267, emphasis added). How should we think about what Bergson might mean 
today when he says the dream (of the invention which sets in motion the 
possibility of innovation) dreamt by chosen souls, if this cannot be the providence 
of all in the same moment? Perhaps it is easier to understand how this idea might 
assume its meaning in the contemporary paradigm if we think of the formation of 
“We-Think” in the way Leadbeater (2008) describes the formation of collective 
intelligence as something that begins with a “good core [that] starts a creative 
conversation, and invites people to contribute” (p. 69). The idea will itself choose 
those who are ready to initiate its realization, which itself is not the rhetoric of 
exclusion.   
 
8.3  
Open innovation and business management studies 
While theorizing both innovation, beginning with Schumpeter’s (1934/1911), and 
the formation of the concept of the open society is a pre-Second World War 
development, beginning with Bergson’s (1935), followed by Popper, Hayek and 
Soros, it is surprising that we should have had to wait until the first decade of the 
21st century for Business Management Studies to develop a theory of open 
innovation (see Chesbrough, 2003). There were prior events such as the Marshall 
Plan that created relations between commercial interests in Europe and the United 
States (Hogan, 2002), the development of the post-war economy in Japan that 
involved the incorporation of foreign ideas used in new ways (‘Quebec 
Agreement’, 2015), the formation of the European Union that encouraged intra-
European commercial collaboration (‘Maastricht Treaty’, 2015), and the fall of 
the Berlin Wall which opened the gates for east-west commercial collaboration in 
Europe (‘German Reunification’, 2015) just to name a few of the more obvious 
                                                 
5  The significance of this dimorphism is discussed in Chapter Two, with respect to innovation and 
entrepreneurship and in Chapter Seven, with respect to the neoliberal innovator and the innovator 
who understands that innovation also supposes an expression of political subjectivity. 
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events. It appears that these large scale events were not interpreted by the 
economic interests such that the events themselves might have spoken to the 
theoretical problem that open innovation supposes.  
This disjuncture between experience and theoretical development also 
speaks to the fragmentation that exists between the various fields of economic 
thought. Drucker, also an expert in the area of business management, proclaims, 
in The landmarks of tomorrow (1959), the coming of the importance of the 
“knowledge worker” as an economic value; an assertion that is followed in quick 
succession by a series of theoretical developments beginning in the early 1960s; 
all contributing to the current understanding of the knowledge-based economy 
(see Peters, 2009). The difference between these two strands of economic thought 
– that which produced Chesbrough’s (2003) retrospective identification of a 
change in paradigm and that which following Drucker’s assertion of the economic 
importance of knowledge – can be distinguished by the latter’s acknowledgement 
of the importance of social innovation. While a theory of innovation does not 
enter into Chesbrough’s (2003) thinking, let alone a sense of social responsibility, 
Drucker (1959) goes as far as saying that “[w]e need social innovation rather than 
we need technological innovation” (p. 33), a belief that is put in clearer 
perspective when it is understood that Drucker considered “[the] two major areas 
of innovation to be: the created universe of nature, and man’s own society” (p. 
23), an idea that should be unsurprisingly congruent with Schumpeter’s concern 
for the human mind and society (Shionoya, 2004); something that is clearly 
tracked in neo-Schumpeterian economics (Hanusch & Pyka, 2007).      
Interpreting this difference from the perspective of Schumpeter’s 
framework, it could be surmised that the business management school 
theorization of economic behaviour does not always succeed in finding a balance 
between the importance of “historical analysis of industries, … industrial 
monographs and biographies of business leaders”; the three elements that 
Schumpeter considered to be so important to giving innovation its proper focus 
(Godin, 2008, p. 7). This is important, because the use of Chesbrough’s theory of 
open innovation needs to acknowledge, in the researcher’s opinion, the obstacle 
this imbalance creates in relation to (1) how open innovation might imply an 
implicit experience of social innovation, and (2) how an understanding of open 
and social innovation can be facilitated in student learning. 
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This section will now engage with the contributions Chesbrough, von 
Hippel, Nonaka and Tuomi, with respect to how open innovation is understood in 
business. The choice of these four thinkers has to do with an interest in bringing 
Tuomi’s critique to bear on the thinking of the first three. Although the work of 
von Hippel (1998) precedes that of Chesbrough (2003) by 15 years, I will begin 




Chesbrough (2003) addresses the situation of the firm that competes in the global 
market. To Chesbrough, survival in the global market means cross-evaluating 
knowledge that informs the firm’s innovative process against knowledge that can 
only be accessed by going outside what the firm already knows. Chesbrough 
theorizes the firm as a global enterprise from the perspective that it can only be 
thought to optimize its possibilities of competing through being open to the use of 
the knowledge that underpins the actions of its competitors across the global 
horizon. This means the problem of innovating is no longer about competing with 
known commercial actors within the delimited domain of, for example, a national 
market: innovation is about competing with new commercial actors who innovate 
within distinctive systems of innovation that utilize methodologies that draw on 
knowledge that is locally embedded. This disposition towards the external is what 
the open of open innovation refers to when innovating in accordance with the 
framework that Chesbrough uses. What this cross-evaluation of knowledge 
implies is that the firm will be open to critiquing its existing knowledge for its 
limitations and with respect to how these limitations construct a closed disposition 
to the innovation process. Such a brief description of Chesbrough’s theory of open 
innovation cannot be made without adding that he supposes his theory to indicate 
a change of paradigm; meaning that to be competitive, the firm must move from 
the paradigm of closed innovation to the paradigm of open innovation6.  
The point of referring to Chesbrough’s (2003) theory of open innovation is 
not simply because he gives open innovation its name: the point of referring to 
                                                 
6 See Appendix F for Chesbrough’s (2003) comparison of the open and closed paradigms of 
innovation. 
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Chesbrough’s theory of open innovation is that his thinking can be seen to inform 
how educational institutions think of innovation. To this effect, it is possible to 
use Chesbrough’s thinking to highlight the further development of two themes of 
thought with which this investigation has been preoccupied: (1) the idea that the 
most critically informative way to think of the educational institution is to think of 
it as a firm and (2) the idea that it is the educational institution, as a firm, that 
constructs a dimorphic subject of innovation. The rest of this section will focus on 
how Tuomi’s (2009) critique of Chesbrough’s thinking contributes to how these 
themes might be better understood.  
Chesbrough’s (2003) theory of open innovation (not to be mistaken for a 
theory of innovation) is paradoxical in that while it supposes an openness to the 
value of exogenous knowledge, this openness uniquely focuses on how 
knowledge might serve the firm’s “business strategy” (Tuomi, 2009, p. 16)7. In 
other words, Chesbrough’s theory of open innovation does not imply the 
possibility of a broader notion of what it means to be innovative. As Tuomi 
indicates, “[t]here is no real discussion of innovation theories”, which leaves 
innovation “in a black box” (p. 17). The illusion might be that Chesbrough 
understands innovation according to some older theoretical model to which he 
adds knowledge without making reference to the “social basis” through which this 
knowledge comes to constitute change. In other words, Chesbrough does not look 
at how new ideas and new knowledge are generated. Such an approach to open 
innovation supposes a static analysis in a dynamic domain; snapshot of the 
problem of being open. The illusion that Chesbrough’s methodology is 
constructed according to the function of an older theoretical model is furthermore 
highlighted by his notion of the open innovator as “heroic innovator” (as cited in 
Tuomi, 2009, p. 17). The basic obstacle to Chesbrough’s theory of open 
innovation informing an understanding of student innovative activity as both open 
and social is that it ignores the problem of the relationship between the 
collaborators and the actor who leads the production of the innovation.  
                                                 
7 Openness to Tuomi (2009) means “open interfaces” and “interoperability” in the “technical” 
sphere and “open access to resources …, open source …, access to decision-making …, [and] open 
boundaries” (p. 20); the latter referring to “legitimate peripheral participation”, which would seem 
critical to understanding how non-proprietary innovation becomes the source of economic 
innovation. These ideas of openness will be further extrapolated later in the chapter and also in the 
next chapter. 
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On the other hand, it is possible to say that Chesbrough’s (2003) model of 
open innovation would work very well in the instance of needing to explain the 
innovative activity of the educational institution. This said this investigation is not 
one that intends to explain how business strategy models describe institutional 
application of a theory of open innovation when competing as a commercial 
institution with other providers. While a critique of this market behaviour is 
relevant to the creation of a broader understanding of open innovation in 
Education, there is now room for such a critique in the context of this 
investigation.  
To conclude, Chesbrough’s (2003) interest is in explaining the problem of 
open innovation of the firm that competes in the global market to produce goods 
for personal financial gain. The only way this thinking might be used to better 
understand the paradox of the student’s situation would be to regard the student as 
the producer of their human capital. In other words, an analysis could be done in 
relation to how students cross-evaluate their existing knowledge of the service 
their institution offers with knowledge gained from other institutions with respect 
to what they offer their students, such that they might make their human capital 
more valuable upon entry into the job market. To do this is to treat the intrinsic 
nature of the student as homo economicus who forms him or herself as a private 
good (Dardot & Laval, 2013). The intention here is rather to treat students as both 
non-proprietary and proprietary dimorphic subjects while imagining that there are 




Eric von Hippel 
Tuomi (2009) thinks of von Hippel as someone who theorizes open innovation. 
Von Hippel (2013) himself distinguishes between user innovation and open 
innovation as different approaches to innovation that should not be mistaken for 
one another. Von Hippel makes this distinction in the following manner:  
Typically open innovation leverages Bill Joy’s insight that there 
are many more smart people outside the firm than inside it who 
might solve a problem. … We don’t have to develop all our new 
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products or processes for ourselves. We can ‘open’ our company 
up to the idea of buying innovations from the outside. … 
Acquiring and benefitting from user innovation on a systematic 
basis involves much more than just being ‘open’ to acquiring 
outside ideas and intellectual property. It involves actually 
understanding the user innovation ecosystem and developing 
processes to work with lead users and user innovation 
communities in a way that is beneficial to both the users and 
your firm. Users and user communities also represent more than 
a source of innovations for a company – they represent a 
potential market. So as a firm, you want to treat them as not only 
innovators, but as customers. You have to learn to deal with 
them respectfully. (p. 17) 
Von Hippel (2013) regards open innovation as a kind of harvesting of 
exogenically produced innovations and innovators that exist or work in the 
domain of the competitor. What emerges from von Hippel’s (2013; see also, 1988, 
2014) thinking on user innovation is his understanding that relations in the 
commercial world need to address the problem of ethics in commercial relations. 
In this sense, von Hippel can be thought to exhibit sensitivity to the more complex 
meaning of openness that can be associated with open innovation, even though he 
himself supposes open innovation to not involve this sensitivity. Von Hippel’s 
distinction between open and user innovation might be questions in relation to the 
following two points. Firstly, there is as yet no single theory of open innovation 
that holds sway across the diverse attempts to say what open innovation refers to. 
The theories of Chesbrough, von Hippel, Nonaka and Tuomi are but four 
contrasting examples. Secondly, it would appear more important to highlight that 
while von Hippel (2013) appears to restrict his interest in user innovation to the 
proprietary domain; his thinking lends itself to the speculation of how his concept 
for democratization of innovation might inform student participation in open and 
social innovation – his interest in ethics being particularly relevant to the latter 
form of innovation. Alluding to the allegorical value of such thinking, von Hippel 
(2014) observes: 
When innovation becomes democratized, many traditional 
assumptions about innovation and the best ways to innovate are 
upended. For example, the advantages that the traditional 
assumptions firms have in place with respect to innovation come 
into question. When innovation resources are cheap and well 
diffused, what firms ought to do is let a thousand flowers 
blossom, as they say, and then select the best flower. (p. 2) 
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As much as this thinking promises the possibility of a development that would 
include students and educational institutions in open and social innovation, this 
possibility is not sufficiently extrapolated in the discourse in Education on user 
innovation. From the perspective to the educational institution, user innovation is 
very much controlled by commercial and administrative interests. This is to say, 
that despite neoliberalism casting students as consumers in their project, students 
are in fact excluded from participation in the user innovation. Yes, they might be 
participants in the process but they have no voice in the design of user innovation; 
user innovations usually being used only to affirm the value of the existing 
provision of Education as a service. This may be contrary to the impression 
educational institutions like to give when including students in, for example, 
surveys of course value, and teaching performance and professionality etc. These 
exercises are largely instrumental and, as such, fail to involve the democratic 
participation of the users (students) in the way the education service is changed. In 
underlying this point, it might be asked, who is innovating in the context of 
implementing change in response to received survey data? Only commercial 
management and administration get to innovate in this instance – certainly not 
students and probably not teachers either. The thousand flowers that blossom in 
the classroom are driven past by commercial and administrative rationalities as if 
they are not deemed to be of productive value; that is, other than in the creation of 
human capital.  
The latter should not be surprising because the concept of innovation 
applied in Education does not embrace student participation. Student innovation is 
black-boxed by educational institutions, except in selective instances where, for 
example, there is collaboration between R&D in universities and commercial 
interests. It would seem that the application the politics of innovation in Education 
is accompanied by a fear that the formation of student capacities to be innovative, 
on account of the idea that student practical reason might become associated with 
a process of innovation that is both open and social. Student open and social 
innovation might bring into question the politics of their own formation and 
affirm that when they are innovative, “many traditional assumptions about 
[institutional] innovation and the best ways to innovate are upended” (von Hippel, 
2014, p. 2), leading students to challenge the closed vision that economic 
innovation employs in the objectification of its self-interest.  
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In the face of this ever-present possibility of such a challenge from 
students to the neo-conservatism that results from economic innovation, the 
educational institution embeds the student cohort within the fold of its own static 
model and modus operandi. Students are coerced into identifying with the manner 
in which the institution utilizes open and user innovation to its own ends. This 
philosophy of innovation – if we can call it that – with respect to both the work of 
the above theorists and to how the institution mediates the relationship between 
“open innovation” and “closed innovation” (Chesbrough, 2003) can be seen most 
transparently in the practices educational institutions use to capture student talent 
from outside their immediate catchments or from competing institutions. Instead 
of challenging the endogenous capacity of the institution to be innovative, 
innovation becomes a commercial and exogenous process of talent acquisition 
(Tuomi, 2009).  As von Hippel’s (2013) iterates: 
… companies don’t like uncertainty, so they often stop radical 
innovations, whether they are developed inside or outside. 
That’s why established companies tend to acquire rather than 
innovate: they want to acquire the whole package of knowledge 
about the market, knowledge about the product, knowledge 
about the technology, and not have to deal with bringing it in 
against resistance. (p. 20) 
In this way, educational institutions are always in danger of making themselves 
servants of the market, instead of trying to change the terrain of the market 
through being innovative in a manner that would include teacher and student 
participation. Such an approach stifles student innovation, sending it underground, 
putting the rationalities of commercial, administrative and Education interests in 
conflict; a conflict that is swept under the carpet in order to uphold the closed, 
static and commercial model, which must compete, ironically in an open, dynamic 




As intimated above, there are limits to which open innovation can be discussed as 
something that takes place in Education and includes students as active 
participants without theoretically coupling open and social innovation. Open 
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source, open access and open publishing, for instance, can be explored from the 
perspective of what they offer technologically to the possibility of open 
innovation, but the implications of this exploration are limited as long as the a 
priori existence of the social context, in which Education takes place goes 
unacknowledged. To discuss the merits of student innovation therefore requires 
openness to be thought of in social terms. Without doing this, knowledge made 
available by open source, open access, open publishing technologies can be 
treated as mere information without any consideration of what students might do 
with this knowledge; with respect to how they interpret problems that might be 
the objects of their learning. In this way, knowledge presumes the presence of a 
social actor. In saying this, if knowledge is to be something more than the form in 
which technology makes it available or disseminates it in Education, it presumes 
students should reshape, rework, reconstitute, and recreate the ideas they engage 
with. To this effect the aim of studying open and social innovation could be 
considered to be one of studying not only how ideation occurs in the classroom 
and lecture theatre, but also it could also be about how this process acquires 
transcendence in the proprietary domain. Another way of stating the same 
problem is to say that collective intelligence cannot be thought of purely in terms 
of open innovation. An aberration of collective intelligence limited to open 
innovation is likely to both speak to (1) the notion of a top-down instrumental use 
of open technologies for economic gain and to (2) the notion that such political 
application supposes the creation of a “fetishized and hypostatized” teacher and 
student cohort, as Pierre Lévy (1997, p. 13) would call it.     
While open and social innovation as a single concept is not explicitly dealt 
with until the following chapter, what will be attempted in the remainder of this 
chapter is an outlining of the metaphysical context in which open innovation and 
social innovation can be said to ontologically constitute one another. 
Tuomi (2009) uses the work of Nonaka to “open the black box of 
innovation” (p. 22) with the intention of asking how “new ideas and new 
knowledge are generated”. To do this, he explains how Nonaka, Toyama and 
Hirata’s (2008) use the idea of how knowledge is created in a spiral of process 
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which these Japanese researchers call a SECI Spiral8. Essentially, this model of 
knowledge creation describes the shared action that takes place through 
knowledge being tacitly and explicitly and tacitly experienced, as an individual, 
when shared with the group, when systemized and when experienced in practice 
(see Appendix E). To Nonaka (2008, as cited in Tuomi, 2009),9 “the SECI process 
does not happen in a vacuum”, rather it “occurs in a specific context”, which is to 
say, “knowledge is contextual” and that this is “why it has meaning” (p. 25). This 
makes understanding open innovation dependent upon understanding the 
specificity of the context in which the open innovation process takes place, the 
problem it is addressing, the relations with stakeholders, etcetera. Nonaka 
describes this context as “Ba”, which refers to a “shared context in motion”. 
Citing Nonaka, Tuomi (2009) puts it like this: 
Knowledge needs context. Without context to specify time, 
place and relationship with others [meaning other contexts] it’s 
just information. Ba is a context that is shared by participants to 
create meanings. Participants understand the context of others 
and oneself and through interaction create the context. Hence it 
is constantly moving.  
The key to understand the context is interaction. It does not 
reside in one’s mind, contexts are shared and created through 
interaction. (p. 25, emphasis added) 
[This is a] constantly evolving context of interaction with others 
and with the world. (p. 27)   
The concept of Ba has its foundation in the concept Basho (Tuomi, 2009, p. 39).10 
According to Tuomi, Basho is “the place where pure experience occurs. … It is 
the space of interaction, where the world and consciousness meet” (p. 40).11 In 
developing the concept of Basho, the Japanese philosopher begins with a critique 
of “Wilhelm Wundt’s philosophy of direct experience and William James’ radical 
                                                 
8 SECI refers to Social, Externalization, Combination, and Internalization (as cited in Tuomi, 
2009, p. 24). 
9 Taken from an unpublished interview Tuomi did with Nonaka (2001).   
10 The concept of Basho was developed “by the Japanese philosopher Kitaro Nishida (1870-1945) 
and was further developed by Hiroshi Shimizu in the context of innovation research and 
“holonics” in the 1980s and 1990s” (Tuomi, 2009, p. 39). 
11 Other philosophers describe this same incommensurability in different ways. To Albert Camus 
(1975), this conflict produces an experience of “the absurd”; to Alain Badiou (2010), the 
relationship is “paradoxical” and requires philosophical thought if its incommensurability is to be 
thought through. To Nonaka, this relationship requires the continued use of “tacit knowledge” (as 
cited in Tuomi, 2009); something, that according to Tuomi, must be “a contextual frame for 
interpretation, peripheral (no-focal), socially shared [and] non-conceptual” (p. 46).      
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empiricism” (Nishida, 1911, as cited in Tuomi, 2009, p. 40) which brought him to 
state that “the world is not “out there”; instead, the knowing subject is 
simultaneously constructed by the same reality that the knower perceives”. As 
Nishida goes onto say, the world and consciousness have a “contradictory 
identity”. From this, Nishida builds “an alternative epistemology, based on 
pragmatism (James, Dewey), phenomenology (Bergson, Husserl, Heidegger) and 
existentialism (Kierkegaard, Nietzsche)”, which he integrates using “Buddhist 
philosophical thinking”. Basho, as the knowing subject who is simultaneously 
constructed by the same reality he perceives, can be found in the words of other 
philosophers, including those of Michael Polanyi: 
… the functional structure of from-to knowing includes jointly a 
subsidiary ‘from’ and the focal ‘to’. But this pair is not linked 
together on their own accord. The relation of a subsidiary to a 
focus is formed by the act of a person who integrated one to the 
other. The from-to relation lasts only so long as a person, the 
knower, sustains this integration.  
… Such integration cannot be replaced by any explicit 
mechanical procedure … It can only be lived, can only be dwelt 
in. (Polanyi & Prosch, 1975, as cited in Tuomi, 2009, p. 49, 
emphasis in original) 
For such a process of integration of this from-to functional structure to resist 
being systemized and reproduced as a mechanical procedure, the relationship of 
subject and object must be collapsed such that the relationships between invented 
subjects and objects would require open innovation to also be social.  
The discussion from Chapter One might be recalled here, in that it was 
argued that the flight recorder (‘Flight Recorder’, 2017) is a poor metaphor for the 
black box that innovation and the innovative subject have been condemned to by 
economics. Rather the black box needs to be thought of as the blacked-out theatre 
just before the commencement of a play. Here the audience and actors are brought 
together in a way that consciousness meets the world: that is, when the lights 
come on. As such, perhaps open and social innovation in Education begins in 
darkness as in when the regimes of rationality are for a moment suspended and 




An educational institution is never entirely open or closed, dynamic or static. 
Educational institutions wish to portray themselves as open and dynamic – look at 
their websites – but this can also be a marketing strategy that is, depending on the 
institution, seldom commensurate with the reality of the learner. If institutional 
criticism is that it is up to the student to be entrepreneurial in new ways, this is not 
a very rational criticism of the situation of the already innovative subject. To the 
already innovative subject it is not enough to just contribute to incremental 
innovation that increases institutional productivity. This on its own only 
contributes to the neoliberal institution to assuming a more conservative 
disposition and losing its capacity to be critically self-conscious of its function as 
an educational institution. It may be that the already innovative subject is wise 
enough to understand that paying the cost of one’s education supposes, in the 
present operational format, the need for students to anonymously populate the 
instutiton’s production function. However, such an individual will also want to 
initiate new actions, not only in their learning but in the work and life of the 
institution. It is only in this moment that it is known whether or not the institution 
is actually open and dynamic. In such moments, this nexus between the student 
and their institution is very important because all education tradition comes into 
question. Students are already choosing to abandon formal education because that 
which they want to learn can be learned more quickly, more effectively and with 
more interesting consequences outside the traditional institution. This is the 
positive implication of the introduction of new technologies to Education: 
heuristic student learning through interest in maintaining agile relations with the 
role of new technologies, results in students, not only wishing to benefit their own 
learning as something that can be acquired in relation to the promise of a future, 
but they also want to transform the conditions under which they learn. This in 
effect means that their learning implicates them in wanting to change institutional 
operations from being closed and static to being open and dynamic operations, 
and therefore that they should be receptive to their own individual and/or 




Social Innovation: A Political and Historical Problem of the Present 
 
Introduction 
Just as there have been periods when innovation has been understood to be 
something other than technological innovation, so too there has been a period 
when social innovation was understood as something different from how it is 
understood today. During the 19th century, innovation was thought of as social 
innovation, not technological innovation. During this period, social innovation 
was thought of in terms of social reform or in terms of social systems, in 
particular, it took the form of socialism (Godin, 2015b).  
Since the mid-19th century and before social innovation re-emerged in 
1960s and 1970s (Godin, 2012), philosophy has given way to the social sciences 
as the favoured form of social inquiry (Lévy, as cited in Peters, 2015b). It is 
speculated in this chapter that socialism and social reform were not extant but 
were correlated forms of thinking about the place social value had in relation to 
political economy. With this idea in mind, it is theorized that the epistemological 
foundations that provided the possibility for rebellion in the 19th century continue 
to inform the impetus for social innovation today. 
This chapter will begin with an examination of Godin’s (2012, 2015a, 
2015b) 19th century concept of social innovation. this discussion s Roberto 
Unger’s (2013) proposal for a maximalist social innovation movement. Unger’s 
project has been chosen because he presents one of the strongest political 
challenges to the neoliberal governance of social innovation. In taking this 
approach, a wider body of literature is ignored because it does not go back to 
Godin’s study of socialism and social reform, appearing, as such, to ‘blackbox’ 





Benoît Godin (The history of social innovation as a category) 
For many people today social innovation represents “a remedy or an adjustment to 
technological innovation” (Godin, 2015b, p. 133). Social innovation  is  also 
considered to be a recent development and is thought to have emerged after 
technological innovation. However, the concept of social innovation actually 
precedes our use of technological innovation. According to Godin, “social 
innovation entered the vocabulary in the aftermath of the French Revolution 
(1789-1799) and was used regularly in the 1860s” (p. 127), whereas technological 
innovation only came to be used following the Second World War (Godin, 2008). 
Understanding why and how this confusion developed becomes important to 
understanding why social innovation languishes today, for the most part, in the 
theoretical realm.  
In reading ‘Social innovation: From Scheme to Utopia’ (Godin, 2015b, pp. 
122-133), the aforementioned task would seem to be one of needing to understand 
how social innovation was dismantled as a practical response. Two aspects of 
social innovation’s genealogy need to be considered: (1) the effect of the French 
Revolution on how social innovation has come to be valued today, and (2) the 
scope for transformation that social innovation presumes, on account of the scale 
and duration of the French Revolution – not discounting the terror, destruction, 
and executions associated with this event. While the French Revolution was not 
thought of at the time as a social innovation – it only came to be retrospectively 
described as such in the early 19th century (Godin, 2015b) – it played a divisive 
role in stigmatizing social innovation and, in so doing, putting contemporary 
capitalism beyond reproach.  
As iterated above, it is not only important to know why this debilitation of 
the social value of social innovation occurred but how this was achieved. During 
the 19th century, both “socialism” and “social reform” were thought of as social 
innovations (Godin, 2015b). Godin tracks these two distinctive social 
developments in a manner that creates the illusion of they were entirely 
independent of one another and, as such, developed in parallel as extant social 
preoccupations. A genealogical interpretation of these developments might be 
better served if they were theorized as if they were always in tension with one 
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another, as if each were implicit to all power relations conditioned by both 
economic and social interests. In this way, it is possible to see how neoliberal 
capitalism has stifled social innovation in all circumstances that do not serve its 
own ends. The objective in the remainder of this section will be to speak to social 
innovation in both 19th century forms – socialism and social reform – while 
holding each in tension with one another.  
William Lucas Sargant (1858, as cited in Godin, 2015), 1  critiquing 
socialism (as social innovation), wrote that “health of body and mind” are 
“obtained not by ease [read excessive wealth], not by indulgence [read welfare], 
but by active participation” (as cited in Godin, 2015b, p. 123). While this may be 
a liberal truth procedure that seeks to gain society’s implication as a whole – both 
capitalist and socialist alike – by appealing to its moral appreciation of that which 
benefits all, the intention is to give social innovation the effect of a pejorative 
connotation. The best way to cut across this criticism might be say that while 
Sargant was writing in the vein of English Idealism, when “a belief in an Absolute 
(a single all-encompassing reality that in some sense formed a coherent and all-
inclusive system)” (‘British Idealism’, 2015) 2 , has the intention of putting 
capitalism beyond reproach with respect to its role as moral arbiter, that Sargant 
was able obfuscate the limits and possibilities of active participation. For 
example, did active participation presume the right to question the capitalist 
project, to challenge it, to transform it, or did active participation merely refer to 
good behaviour as an expression of acceptance of one’s ascribed economic role? 
To be more precise, did active participation refer to anything beyond effective 
performance as homo economicus? The inability to address these questions at the 
time and in the form of a problematic (Foucault, 1997d) can be understood to 
have contributed to the incapacity of social innovators to constitute themselves 
such that they could challenge capitalism on its own terms; which is to say in 
                                                 
1 “Will Lucas Sargant (1809-1889) [was] an English businessman, political economist and 
educational reformer”, published Social innovators and their schemes” (1858) (as citied in Godin, 
2015, p. 123), would appear to be one of the major influences in Godin’s thinking on social 
innovation in the 19th century. 
2 British idealism was generally marked by several broad tendencies: a belief in an Absolute (a 
single all-encompassing reality that in some sense formed a coherent and all-inclusive system); the 
assignment of a high place to reason as both the faculty by which the Absolute's structure is 
grasped and as that structure itself; and a fundamental unwillingness to accept a dichotomy 
between thought and object, reality consisting of thought-and-object together in a strongly 
coherent unity (‘British Idealism’, 2015). 
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relation to the interests of both the individual and private property. To succeed, 
socialism as a social innovation had to find a way to break away from capitalism’s 
particular governance of political economy – as the political project instigated by 
the Russian Revolution in 1917 proved to be the case. 
Sargant (1858, as cited in Godin, 2015) illustrates how this drama came to 
be played out. Capitalism was able to produce conditions for giving socialism, as 
social innovation, a pejorative connotation by highlighting that socialists (as 
social innovators) hated having to subject themselves to (1) the role “capital” 
played and (2) the necessity for “competition” (p. 123), and that this negativity 
existed on account of their “profound ignorance … of political economy” (p. 124). 
This chastisement was compounded by the observation that socialists (as social 
innovators) did not act alone – that they worked in “sect[s]” (p. 127). 
Furthermore, the social innovator was thought to be “a revolutionary” (Guizot, 
1859, as cited in Godin, 2015b, p. 125). ““[P]olitical and social innovation” are 
frequently put together in the same phrase to highlight this characteristic” (Godin, 
2015c, p. 126); the coupling of which can be understood to facilitate the negative 
echo that continued to reverberate from the historical memory of the French 
Revolution. The perception of neo-classical or Liberal thinkers was therefore one 
of regarding social innovators, in the guise of socialists, to be both intellectually 
impotent and revolutionary without proper cause. “What they propose”, wrote one 
anonymous writer “is not to improve our present system of society, but to abolish 
it entirely, and to construct a new one in its stead” (Anonymous, 1845, as cited in 
Godin, 2015c, p. 128, emphasis added). What is evident here is that the art of self-
government was not yet something that social innovators understood. This is to 
say, these more radical social innovators were unable to accept to be governed by 
the other and refer to the relationship with the self (Foucault, 2000) in such a way 
that would enable them to differentiate both themselves and their actions both 
from and within the existing system of governance. It is through the negotiation of 
accepting to be governed by the other that new strategies are formed and the work 
that transformation will require becomes visible. I will return to the abhorrence 
that socialists (as social innovators) had towards capital and competition at the 




Social innovation (institutional) 
While socialism (as social innovation) has been spoken of above in radically 
political terms, in that socialists (as social innovators) were supposed to have had 
revolution as their objective (Godin, 2015c), it may not be clear how this attitude 
to social change might have been in tension with the attitude of the social 
reformers (also social innovators). Identifying this tension is important to 
understanding the problem of social innovation today. When speaking specifically 
to this tension – something Godin does not speak to – there are two theoretical 
points to make. Firstly, there is the issue of how governmentality functions when 
there is conflict relating to the belief that there can be an Absolute all-inclusive 
system – capitalism. Secondly, there is the methodological question relating to the 
idea that if the pejorative connotation of social innovation is succeeded by a 
positive connation of social innovation, as it turned out to be the case (Godin, 
2015c), then do the epistemological features of political and social thought that 
underpinned the historical disposition to which the pejorative connotation referred 
to – that of the revolutionary – still inform the will to social innovation? Such 
epistemological influences – they will not be the same influences as those of the 
19th century – must still be considered to condition self-governance of the thought 
that produces the need for social innovation. After all, social reform (as social 
innovation) cannot be relied  on to provide the rigour of self-critique that it should 
be required to show. 
Beginning with the first point, in the latter part of the 19th century, 
according to Godin (2015c), social innovation takes on a positive connotation. 
Because there is not the space to extensively explore this transition in language 
from the pejorative connotation to the positive one3, this could be summarized by 
the idea that “improving society “without aspiring to reconstruct it”” 
(Anonymous, 1959, as cited in Godin, 2015c, p. 128) gained ascendency over the 
idea of abolishing the present system as it stands, and constructing a new one in 
its place (Godin, 2015c). With respect to how governmentality is understood 
(Foucault, 2000), power relations between the social reformer (as social 
innovator) and the advocates of the existing system can be understood to be 
                                                 
3 Godin deals with this question at length (2015a, 2015b). 
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characterized by a commensurability in values that defend the individual and 
private property as sacrosanct. It would therefore be assumed that there only 
needed to be corroboration with respect to how small differences would not be 
vetoed by the captains of industry. In this way, what was feared in social 
innovation; that it risked leading “to uncontrollable consequences” (p. 128), could 
be coerced into conforming to a desire for “reform”, such that the integrity of the 
existing system would continue to endure. As Godin puts it, “[t]his positive 
connotation applies to any program, particularly if, initiated by governments for 
improving the social condition of mankind” (p. 129). In this way, governments 
could be thought to have stood-in for social reformers (as social innovators) in 
their power relations with socialists. Hence, social innovation, when thought of 
strictly in the language of social reform, becomes the unique prerogative of the 
Absolute and all-inclusive system of capitalism. In this context, the system is able 
to self-reform without analyzing the foundation of what otherwise might give rise 
to social innovation as a response to a critique of the system itself.  
The second point has to do with the aforementioned methodological 
consideration: that the positive connotation of that which social innovation refers 
to should not presume the disappearance of the epistemological features of 
political and social thought that underpin that which the pejorative connotation 
refers to. While social innovation today does not occur without first being both 
state sanctioned or institutionally sanctioned, this does not mean that the impetus 
for social innovation that challenges the foundations of the capitalist system 
should have disappeared. Absolute inclusion itself implies that social innovation 
must be occurring on the inside; something that becomes recognizable in the next 
chapter, when open source in education is theorized in relation to the provision of 
possibilities for the formation of collective intelligence.  
The continued possibility of social innovation in a more radical form must 
be considered inevitable if the forces of static and dynamic societies are 
examined. Returning to Bergson’s (1935) description of these societies, it is 
possible in part to equate the sustainability of the Absolute and all inclusive 
system of capitalism with “[t]he closed society … whose members hold together 
… on the alert for attack or defence, bound … to the perpetual readiness for 
battle” (p. 266). The paradox is, according to Bergson, one where man is made for 
this society because it is understood to be the closest thing, for now, to what 
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nature itself would create in our name. The phrase that is most incommensurable 
with this image, expresses the idea that this Absolute all inclusive society “[cares] 
nothing for the rest of humanity” (p. 266). This incommensurability can be 
explained however in that it is the very idea of the Absolute, as all inclusive 
system, that is itself ontologically underdeveloped in that it does not as yet include 
the idea of “collective subjectification” (Lévy, 1997, p. 139). According to Lévy, 
what we see in contemporary economic activity are new “forms of self-
organization and sociability … [that] tend toward the production of subjectivity” 
(p. 141); the effect of which is the continuous production of diversity and by 
insinuation, the development of the creative implications these diversities 
suppose. Furthermore, Lévy claims that this “continuous production of 
subjectivity will most likely be considered the major economic activity throughout 
the next century” (p. 4); meaning during the 21st century. It might therefore be 
prematurely concluded that subjectivities become the means by which capitalism 
will be transformed.     
So when Godin (2015c) asks, “[w]hat is it in social innovation that gives 
rise to such disparate representations?” (p. 127), it might be assumed that social 
innovations should be, by definition, disparate. While various global problems 
implicate the participation of all humanity, ultimately such problems must be 
addressed locally. This is to say, while it might be desirable that there be a 
collective intelligence acted on in addressing such problems (for example, 
poverty, the health of nature’s ecosystem, conflict, education), the scope of this 
collectivity will be geopolitical in nature and, as such, result in social innovations 
that assume the special character that can only be defined by the way in which 
multiple subjectivities are given to working together in the context in which they 
can affirm the practical value of their relations. To this effect, social innovation, in 
the first instance, does not need to be a representation that challenges and 
competes with the absolute nature of the capitalist system: it might rather achieve 
the effect of transforming the way global behaviour is systemized through projects 
of a smaller scope on account of these projects being educative in nature. 





Theorizing social innovation (Roberto Unger) 
The fundamental problems of … contemporary societies cannot 
be resolved with the restraints of the limited repertory of the 
available institutional options. The multitude of small scale 
innovation arises from below as a pre-figurement of larger 
possibilities. The world remains restless under the dictatorship 
of no alternatives. Let this restless world find an unexpected ally 
in the social innovation movement. (Unger, 2013, p. 5) 
It would seem important to clarify what Unger (2013) means when he speaks of 
“the available institutional options” (p. 1). According to Unger, the authors of 
these options, the rich and governing elite of the North Atlantic seek to reconcile 
“American style economic flexibility with European style social protection within 
the limits of an institutional and ideological compromise” that is incapable of 
addressing this challenge in a way that benefits all. Because engagement with 
diversity is always, or should be, a moral imperative in Education, Unger’s 
analysis of this tyranny of political economy should likewise suppose the need to 
scrutinize whether or not educational institutions use social innovation as a 
strategic solution that, like in the case of the North American and the European 
Union, may bear little relationship to the problems they suppose to address. 
Paraphrasing Godin (2015b), it can be said that “innovation” has come to be 
thought of as “the a priori solution”, irrespective of “society’s problems” (p. 15). 
While there are various ways of examining the idea that social innovation could 
be applied as a solution, irrespective of the nature of the problem it addresses, any 
instrumental abuse of this power would need to be examined from the point of 
view of how social innovation is governed. 
In the hands of the institution, social innovation can be understood to 
exemplify the extent to which economic interests define the purpose of political 
practice, meaning the purpose of social innovation can be understood as one of 
enhancing or extending existing economic benefits. Foucault, in his article 
‘Governmentality’ (Foucault, 2000), underlines the nature of this privileging of 
the role of economics in power relations, when he says that “the essential issue in 
the establishment of the art of government [is the] introduction of economy into 
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political practice” (p. 207)4; in other words, while economics is an issue when it 
privileges profit over and above the creation of all other goods, it has to be said 
that economics is also responsible for the establishment of these power relations 
in the first place.  
Nevertheless, the purpose of scrutinizing institutional use of social 
innovation as a strategic solution is not to just to show the extent to which 
institutions – governments, NGOs, city councils and universities – incorporate 
social innovation into their programs of governance as a means of ameliorating 
public concern about a social problem, but to show how their subjects (employees, 
customers, the electorate and students) are being constituted as subjects who 
understand political practice as an economic practice and therefore social 
innovation as an economic innovation. Curiously this interpretation of the 
political use of social innovation is the reverse of what Drucker (1959) – “the 
father of modern management” (Beatty, 1998, as cited in Kiessling, 2004, p. 85) – 
appeared to be proposing when he said “we need social innovation more than we 
need technological innovation” (p. 33), but perhaps this is because Drucker’s 
notion of social innovation has already been seconded by economics, whereby the 
Zeitgeist becomes obliged to hide its hand. It is therefore not hard to understand 
why social innovation in Education might be reinterpreted as social enterprise and 
social entrepreneurship, and social economy with the objective being the 
economic value they bring to the institution. 
Unger (2013), for his part, seeks to intervene with a method that exposes 
both the weaknesses and possibilities of social innovation with the intention of 
illustrating how the existing “dictatorship of no alternatives” (p. 1) should be 
transformed through resistance and subversion5. Unger makes his case at the 2013 
NESTA Conference of Social Frontiers6 by beginning with a comparison of what 
                                                 
4 Foucault’s (2000) statement of belief is made in the context of tracking the introduction of 
economy into political practice between the 16th and 18th centuries. The deepening, complexity and 
subtly of this embedding of economy in political practice has become such that in the 21st century, 
the political can be thought of as economic practice; something perhaps best exemplified by the 
fact that in many instances the prime ministers and presidents of many countries are elected on 
account of their wealth and economic acumen – no examples needed. 
5 Roberto Unger is a Brazilian academic and is clearly sensitive to the desire of ordinary Brazilians 
to participate in the global relations and development – something clearly seen in his empathy for 
the “multitude of small scale innovation” that is arising from below “as a pre-figurement of larger 
possibilities” (2013, p. 5).  
6 See 2013 NESTA Conference of Social Frontiers http://www.nesta.org.uk/event/social-frontiers 
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he calls “the minimalist” and “the maximalist” approaches to social innovation. In 
Unger’s words, the minimalist approach to social innovation  
…is a movement within civil society and about civil society. It 
does not directly engage in the politics of state power and it 
renounces the hope of proposing a comprehensive project for 
society. The minimalist approach to social innovation has the 
attraction of modesty and apparent realism. (p. 1) 
This approach resonates with Bergson’s (1935) idea of the closed society (see 
previous chapter). Clearly identification with the system means that the logic of 
the very same system must be that which defines the parameters within which 
change occurs. Habitus would seem to play a significant role in ensuring the 
culture of this identification.  
The maximalist view of socialist innovation, on the other hand, is that 
… although headquartered in civil society, is not simply about 
civil society, but about everything, and therefore, must engage 
the politics of state power and must have a comprehensive 
proposal for society. (Unger, 2013, p. 1) 
Unger’s (2013) comprehensive proposal can only be a proposal that signals the 
possibility of a genuine alternative if it puts consciousness in conflict with the 
world (see Camus, 2000), if it elicits the absurdity of the way we have made 
ourselves such that it has become difficult to imagine an alternative response to 
the world. Metaphysically, Unger appears to be meeting the spirit of competition 
with a strategy that is of equal force to the will to compete. Cut back to its barest 
fundamentals, he would appear to be using strategy to confront operational 
efficiency, which as Porter (1998) reminds us, are not the same thing. Central to 
this investigation is the notion that when innovation is only thought of in terms of 
cumulative profits, the art of strategy with respect to creative development of the 
institution can be compromised and in effect be replaced by operational 
efficiency. Strategy in a closed society can only be used to maintain the traditions 
that have given it continuity. On the other hand, strategy in an open society 
becomes a positive force for change, through temporarily opening the closed 
society mould.  
The question that Unger (2013) raises, in relation to the intentions of this 
investigation is, what kind of proposal would contribute to students being openly 
and socially innovative in a way that would implicate them in having to better 
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understand their relationship to the significant problems of the world? Reiterating 
the argument made in Chapter Eight, the intention is not to see Education as a 
subset of paid-employment but to see it as the experience which transforms the 
domain of paid-employment through initiating new creative responses to the 
conflict between consciousness and the world, through an engagement with what 
could be called a limited number of universally accepted problems.7 Lévy’s (1997, 
2013, 2015) work with collective intelligence would be a good example of the 
type of change this question refers to. To this effect, there is a need to be 
discerning in responding to Unger’s proposal; to not take everything literally and 
to argue every point. During the rest of this section, I will lay out the key elements 
in Unger’s proposal that are relevant to the above question.  
Unger’s (2013) proposal comprises the following elements: (1) an analysis 
of the current “situation” of social innovation; (2) the “task”; (3) the “direction”; 
and (4) the “methods” (p. 1) by which such a transformation is to be achieved.  
According to Unger (2013), the current situation of the social innovation 
movement is characterized by a series of problems, including: “the hierarchical 
segmentation of the economy”; “the disconnection of finance from the economy” 
(Unger, 2013, p. 1); “the non-existence of any promising way to enhance the 
quality of the provision of public services”; “the absence in these societies of an 
adequate basis of social solidarity”; and “the flawed and relatively impotent 
character of democratic politics” (p. 2). The question is, how does this articulation 
of problems implicate students in innovation that connects them with a limited 
number of universally accepted problems? The simple way of addressing this 
question might be to ask, how might the first two problems be related to the last 
two problems?  
Thomas Piketty’s research on wealth creation, published under the title of 
Capital in the Twenty-First Century (2014), makes an interesting contribution to 
understanding Unger’s (2013) description of the economic situation which the 
latter’s proposal addresses. How, for example, should the politics of education 
inform student understanding of their relationship with the world, with respect to 
the fact that, while they are led to believe they are being formed with the capacity 
to be innovative, their participation in paid employment is likely to involve little 
                                                 
7 This articulation of problems will be explained in more detail in the following chapter.   
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more than (Sennett, 2006) executing the innovations initiated by others. It is those 
who initiate and execute who have the possibility of accruing the capital that in 
turn makes it possible to invest in non-productive more rewarding investments. 
The following three things are likely to happen if students are misled with respect 
to how Education contributes to the creation of wealth: (1) both the pedagogy and 
the curriculum continue to work in function of what can now be considered, in 
light of Piketty’s (2014)  research, an obsolete theoretical model for how 
innovation results in wealth; (2) the complexity of the profit motive that is said to 
drive innovation and entrepreneurship (Procter, 2008; Hanusch & Pyka, 2007b; 
Fagerberg, Mowery & Nelson, 2005) will be misunderstood8 and/or (3) which in 
turn will undermine student trust in the education system in general.  
In relation to the first, Piketty’s rationale supposes that Education prepares 
students with two distinctive and unrelated futures in play: for those who will 
work in the productive sector and for those who will increase their wealth through 
not having to invest in the productive sector. The assumption might be that all 
students who begin by working in paid-employment have equal opportunity of 
accruing wealth through non-productive investment, but this assumption collapses 
in the context of doing a more dynamic analysis.  
The second element of Unger’s (2013) proposal cannot be addressed in 
relation to the problem of social innovation, as it might otherwise be thought to 
take place in Education, without first addressing issues (1) and (2). In other words, 
the question of how the quality of Education, as provision of a public service, 
cannot be enhanced without first providing transparency with respect to how the 
politics of education addresses Piketty’s claims on how wealth is accrued in 
productive and non-productive forms. Likewise with the question of how 
democracy might become a more vital contributor to collaborative learning: the 
contribution that the unproductive accrual of wealth makes to the provision of 
technology (a capital cost) would need to be made transparent before it could be 
expected that democracy could become a more potent force in student relations. If 
this issue is not addressed, the intrinsic loyalties to cultural capital associated with 
either productive paid-employment or non-productive investments will be divisive 
in student relations in the context of open and social innovation.  
                                                 
8 These texts are just three key examples of many that could be provided; the third one chosen for 
its local relevance.  
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The second element of Unger’s (2013) proposal for transformation 
through social innovation involves “the task”. Unger’s strategy is one of 
mobilizing “the multitude of small-scale innovations” and the “little epiphanies 
that exist all around the world” (p. 2). Unger does not explicitly say that his 
proletariat is made up of all those who are without the legitimate power to initiate 
new actions under neoliberalism, by which he might have meant all those who do 
not have work in paid employment and all those who cannot get work but have a 
new idea. While there is no clear indication that this proletariat includes the 
subject of Education, it is evident from his articulation of tasks, that students are 
not considered to be primary actors.  
Unger’s task is to identify the “enabling conditions”: “the vast array of 
small scale innovations coming from the grass roots”; “the functional imperative 
of success … [is] always the indeterminate in their social and institutional 
implications”; and “there are always alternative ways of defining or defending 
group or class interest” (p. 2). Such enabling conditions would need to be 
rewritten for Education in a way that recognizes the context in which open and 
social innovation is already producing these so-called small-scale innovations and 
little epiphanies.  
Critical to the articulation of enabling conditions in Education would need 
to be an identification of the characteristics in “the knowledge space” (see Lévy, 
1997, pp. 138-141) that enable open and social innovation. The knowledge space, 
as Lévy understands it, is not an extant space that can be characterized according 
to its unique characteristics without such an articulation containing within its 
expression a critique of “the commodity space” (see pp. 135-138). In effect, these 
two spaces need to be thought of as distinctive cultural paradigms. This 
distinction would need to acknowledge that the knowledge space, in as much as it 
is possible for science to be philosophical and philosophy to be scientific 
(personal communication, 2016), identifies on behalf of neoliberalism the limits 
of the commodity space as an end in itself. To provide an example, it would no 
longer be possible to think of students as consumers of research. The enabling 
conditions of the knowledge space will be addressed more specifically in the next 
chapter, where the focus is on the work of Lévy (1997, 2015a, 2015b; see also, 
Peters, 2015b). 
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Fundamental to Unger’s (2013) proposal is the articulation of the 
“direction” this proposal should take. To clarify, Unger does not argue for a single 
programme of social innovation but rather for a space in which alternatives are 
able to “contest for ascendency” (p. 3). In order to realize the possibilities of such 
an ascendency of new ideas, Unger proposes the initiation of four converging 
projects. It is in the mechanism of these projects that social innovation can be 
understood to happen as a consequence of this innovative activity also involving 
open innovation. As will be seen later in this chapter, the articulations of these 
four projects intuit the contribution that Lévy (1997) is beginning to make with 
respect to how Education might come to be transformed; this, even though Lévy’s 
publication precedes Unger’s (2013) by 15 years9.  
Unger’s (2013) four projects are as follows: (1) a “new form of production 
characterized by permanent experimentalism”, that would no longer be limited to 
the who has political control of an exclusive sector of society and the economy (p. 
3); (2) the radical transformation of “the character of education” which as such is 
aimed at changing “the content of consciousness”; (3) “innovating in the 
provision of public goods. The goods by which people make people, we make 
them bigger”; and (4) the “energizing and deepening of democracy, creating a 
high-energy democracy”. Unger believes that these projects must be spiritually 
unified if they are to function in a manner that mutually supports their 
development and, as such, he proposes two ways of understanding this unifying 
force: there must be “structural ambition without structural dogmatism” (p. 4), 
achieved through “institutionalizing every area of social life, … in the form of a 
radical experimentation, … [which itself becomes] the unifying point of these 
initiatives [or projects]”. Alternatively, “the spirit that animates this project is to 
emphasize its goal, rather than its method” … the goal being “a marginal increase 
in equality” (Unger, 2013, p. 4).  
These articulations can be seen as being intrinsic to the general dynamic 
and orientation of progress within this movement of social innovation. In as much 
                                                 
9 The reason for this is that technology has only more recently gained cultural and professional 
leverage through the exploitation of social media platforms. For example, Facebook was launched 
in 2004 (‘History of Facebook’, 2015). The research has not been done in this investigation on 
when social media reaches such critical mass of use that it can be considered to be significant as a 
platform for education and professional use, by both students and paid-employees. The question 
might be, when did it become the educational norm for classes to form their own Facebook pages 
for the purpose of discussion of a particular course.  
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as Unger’s (2013) proposal is a complex one, it is a set of projects that should be 
understood as one that can only be gradually realized in practice. While these four 
projects are framed in a manner that speaks to the problem of transforming 
Education such that learning might take place through experimentalism in open 
and social innovation, optimism might be found in Unger’s (2013) statement 
“[t]he goods by which people make people, we make them bigger” (2013, p. 3). 
These goods are formed in what calls “the knowledge space” (Lévy, 1997, pp. 
138-141). If such a discussion as the aforementioned were centred in the 
development of “the commodity space”, as it is understood by Lévy (1997, pp. 
135-138), the goods that make people would be those that comprise the 
“[e]conomy of material and statistical goods” (p. 140), which is to say those that 
produce financial capital as their only end. To extrapolate, this refers to 
everything that makes the formation of human capital measurable; that is: all 
skills and knowledge acquired in particular courses and in particular institutions 
that have a particular commercial status and value. This is an industrial model of 
which many contemporary educational institutions are late-model exemplars.  
While the knowledge space, as understood by Lévy (1997) did not yet 
exist at the time of writing, he thought of it as a “u-topia”, a “no space” (p. 138) – 
there are new student drives, in the form of “[i]dentity; skill, nomadic 
cooperation, continuous hybridization” (p. 140), that produce new public goods 
and in this vein, there has been much development since 1997. The objective of 
the knowledge space is the formation of “human qualities” (p. 140) over and 
above the formation of human capital, in the form of skills and commodified 
knowledge. Capitalism remains and “there is always a commodity space” (p. 137). 
What has changed and what puts capitalism in perspective with respect to how 
Education begins to configure itself within the realm of cyberspace and the 
information economy network, is an “anthropological dimension”, where it would 
seem that open innovation facilitates social innovation through deterritorializing 
the deterritorialization of the commodity space, where “the processes of 
individual and collective subjectivization come together” (p. 139). As such, to 
make the Unger’s (2013) public goods (human qualities) bigger would be to 
enable students to bring the knowledge space from the virtual realm of 
understanding into a functioning educational ecology, where collective 
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intelligence, through the use of new open technologies, enables students to be 
actors to experiment with the problem of affecting change. 
Lastly, Unger (2013) speaks of two methods. These methods will be treated very 
discretely, as it is Lévy (1997) who has more to contribute on this subject for 
reason that his research goes more deeply into the problem of describing the 
epistemology of the knowledge space. The first method involves “interpreted 
foreshadowings” (Unger, 2013, p. 4), where “[s]mall-scale projects” are worked 
from the bottom up to produce large-scale projects. The second method is referred 
to as the “exemplary insurgence”10, which refers to the engagement of “every area 
of social life, although beginning from its seat within civil society”. The seat from 
which students begin in the knowledge space, is the “core”, as explained by 
Charles Leadbeater (2008), when describing how small collaborative initiatives 
produce the “we-think” experience – an essential element of open and social 
innovation that will be expanded on in the next chapter. 
 
Conclusion 
The discussion of social innovation will be continued in Chapter Ten, where 
Lévy’s (1997, 2015a, 2015b; Peters, 2015b) description of the knowledge space 
will become a site for theorizing the open and social innovation that results from 
treating student knowledge as ubiquitous, constantly enhancing, co-ordinated in 
real time and resulting from an effective mobilization of skills (1997). These are  
characteristics that speak to the formation of a new theory of relationships 
between subjectivities and the collective community, where the institution comes 
to be defined by collaborative active and collective thinking; which is to say, not 
only by commercial and administrative managers but also by the teacher and 
student cohort. The non-proprietary aspect of the student’s learning project 
enables open and social innovation to be developed from the bottom up, where 
students think the paradox of Education is such a way that the ideation that should 
come with learning itself promises the possibility of transforming Education as we 
know it.   
                                                 
10 Unger (2013) wrote “incurgence” (sic) when I believe, given the text that follows, that he meant 




Collective Intelligence:  




It is Lévy’s (1997, 2015; Peters, 2015b) work with collective intelligence that 
makes it possible to think of open and social innovation as a concept for how 
students co-create in an open source learning environment. Is it possible to say 
such a thing – that innovation can be thought of as a form of co-creation? The 
merit of this initial statement falls on the necessary distinction Lévy makes 
between the commodity space and the knowledge space and the different goods – 
commercial goods and human qualities – that these learning spaces produce. This 
chapter explores how open and social innovation in student learning can be 
thought to produce human qualities and, in doing this, considers the implications 
for this development in Education. The discussion in this chapter explores a new 
approach to innovation and Education. Three issues are tackled: How Lévy’s 
thinking overcomes Heidegger’s with regard to the subject’s relationship to 
technology; how collaboration and competition need to be reconsidered when 
Education is thought of in terms of the formation of collective intelligence; and 
how the commodity and knowledge spaces need to be thought with respect to 
rethinking innovation such that what is thought of as an individual activity (see 
Chapter Seven) can be rethought of as a collective activity.   
 
10.1 
Collective intelligence in education 
The impetus to break with the present model of education expresses a desire to 
show how collective intelligence, as a conceptual context for learning, asks new 
questions about how significant problems facing the global community might be 
more effectively addressed.11 Framing these questions requires the overcoming of 
                                                 
11 As highlighted elsewhere in the thesis. 
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a methodological problem with respect to how Lévy’s thinking might otherwise 
be interpreted. On the one hand, it might be tempting to describe Lévy’s (1997, 
2015a; Peters, 2015b) work as expressing a political and social innovation that 
theorizes and exposits the future challenges and benefits of collective intelligence. 
Lévy can be seen to do this through his drawing on an epistemology that explains 
the influence of neoliberal economics on contemporary Education.  To draw this 
conclusion would be to interpret his work as representing an attempt to reform the 
present system; an interpretation that, on its own, would be unfair on Lévy.  
On the other hand, Lévy’s (1997, 2015a; Peters, 2015b) work also 
represents something more than mere political and social innovation for the 
reason that it also speaks to an anthropological collaboration that breaks with the 
fetishism with incremental models of innovative thinking that neoliberalism relies 
upon to further commercialize its interests in Education. This latter aspect of 
Lévy’s thinking speaks to a need to create an alternative understanding of how 
collective intelligence might inform the purpose and process of education; one 
that, for example, acknowledges the value of the commodity space while 
theoretically and practically positioning this space in a subordinate role to the 
knowledge space.    
What grounds these two above perspectives is the idea that Lévy’s 
methodology neither seeks to reform the existing system being reliant upon the 
value of a commodity space nor seeks to propose an alternative to education 
being conducted in a commodity space. It would seem that what he proposes is 
something that involves an allegiance to both forms of thinking; “the break that is 
not a break” (see Foucault, 1989). To iterate, the commodity space continues to be 
relevant but sits beneath the knowledge space – the former maintaining its 
relevance in as much as it provides freedom for the latter to be responsible for 
setting the objectives of education.  
It is with this concept of a relationship between the commodity space and 
the knowledge space that Lévy’s concept of collective intelligence will be briefly 
examined. Since the publication of Collective Intelligence: Mankind’s emerging 
world of cyberspace (1997), Lévy’s research has progressed significantly with 
respect to how this development might be understood by stakeholders (see Lévy, 
2015; Peters, 2015b). Lévy’s understanding of collective intelligence has been 
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described in various ways. In Collective Intelligence: Mankind’s emerging world 
of cyberspace (1997), Lévy defines collective intelligence as 
… a form of universally distributed intelligence, constantly 
enhances, coordinated in real time, and resulting from the 
effective mobility of skills. (p. 13, emphasis in original) 
To this definition, Lévy (1997) highlights what he calls 
The basis and goal of collective intelligence is the mutual 
recognition and enrichment of individuals rather than the cult of 
fetishized or hypostatized communities. (p. 13) 
On his institutional webpage, Lévy (2013) defines collective intelligence as 
… the capacity of human communities to co-operate 
intellectually in creation, innovation and invention. As our 
society becomes more and more knowledge-dependent, this 
collective ability becomes of fundamental importance. It is 
therefore vital to understand, among other things, how collective 
intelligence processes can be expanded by digital networks. It is 
one of the keys to success for modern societies.  
In an interview with Peters (2015b), Lévy defines collective intelligence as: 
… scientific, technical and political project that aims to make 
people smarter with computers instead of trying to make 
computers smarter than people. So, collective intelligence is 
neither the opposite of collective stupidity nor the opposite of 
individual intelligence. It is the opposite of artificial 
intelligence. It is a way to grow a renewed human/cultural 
cognitive system by exploiting our increasing computing power 
and our ubiquitous memory. (p. 4, emphasis in original)12 
The rest of this section will consider these descriptions of collective intelligence 
in relation to two factors that Lévy’s (1997, 2015; Peters, 2015b) descriptions 
appear to overcome: (1) Heidegger’s (1977) understanding that human beings are 
enframed by the essence of technology, and (2) a colloquial understanding that 
collective intelligence necessarily involves competition between individuals as a 
fundamental factor in collaborative behaviour (see, for example, ‘Collective 
Intelligence’, 2016).   
 
                                                 
12 Further description by Lévy (2015) of collective intelligence and what this means in education 




Collective intelligence and Heidegger’s question concerning technology 
To understand how Lévy appears to have deviated from Heidegger’s analysis of 
our relationship with technology, it is first necessary to refer to what Heidegger 
(1977) means by enframing. Heidegger has the following to say:  
The essence of technology lies in Enframing. Its holding sway 
belongs within destining. Since destining at any given time 
starts man on a way of revealing, man, thus under way, is 
continually approaching the brink of the possibility of pursuing 
and pushing forward nothing but what is revealed in ordering, 
and of deriving all his standards on this basis. Through this, the 
other possibility is blocked, that man might be admitted more 
and sooner and ever more primally to the essence of that which 
is unconcealed and to its unconcealment, in order that he might 
experience as his essence his needed belonging to revealing.  
Placed between these possibilities, man is endangered from out 
of destining. The destining of revealing is as such, in every one 
of its modes, and therefore necessarily, danger.   
… 
The destining of revealing is no itself not just any danger, but 
danger as such. (1977, p. 26) 
… 
But Enframing does not simply endanger man in his relationship 
to himself and to everything that is. As a destining, it banishes 
man into that kind of revealing which is an ordering. Where his 
ordering holds sway, it drives out every other possibility of 
revealing. (1977, p. 27) 
… 
What is dangerous is not technology. There is no demonry of 
technology, but rather there is the mystery of its essence. The 
essence of technology, as a destining of revealing, is the danger. 
(1977, p. 28) 
Heidegger (1977) clearly leads us to understand that there is no escape from the 
enframing that comes as a consequence of man’s relationship with the mystery of 
the essence of technology. The consequence of this enframing is that all forms of 
revealing that do not have to do with the ordering, which technology so ably 
makes possible, are banished and made inaccessible. How then does Lévy 
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theoretically overcome this enframing, such that he is able to propose that 
collective intelligence should credibly be a project “that aims to make people 
smarter than computers” (Peters, 2015b, p. 4)? How is it possible that students can 
go beyond the limits of this self-enframing such that they are able to belong to 
their revealing (as does a dramatic actor) such that they draw from what might 
otherwise have been concealed from others? It would appear that the advent of the 
internet and the possibility of peer-to-peer relations across a dispersed network 
have facilitated the reversal of the resolution of an ancient political problem. To 
illustrate this point, it will be necessary to first explain how Arendt (1998) 
understands the nature of this ancient problem and then how Plato (2001) is said 
to have proposed the means to resolving it.  
According to Arendt (1998), the problem of the plurality of society in Ancient 
Greece before the formation of the monarchy as a formation of governance was 
always brought to a head in the context of a calamity. It such situations, it was the 
temptation of “men of action” and “men of thought” … “to find a substitute for 
action in the hope that the realm of human affairs may escape the haphazardness 
and moral irresponsibility in a plurality of agents” (p. 220). This substitute was 
configured according to the following theoretical understanding:  
… Plato opens a gulf between the two modes of action, archein 
and prattein (“beginning” and “achieving”), which according to 
Greek understanding were interconnected. The problem, as Plato 
saw it, was to make sure that the beginner would remain the 
complete master of what he had begun, and not needing the help 
of others to carry it through. In the realm of action, this isolated 
mastership can be achieved only if the others are no longer 
needed to join the enterprise of their own accord, with their own 
motives and aims, but are used to execute orders, and if, on the 
other hand, the beginner who took the initiative does not permit 
himself to get involved in the action itself. To begin (archein) 
and to act (prattein) thus can become two altogether different 
activities, and the beginner has become the ruler (in the twofold 
sense of the word) who “does not have to act at all (prattein), 
but rules (archein) over those who are capable of execution”. 
Under these circumstances, the essence of politics is “to know 
how to begin and rule in the gravest matter with regard to 
timeliness and untimeliness”; action as such is entirely 
eliminated and has become the mere “execution of orders”.  
(Arendt, 1998, pp. 222-223) 
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According to Arendt (1998),  
Plato was the first to introduce the division between those who 
know and do not act and those who act and do not know, instead 
of the old articulation of action into beginning and achievement, 
so that knowing what to do and doing it became two altogether 
alternative performances. (p. 223)  
What is significant about the separation of action into performative roles is that, 
irrespective of whether or not there was a calamity, this manner of governing 
action came to be adopted in all human activity. In the educational institution, this 
is such that students, in their day-to-day routines, hold teachers responsible for 
initiating activities such that students can transmit the impression that they believe 
they can only learn from by executing what has been initiated by the teacher and 
without asking the purpose of these activities.13 
So, just taking the situation of the student, it might be tempting, with the 
introduction of the internet, to interpret this embedded tradition of insisting upon 
the division of roles as a tradition that should continue to be manifest in student 
peer-to-peer relations across the dispersed network – that there should be those 
“who know and do not act and those who act and do not know” (Arendt, 1998, p. 
223). It would be logical that the student who has been historically constituted in a 
regime where action was implicitly understood as most meaningfully governed 
through a separation of the performative roles and that this tradition should 
continue irrespective of the context of the student’s learning. However, Lévy’s 
(1997, 2015) thinking presumes a sharp break with this tradition with a 
characterization which, in effect, supposes a reversal of Plato’s resolution of the 
original problem. On reflection, this sharp break has in itself its own logic. In 
Peters’ (2015b) interview of Lévy, Lévy alludes to his Masters’ research when 
supervised by the Greek philosopher Cornelius Castoriadis, whose “thinking 
revolved around the idea of historical creation: the surprising emergence of new 
natural and cultural forms that could not be deduced from previous facts and 
logical thinking” (p. 3, emphasis in original). 
So how does this new cultural form of collective intelligence manifest 
itself as a reversal of Plato’s solution, in terms of how it could be said to address 
                                                 
13 Bingham and Biesta’s (2010) critique of progressive education can be seen to clearly articulate 
this delineation of roles.  
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the same problem? The plurality that was a problem in the moment of calamity in 
Ancient Greece (see Arendt, 1998) is a different sort of problem for the state 
today. While the contemporary subject can be considered to be over-governed 
(Arendt, 1998), as if morally responsible and rational behaviour, to paraphrase 
Arendt’s words, can only be administered from above, democracy takes a new 
turn and one for the better with the advent and use of social media platforms and 
new ICTs in general. When democracy is administered from above, the timing of 
this administration – new developments, press releases, the management of 
conflicts, etcetera – are always when possible strategically admitted to the public 
domain; that is, to the benefit of the party in power. This strategic use of the way 
information is disseminated has the effect of excluding the plurality of citizens 
from democratic debate and participation in decision-making. What social media 
platforms and new ICTs (for example, Android and Mobile APPs) do is facilitate 
the mobility of democratic participation from below; from the public realm. This 
reversal of the resolution of the problem Plato addressed and the creation of “the 
division between those who know and do not act and those who act and do not 
know” is made possible in the context of the use of social media platforms 
through the collapse of this division of roles. Everyone who uses these 
technologies is free to both initiate and execute – to begin and achieve – for 
themselves and without reliance upon the directive of executive power.  
This collapsing of the division of roles is much more radical than might 
immediately be obvious. The Internet, social media platforms, relations across a 
dispersed network, the use of APPs and other features associated with the habitus 
of new technologies do not oblige students to collapse the division between these 
roles – it is still possible to continue a default to this historical division of either 
initiating or executing but this would be entirely counter-intuitive to optimum use 
of the attributes of this new form of learning, social and professional engagement. 
It is more intuitive for the individual subject to not only initiate things for 
themselves, but also to carry out what they initiate and  also potentially re-
interpret what they initially decided to do and to continue but in a manner that was 
unanticipated. Likewise, on accepting a command initiated by another individual, 
it is not only more intuitive to reinterpret the command of the other, and, as such, 
to re-initiate the original act as if it were now an action that expresses the will of 
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the subject, but it is also more intuitive to consider the other a collaborator rather 
that an agent defined by the parameters of their position in the hierarchy.  
In summary, the technological attributes that characterize the use of the 
Internet, social media platforms, the dispersed network, APPs etcetera, facilitate 
the development of a new relation with the essence of technology and hence 
possibilities for new forms of relations with all other subjects the student interacts 
with. This development represents a fundamental change in the subject’s 
disposition such that their creativity and use of these technologies leaves the 
Cartesian separation of subject and object, making practice an action that needs to 
be theorized such that it becomes particular to the moment and the subjective 
interests of the individual. It is in this context that human qualities are said to 
develop in the way that Lévy (1997) describes as emergence. This will be 
discussed in more detail later in the chapter.     
Before moving to the next section, it would seem useful to provide an 
historical example of how new technologies facilitate the expression of self-
responsibility. This example involves the uncovering of an attempt by executive 
power to disguise the real nature of a real calamity and how collaboration and 
democratic participation changed the course of history. This example involves the 
use of mobile phone SMS (short messages service) technologies in the days 
running up to the Spanish elections in 2004 (Suárez, 2006). On March 11 that 
year, 192 people were killed and 1,800 were wounded in explosions set off in two 
trains approaching Atocha Railway Station, Madrid (‘Atocha’, 2016). The Partido 
Popular (the Popular Party or the PP) was seeking another term in office and 
promoted the notion that these explosions were terrorist acts perpetrated by the 
Basque separatist and terrorist organisation ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna or 
Basque Country and Freedom) (Suárez, 2006). Without social media and the use 
of SMS, the PP might have gained another term in office. The PP was keen to 
leverage the idea that Spain’s participation in the war in Iraq brought no danger to 
the Spain state, despite the fact that an informal public referendum had recorded 
that 90% of the Spanish public wanted its troops brought home. Those in favour 
of a change in power in Spain picked the PP’s rouse, thinking that those 
responsible for the bombings were not in fact ETA but were terrorists sympathetic 
to Al Qaeda, which later proved to be the case. In order to swing public support 
behind the opposition’s objections to PP’s manipulation of public ignorance 
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through use of the press, young voters began to use mobile SMS as a means of 
telling a different story such that the PSOE (the Partido Socialista Obrero 
Español or the Spanish Socialist Labour Party) achieved an upset election victory. 
The critical factor here was that the explosions took place on March 10, which is 
to say only three days before the elections on March 14. This meant public 
participation had to be spontaneous such that democracy in Lévy’s (1997) words 
would happen in “real time”. This real time democratic participation could only 
happen in these circumstances through the use of such new technologies. Suárez 
(2006) suggests that without the use of SMS, there would not have been sufficient 
participation in the election to force a change of power and, as such, would not 
have overcome the “haphazardness and moral irresponsibility” of executive 
behaviour that the ancient Greeks associated with the plurality of agents. 
 
10.1.2 
Collective intelligence and competition in the education setting 
Given the recent emergence of an interest in collective intelligence (see Peters & 
Heraud, 2015), it would seem reasonable to begin the critique of the role of 
competition in collective intelligence using a Wikipedia definition. The entry 
begins: 
Collective intelligence is shared or group intelligence that 
emerges from the collaboration, collective efforts, and 
competition of many individuals and appears in consensus. The 
term appears in socio-biology, political science and in context of 
mass peer review and crowd sourcing applications. It may 
involve consensus, social capital and formalisms such as voting 
systems, social media and other means of quantifying mass 
activity. Collective IQ is a measure of collective intelligence, 
although it is often used interchangeably with the term collective 
intelligence. Collective intelligence has also been attributed to 
bacteria and animals. (‘Collective Intelligence’, 2016) 
 
If this is a popular definition, it becomes important to think in these terms for 
reason that if intelligence is ubiquitous, then the concept implies that collective 
intelligence must be considered as needing to embrace participation that takes its 
actions beyond the parameters of academic work. It is in this broader realm of 
thought that truth should be contested. There are two aspects of this definition that 
highlight the difference between how the authors of this Wikipedia entry (and by 
200 
association wider public) think about collective intelligence and Lévy’s (1997, 
2015; Peters, 2015b) own concept of collective intelligence. One is the idea that 
competition is important to collective intelligence and the other is the idea that 
collective intelligence is best understood through how it is exhibited in 
commercial behaviour in both the consumer and producer (‘Collective 
Intelligence’, 2016). Both these ideas are problematic. 
Both these ideas will be dealt with together, as they are intrinsically 
related. If “collective intelligence is shared or group intelligence that emerges 
from the collaboration, collective efforts, and competition of many individuals” 
(‘Collective Intelligence’, 2016), it needs to be asked whether it is plausible that 
collective intelligence can be thought of as both collaborative and the 
consequence of competition. If collective intelligence cannot be thought of in this 
way, then how should these approaches to thinking and acting in collective 
settings be separated from one another so as not to be understood contradictory. 
Competition is thought of as an expression of will that “to improves the breed”, 
[by] delivering more value to customers by forcing businesses to look for new 
ways of gaining competitive advantage” (Spender, 2014, p. 23). Equally, it could 
be argued that collaboration improves the breed, although it would not be 
surprising to find that competition is understood to be more effective in achieving 
this objective; an understanding that has its epistemological roots in Darwin’s 
(2009) concept of the survival of the fittest. As such, competition would seem to 
offer limited value to collective intelligence in that the extent of its optimum value 
can only be expressed, according to Spender’s definition, in terms of consumer 
satisfaction, which in itself cannot be thought of as an optimum expression of 
intelligence per se. Intelligence, when put at the service of being competitive, 
means being “strategic” (Porter, 1998), which furthermore implies a rivalry 
between competitors. This behaviour, in order to succeed must exclude interest in 
collaborating with others who have like interests – entering the same market at the 
same price – meaning that this behaviour cannot be collective and therefore 
collectively intelligent without compromising the business’ competitive 
advantage. 
Lévy (1997) discusses this issue – the distinction between competitive and 
collaborative action – in terms of power and strength. Lévy uses the terms power 
and strength to distinguish between the dynamic that is asserted from above, 
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which is “power over society” – a form of “totalitarianism” (p. 82) – and where 
collaboration involves “the communication of the community with itself, … [and] 
knowledge of the community’s self”, respectively. While, Foucault (1977, 1990), 
the most prominent contemporary philosopher of power, says that power does not 
only come from above, but from everywhere, Lévy (1997) seems to have further 
theorized power in forming his concept of strength. In as much as collective 
intelligence is thought to be “constantly enhanced” (p. 14), a “real-time co-
ordination” and involve the “effective mobilization of skills” (p. 15), the 
facilitation of the subjective implication of other individuals in collective 
projects” forms a dynamic power of community. 
The competitive and collaborative actions that occur as a consequence of 
the power and strength that characterize these two dynamics have their own 
distinctive forms of thinking about the value of knowledge. While it is at this 
point that the discussion needs to acknowledge how Lévy (1997) distinguishes 
between the commodity space and the knowledge space, this aspect of the 
discussion will be addressed in the next section. What remains to be discussed in 
this section is how Lévy thinks of time in relation to the dynamics of competition 
and collaboration. 
          Lévy (1997) understands time in terms of its capacity to facilitate 
democracy. Lévy understands that there is  
… [a] real-time mechanism for direct democracy in cyberspace 
[that] would allow everyone to help and refine shared problems 
on a continuous basis, introduce new questions, construct new 
arguments, and formulate independent positions on a wide range 
of topics. (p. 65) 
Lévy (1997) is speaking about society in general and not the student cohort. 
However, his argument applies to students and their right to question existing and 
promoted notions of institutional innovation, commercial innovation, the 
institution’s notion of collective intelligence, and open and social innovation, let 
alone the problems upon which world events pivot and flounder. Cyberspace 
already includes students in as much as it makes their refinement of an 
understanding of problems possible, is as much as they are likely to introduce new 
questions, which in turn drive them to construct new arguments and formulate 
independent positions. 
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          Lévy (1997) continues:  
Together citizens would elaborate a diverse political landscape 
that was not preconstrained by the gapping molar separation 
among different parties. (p. 65)14 
Students can already be intuited to elaborate, as a cohort, their political landscape, 
if not by reacting with a specific political strategy then nevertheless through the 
way that governance invites individuals to consider being governed from the point 
of view of the extent to which their thinking diverges from the preconstrained 
tyranny of ideas; ideas that are mechanically re-explained in the pretence that 
knowledge is constructed in some concrete and assessable manner. The molar 
separation among different parties that Lévy (1997) refers to here would not refer 
to gapping political gaps in the student cohort but to gapping political gaps that 
separate student and teacher cohorts – a gap that can easily be glossed over, as if 
its absurdity does not also speak for the paradox that has been spoken about 
throughout this investigation: the paradox of the already innovative student.      
          Continuing with Lévy (1997),  
The political identity of the citizens would be defined by their 
contributions to the construction of a political landscape that 
was perpetually in flux and by their support for various 
problems … positions … and arguments. In this way everyone 
would have a completely unique political identity and role, 
distinct from any other individual, coupled with the possibility 
of working with others having similar or complementary 
positions of a given subject, at a given moment. (p. 65) 
While the already innovative student might have an implicit appreciation of the 
value of being anticipated in their needs to be politically diverse as an individual 
within the cohort and in relation to the curriculum (both the how and the what)15, 
for such an approach as Lévy’s (1997) to work in Education, it would seem that 
the curriculum would need to both be interdisciplinary and assessed according to 
real-time problems upon which world events continue to pivot and flounder.  
          These are the conditions that can be said to provide the theoretical fabric for 
how Lévy (1997) might describe the development of democracy in Education. At 
                                                 
14 According to Lévy (1997), molar technologies, when operated in relation to the control of living 
species – in this context, students – refers to “Finalization”, “Historic time” and “Operates on 
entire populations” (See Table, p. 41, The Major Technological Evolutions).     
15  See Egan (1978). 
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the heart of the problem of collective intelligence is what Lévy calls “real-time 
democracy” (pp. 76-82).  
As it is most commonly understood, democracy can be 
contrasted with the arbitrary nature of tyranny or the power of a 
minority; it posits a system of laws that are valid for everyone 
and determined by all (or at least by a majority). This implies 
that the goal of democracy is to realize and preserve the 
autonomy of a group of citizens: the polis establishes its own 
laws. (p. 78) 
While Lévy is not specifically speaking about the politics of collective 
intelligence in Education, and even if the politics of education were such that 
students are not credited with comprising a polis in their own right, they are now 
working in conditions that anyway foster this orientation towards real-time 
democracy. While it is rare in this age of the commercial educational institution 
that students should even be permitted to express their voice on the institution’s 
executive, they are consolidating a new form of political life. This brings the 
discussion to the question of autonomy, which is a topic that will be addressed in 
the Conclusion to the thesis. 
 
10.2 
Knowledge and human qualities 
In Chapter Seven ‘The Subject of innovation/The Innovative Subject, Lévy’s 
(1997) concepts of the commodity space and the knowledge space were 
introduced to the thesis argument. These two learning spaces were examined at 
that moment in the discussion for how their distinctive ontologies make it possible 
to contrast the situation of the individual, as a subject of innovation, with the 
situation of the individual, as an innovative subject. Particular to that discussion 
was the question of what these two spaces of learning suppose for the subject as 
an individual; which is to say, how the student, as homo economicus, and how the 
student, as an already innovative individual, make use or do not make use of their 
possibilities to learn. In this section, these learning spaces are contrasted in 
relation to how they might be experienced in collaborative learning.  
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10.2.1 
The commodity space and collaborative learning 
Much of the problem of distinguishing between the commodity space and the 
knowledge space, as two learning spaces, rests on the status ascribed to 
knowledge, in each space, and what this means for the constitution of the 
innovative subject. The limits ascribed to knowledge in the commodity space are 
perhaps best understood when the commodity space is reverse-engineered. By 
beginning with a positive evaluation of knowledge and the possibility for the 
formation of innovative subjectivities, in the form that these values have been 
acquired in a study of the knowledge space, the merits of the commodity space as 
an end in itself have to be questioned. In fact, there are a series of questions that 
should trouble the argument that defends the commodity space as an end. For 
example, it might be asked: (1) what does collaboration refer to in the commodity 
space? (2) What would it mean to rely on the commodity space for the formation 
of human qualities? (3) What is the fate of the concept of innovation in the 
commodity space, if innovation is to serve addressing anything other than 
commercial interest, for example, a problem that is characterized by a lack of 
social implication in problems that become structural to the detriment of others? 
The is no adequate space here to address these questions in any depth.  
Lévy (1997), begins with the statement that “[t]he information society is a 
trap” (p. 31), when speaking of human qualities in the economy of collective 
intelligence, Lévy is quick to highlight that, while it might be thought that all 
economic activity is driven by information processing, there is a limit to the extent 
to which society can be automated. He asks:  
What remains after we have mechanized agriculture, industry 
and messaging technologies? The economy will centre, as it 
does already, on that which can never be fully automated, on 
that which is irreducible: the production of the social bond, the 
relational. This implies not only an economy of knowledge but a 
more general, human economy, one that comprises the economy 
of knowledge as one of its subsystems. (1997, p. 31) 
Collaboration and collaborative innovation in the commodity space might thus be 
examined from the perspective that all activity could be considered to being 
reducible to being fully automated. The end here is not “the human as an end in 
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itself” (Lévy, 1997, p. 32) – as the will towards collective intelligence supposes it 
should be. So when the end in itself is automation, what is collaboration between 
students on social media platforms and the dispersed network on the Internet? If 
the social cannot be relational between peers, the social bond cannot be with other 
students but must be between students and the institution.  
Here, the subject is constituted according to his or her will to accept the 
institution’s own strategic approach to innovation without differing to the self; the 
relation with the self is given up. As Lévy says, “[i]n the commodity space there 
is no longer any possibility of fixing positions … within the system. Everything is 
in circulation; everything is in a state of flux” (p. 189). “Individualities … [are] 
lumped together in a single mass” (p. 190). In this context, human qualities that 
result from “mutual recognition and the enrichment of individuals” (p. 13) are 
prescribed from above through the politics of education, the institution’s 
management of its commercial interests and the curriculum itself. This would 
appear to be done in such a way as to protect a very specific understanding of 
what innovation should mean: that innovation is uniquely commercial and 
technological. As such, the key competencies are about fostering inclusion 
without real participation.  
 
10.2.2 
The knowledge space and collaborative learning 
Lévy writes in 1997 – nearly 20 years ago – that the knowledge space does not yet 
exist, that it is “a u-topia”, a “no-place” (1997, p. 138). However, today it can be 
argued here that the knowledge space can be seen to emerge in the use of social 
media platforms and dispersed networks in the education sector. Of course, as 
Lévy says, “the knowledge space is still subject to capital’s need of competition 
and calculation, it is subordinate to the objectives of power and the bureaucratic 
management of the state” (in which we should include educational institutions), 
but the commodity space does not prevail in all contexts. Collective intelligence 
can be thought to be afoot for reason of the nature of social relations responsible 
for the development of new communities. A good example in education is the 
frequent setting up of Facebook web-pages by students to discuss course content. 
There discussions are not initiated or directed from above and can theoretically 
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only be thought to survive on account of the development of new human qualities; 
qualities that stand in for the obsolete hierarchical direction upon which dialogue 
previously depended. The quality that is initially most likely to dominate these 
collective interactions is likely to be “listening” (see Lévy, 1997, pp. 70-71).  
This new horizon in the form of what Lévy (1997) calls the knowledge 
space, is new and will appear new in the covert interactions of students in three 
aspects of student learning:  
the rate of evolution of knowledge, the number of people who 
will be asked to learn and produce new forms of knowledge, and 
… the appearance of new tools (cyberspatial tools) capable of 
bring forth … unknown and distinct landscapes, singular 
identities characteristic of this space, new socio-historical 
figures. (1997, p. 8) 
However rapidly the rate of the evolution of knowledge has developed since the 
writing of Lévy’s (1997) text, in order to understand the situation of students and 
their impetus to collaborate in their own community, becomes “a knowledge-of-
living, a living-in-knowledge” (p. 139). The reason for this is that ascribed 
knowledge frameworks, as promoted in the politics of education, are no longer 
sufficient in the situation of students confronting the absurdity of the relationship 
between consciousness and the concept of the world that Education teaches them. 
If this is hard to imagine and therefore not seemingly credible, one would only 
need to question the extent to which it is thought that students overcome what 
Lévy considers to be “the main problem of the knowledge space” (p. 190). Are 
students able to “organize the organizing, [to] objectivize the subjectivizing”? It is 
claimed here that the possibility of communities of collective intelligence 
sustaining their community and activities would not be possible if these provisos 
were not already mastered in some minimum manner.  
 
Conclusion 
So what of the innovative subject as collaborative student and actor in collective 
intelligence? As highlighted in Chapter Three, Innovator/Entrepreneur’, the 
innovative individual who innovates is first described in significant detail in 
Drucker’s The landmarks of tomorrow (1959), a text that is also significant for 
Drucker’s early mention of the importance of knowledge to the innovation 
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process. This would seem an opportune moment to revisit Drucker’s description 
of innovation with a view to exploring how collaborative innovation might be 
understood to occur in the knowledge space.  
The first aspect of this description has to do with Drucker’s (1959) notion 
that innovation involves the bedding in of a universal vision. What is significant 
about this idea of the purpose of innovation is that society as a whole has been 
asked to implicate itself in a vision and to form itself according to a purpose that 
has been predetermined by those few who drive political economy from above. 
This is to say, this vision for the purpose of innovation was not collectively 
designed. Collective intelligence cannot be directed from above (Lévy, 1997). To 
this effect, innovation is going to have a much broader and richer role in the 
knowledge space.  
The second aspect of Drucker’s (1959) description that is of particular 
importance to this investigation is captured in the following text:              
Innovation, as we now use the term, is based on the systematic, 
organized leap into the unknown. Its aim is to give us new 
power for action through a new capacity to see, a new vision. Its 
tools are scientific; but its process is of the imagination, its 
method the organization of ignorance rather than that of known 
facts. (1959, p. 13) 
So, if innovation is not to be initiated and directed from above, if it can be both 
“initiated” and “achieved” (Arendt, 1998) by multiple collaborative subjects, then 
it is initiated and achieved through the organizing collective leaps; that is where 
the organizing of the organizing, as a problem of the knowledge space, becomes a 
collective strategy for addressing the unknown. This new power of action, as that 
which occurs through a new capacity, is not imbued in the individual by a fixed 
idea but is one that is discovered and critiqued by multiple collaborative 
innovators. Furthermore, in the knowledge space, the value of organizing 
ignorance is recovered such that the problem of the strategy of using scientific 
tools in a process that always requires imagination is problematized such that it 
becomes credible that innovation might address problems besides those that are 





Making an argument for why the situation of the already innovative subject in 
Education needs to be understood to the benefit of the individual, Education and 
society required an investigation into how the concept of innovation itself is 
currently understood. Innovation is not merely technological innovation. In an age 
in which innovation is dominated by the protagonism of ideas, people, and things, 
innovation is also always in some way political. What this means in Education is 
that the formation of innovation subjectivities is always accompanied by the 
formation of political subjectivities – subjectivities that find their way to 
interacting across open social digitally mediated spaces. As such, the relationship 
between the formation of thought and the possibility of new actions in relation to 
real problems of the world is undergoing a profound process of transformation. 
The question in this investigation centred on the paradoxical of the situation of the 
innovative subject in Education. The purpose of examining this paradox was to 
identify how the domain of this subject’s experience of their education – thought 
of here as a black box – might enable the theorization of the actor’s role in the 
process of innovaton, such that students could be valued as not just participants in 
innovation, but as contributors to change. By contributors to change, it is meant 
that the ideation that characterizes their learning should be linked to, focused on 
and assessed in relation to real problems of the world. Students not only want to 
enjoy the freedom of engagement with the world afforded them by new ICTs, 
APPs and AI in the form of social platforms and networked information 
economies, their collective creativity in relation to existing historical problems 
supposes, new interpretations, new questions, new practices, new strategies and 
new forms of engagement. Leveraging this discussion around the theoretical 
significance of already innovative subject in Education supposes a series of 
questions across a broad domain of interest, principally because the application of 
innovation in Education is ends oriented and closed to new thinking. This 
challenge to how innovation is understood begs many questions across a broad 
domain of inquiry.  
Many questions needed to be passed over; questions such as: whether the 
theory of human capital is only supporting innovation promoted by neo-
conservative interests or whether it extends to capacitate students to create 
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innovations capable of disrupting and transforming the hypostasized foundations 
of Education; the role of endogenous necessity in the growth of heuristic learners; 
the relationship between politics and innovation at the level of subjective 
experience in the age of people, ideas and things; ideation in student innovation; 
how innovation might be thought of when its political, social and technological 
aspects contribute simultaneously rather than sequentially; the significance of 
entrepreneurship in collaborative networked information economies; the way 
invention and innovation might be thought of in these networks when roles 
frequently interchange; the value of the collective black box as a metaphor for 
addressing the significance of tacit knowledge and how this contributes to the 
formation of collective intelligence; the politics of innovation in education and the 
creation of the new worker; the politics of research in innovation and the conflict 
between interests in technological change and technological innovation; the 
usefulness of paradox as a means for analyzing closed institutional dispositions to 
the endogenous necessity of learning and being create; the divisive role STEM 
subjects play in stifling innovative thinking; and so on. The point is, once 
philosophical empathy is shown for the paradoxical situation of the student, let 
alone the already innovative subject, institutional practices, habits, conventions, 
traditions, protocols, regulations and so on, become secondary to the cost that 
these constraints impose on the student. If these phenomena stifle the formation of 
innovative subjectivities, then what is their collective purpose? 
To take the question a little further, why is this the moment when we 
should see the above concerns in the light of the paradoxical situation of the 
already innovative subject in Education? Why does the experience of the already 
innovative student make this individual a key actor if not the key actor with 
respect to how Education will now need serve the future? The simple answer is 
that the student cohort’s algorithmic understanding of their relationship to 
opportunities is better suited to the role that innovation is beginning to play in the 
development of the cognitive capitalism that will govern future economic activity.   
In doing this investigation, it becomes important to speak of the future. 
The future will not involve an enhancement of what already exists and in this 
sense it will not be a product of innovation as routine as that which Schumpeter 
(as cited in Stinchcombe, 1990) was already speaking about in the 1940s. The 
foundations of such a fantasy have already eroded beyond possible recovery. The 
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future will comprise a series of opportunities that allude to the possibility of a 
whole new range of developments that will come through disruptive actions. In 
the theoretical sphere, these new developments will occur because existing 
problems will require new questions – the old ones, from the perspective of the 
already innovative student, have exhausted their value. In this way, the future is 
comprised of actions that address problems, actions that began their formation in 
an education system that is yet to understand the value of the knowledge space 
that enables students to work as individuals and as a collective, such that their 
learning contributes to the radical innovation processes that will now be required. 
The problems that students engage with do not need explaining. If we are already 
in the throws of the most monumental cultural shift in human experience (see 
Peters, 2016) on account of the our transition into the cyber-physical industrial 
revolution (Bloem, et al., 2014), the change in the big picture supposes questions 
relating to what is important to our collective survival. If, within 20 years, 50% of 
the population have lost their jobs to AI and a range of robots that are more 
capable than our species, the upheaval brought about by the first industrial 
revolution does not even come close to what will now unfold.     
Put in other words, why of all questions that could have been asked about 
the importance of innovation to Education does the fate of the subject of 
innovation become the significant question that needs to be asked? Because if the 
use of new ICTs in schools facilitates the development of collective intelligence, 
as Lévy was already speaking about in the 1990s, then the power of collective 
intelligence depends upon an education system that encourages the development 
of innovative subjectivities. The danger is that the Education system instead forms 
subjects of innovation who end up being nothing more than a further mutation of 
homo economicus. While the latter might be thought of, in Thatcher’s language 
(1988, as cited in Dardot & Laval, 2013), as the captured souls of neoliberal 
economics, in the context of this discussion every child and every young person is 
thought of as a subject ready to leap in response to the freedom of thought that 
new actions demand. The child and the young person may not be ready to leap, 
today or tomorrow, but this is not the point. The point is that they are thought of 
as being ready to leap. As such, every subject of innovation is an innovative 
subject and an individual with capabilities of taking new and unforeseen 
initiatives in their learning and in relation to real (local) problems in the world. 
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So what was learned during this investigation? 
When standard economics treats the process of innovation as a black box, 
it creates a climate of theoretical confusion in Education for all innovative 
subjects who already have a wider understanding of the concept of innovation. A 
wider understanding of innovation supposes knowledge of the political and social 
aspects of the innovation process; aspects of innovation that are neither modeled 
by commercial management’s innovative activities nor made explicit in the 
Innovation Studies literature that informs policy and how innovation is understood 
by students and researchers. In as much as this confusion is sustained, a paradox is 
produced in the situation of the already innovative subject. The reason for this 
paradox is that combinatory capacities in students that are expressed in their 
curiosity about the world, their newfound autonomy that comes from being 
answerable to their own ethics in networked information economies and their 
constitution of relations that are collective, problem-oriented and focused on new 
areas of ideation cannot be commensurable with institutional innovation. This 
incommensurability exists on account of the institution’s micro-management of 
changes in its productive function, which as a practice prohibits student 
participation beyond their inactive populating of institutional processes of 
innovation. The already innovative subject has already broken with or will soon 
break with the institutional model and the tutelage that this closed model of 
learning offers. Yes the institution is open to bringing in academics, management 
and new knowledge from outside but while this seems like a positive initiative, it 
betrays the institution’s bent towards exogenously stimulated growth. If the 
institution were open in a manner that recognized the extensive endogenous 
resources and new processes of ideation in student learning and student innovative 
activity, it might be hoped that it would also openly explore new forms of 
collaborative relations with students.  
Without this initiative, educational institutions are prone to becoming 
homogenous, hypostasized, ever-more conservative, and enhancing in their 
practice of that which is already in decay. If this seems a strong criticism, it is 
intended to be, for reason that more than anything else, a thesis should use the 
fullness of the value of language to make its argument heard. If these implications 
are not heeded, the danger is that already innovative subjects in tertiary education 
will begin to think of the institution as pimping students, from the point of view 
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that the benefit of acquiring human capital can be seen as principally benefitting 
the institution. To students, such an operation is insidious and in particular when 
they consider the every greater possibility that unemployment awaits them in 
occupations that have historically been the conduit for career development.  
 
The questions that remain unaddressed in this investigation are particularly 
important to the thesis argument in that the argument itself could never address all 
the features of the discussion. Such an approach was necessary because arguing 
for profound change and the need for both Education and society to address the 
role of the innovative subject in relation to future challenges. Some of these 
questions were highlighted in the range of topics identified in the second 
paragraph of this chapter. However, there are a range of questions and problems 
that specifically relate to the investigation that need to be elaborated upon here.  
The history of ambiguation, with respect to how innovation is understood 
in society, Education and the proprietary domain needs to be genealogically 
engaged. To do this, the rhetoric of the major global institutions including that of 
Education, business and Treasury policy-makers needs to be analysed to explain 
the manner in which the process of innovation, as a concept, has been 
theoretically abandoned. This analysis needs to be done alongside a genealogical 
study of the conditions under which the innovative actor became absented from 
how the innovation process is presently conceptualized (Fagerberg, Mowery & 
Nelson, 2005; Hanusch & Pyka, 2007a). While Becker (Becker et al., 2012) 
argues that human capital theory puts the individual at the centre of economic 
activity (economic activity clearly not doubling for an innovation process), it is 
argued in this investigation that, while all human activity is described as economic 
activity, the individual who is put at the center of economic activity cannot be 
thought of as a mere descendant of homo economicus. He or she needs to be 
thought of as an individual who engages with questions and problems that concern 
the whole of humanity and permits them to be innovative in a manner that will be 
arbitrated according values that are not uniquely commercial.1  
                                                 
1 The fear now might be that we have reached a stage where human disaster – for example, famine 
– can be completely ignored because it is not considered economically viable to save the lives of 
whole populations.  
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Another question concerns student participation in institutional processes 
of innovation. Once the development of human qualities is formally recognized as 
a consequence of student collaboration in the knowledge space, then research 
needs to be done on how student ideation might contribute to the transformation 
of educational institutions. If, as iterated earlier in this chapter, the student 
algorithmic understanding of opportunities is further advanced as a capacity than 
that of the rest of the population, then new types of relations need to be developed 
between students and teaching staff, administration and commercial management.  
This question is intimately connected to how student innovative learning 
processes contribute to how Education and pedagogy need to be understood in the 
future and in relation to the image that was earlier described, re the role of AI. 
Post-Cartesian study needs to be done into how functions of the commodity space 
and the knowledge space are delineated by student thinking. In the current 
neoliberal model, the public good produced in the knowledge space that 
ontologically cannot be measured in purely commercial terms is any appropriated 
as if it were a product of the commercial management of Education. If student 
fidelity to the curriculum collapsed on account of the new autonomy students have 
in the context of the collaborative networked relations, then this aforementioned 
delineation of spaces is probably most easily seen in the innovative learning 
environment. It is here that many teachers have become anxious upon discovering 
that their notion of the teacher’s role is no longer relevant to the learning 
processes taking place in these new spaces. 
Of these questions and problems, the most important one would seem 
concern the need to address the manner in which human capital theory is 
inhibiting endogenous growth in the development of student capacities. This is 
largely because endogenous growth has not yet been theorized in relation to 
student heuristic learning. It is assumed that the paying of fees and the need for a 
qualifications in themselves reflect that the student’s willingness to acknowledge 
the need to silently populate the production function of the educational institution. 
However, if this same student has learned to think for him or herself, then their 
thinking, by definition, must carry them beyond this role in improving the market 
status of the institution. The emergence of endogenous growth in students, of the 
capacity to think and do things for themselves and others, to act beyond the realm 
of mere work may now be associated with innovative learning environments. This 
214 
said this synergy of action and place is not made certain by the place itself or the 
pedagogies that they require. While, innovative learning environments presume a 
dramatic shift in the system of education and one that brings into question much 
of what contemporary Education means, there is also a need for transformation in 
the institution, for teachers, administrators and commercial managers such that 
they too become innovative subjects in the wider sense of how innovation is 
understood in this investigation. This development needs to be something that is 
horizontally and vertically networked, responsive the developments in “cognitive 
capitalism” (Peters & Bulut, 2011), open and social at the same time (not 
rhetorically open while closed in action), interdisciplinary and engaging in new 
disciplined forms of interaction. In effect, the task is to engage with what is 
required to free the knowledge space from the commodity space. The subject of 
innovation is a subject of the commodity space and without the possibility of 
being independent to be innovative in relation to the problems that are important 
to students, perhaps there will be no significant learning in these spaces. The 
already innovative subject is a subject of their own formation and the formation of 
their virtual and actual cohort, and one who knows how to differentiate the 
commercial interests from interests that require that they further develop their 
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Figure 1: Germany 1815 
 

















Figure 2: The French national railway system based on the Legrand Star or a 
centralized network  
 












Figure 3: Germany’s disconnected principalities and Prussia were connected by a 
national railway system that simulates the modern distributed network. 
 















Figure 4: (a) As in France’s centralized railway system, and (b) as in Germany’s 
distributed network of railways. 
 


































Table 1: Contrasting principles of closed and open innovation 
Closed innovation Principles Open innovation Principles 
The smart people in our field 
work for us. 
Not all the smart people work for us. We need 
to work with smart people inside and outside 
our company. 
To profit from research and 
development (R&D), we must 
discover it, develop it and ship it 
ourselves. 
External R&D can create significant value; 
internal R&D is needed to claim some portion 
of that value. 
If we discover it ourselves, we 
will get it to market first. 
We don’t have to originate the research to 
profit from it. 
The company that gets an 
innovation to market first will 
win. 
Building a better business model is better than 
getting to market first. 
If we create the most and the best 
ideas in the industry, we will win. 
If we make the best use of internal and 
external ideas, we will win. 
We should control our innovation 
process, so that our competitors 
don’t profit from our ideas. 
We should profit from others’ use of our 
innovation process, and we should buy others’ 
intellectual property (IP) whenever it advances 
our own business model. 
(Chesbrough, 2003, p. xxvi) 
 
 
